Public Law Question Pack - Questions
Public Law
1. A constitutional application is brought in the Ontario Superior Court by a public interest group alleging that a provincial law restricting online speech violates s. 2(b) of the Charter. The applicants seek only a declaration and no personal remedy. They plan to rely entirely on academic research and media commentary to support the impact of the law on marginalized groups. The province challenges standing, arguing that the applicants are not personally affected and have no admissible evidence showing a Charter breach.
How will the court evaluate the applicant’s standing to bring this Charter claim?
A) The court will deny standing unless the applicants demonstrate direct infringement of their own constitutional rights and produce sworn evidence of personal harm.
B) The applicants may be granted public interest standing if the claim raises a serious justiciable issue, they have a genuine interest, and the suit is a reasonable means to bring the issue before the court.
C) The court will dismiss the application for lack of standing unless the applicants present firsthand evidence from directly affected individuals proving a prima facie Charter violation.
D) Standing will be declined because media articles and academic research are inadmissible as evidence at the preliminary standing stage.
2. Tamara is a community advocate employed by a student legal clinic that assists post-secondary students facing human rights issues. Under supervision from a licensed lawyer, she regularly appears before the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) representing students in discrimination and accommodation cases. During a hearing involving a student with a disability, opposing counsel objects to Tamara’s representation, asserting that she is “not legally qualified” and is practicing law without a license. The presiding adjudicator pauses the hearing and requests submissions on the matter.
How should the tribunal evaluate Tamara’s right to act as a representative in the hearing?
A) She must be excluded from the proceeding because she is neither a licensed lawyer nor a licensed paralegal under the Law Society Act.
B) She may continue because she is exempt under the Law Society Act and authorized under s. 10 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act (SPPA).
C) She must file an application to be approved as an advocate by the tribunal.
D) The hearing must be adjourned until a superior court determines whether her representation constitutes unauthorized practice.
3. Elias, a member of a Métis community in Saskatchewan, is charged under provincial hunting regulations for possessing a harvested deer during a closed season. He asserts an Aboriginal right to hunt under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The Crown agrees he is Métis but argues that the right does not apply because the hunt occurred in 2023, and his community was not established until after 1900. Elias relies on community records showing that the Métis exercised organized, traditional harvesting practices prior to the province’s entry into Confederation.
What legal framework governs the assessment of Elias’s claim to an Aboriginal right?
A) The Powley test applies, requiring proof that the community existed as a distinct Métis society and that the practice was integral at the time of effective European control.
B) The Sparrow framework applies to all Aboriginal rights claims, including Métis rights, and focuses primarily on conservation justifications.
C) Elias must possess Indian status under the Indian Act to assert a constitutionally protected right to harvest wildlife under s. 35.
D) Because no historical treaty covers the area or activity in question, Elias cannot raise a valid constitutional defence to the regulatory offence.
4. A federal tribunal issues a decision applying a newly adopted internal interpretation policy. The applicant was not informed that the policy existed prior to the hearing. The tribunal uses the policy to reject the applicant’s submissions but offers no explanation for adopting the new interpretation or how it fits within the legislative scheme. The applicant files for judicial review.
Which aspect of the tribunal’s reasoning is most likely to render the decision unreasonable?
A) The policy had not been reviewed by Parliament.
B) The tribunal failed to provide transparent, intelligible reasons for relying on the new internal policy.
C) The internal policy was not formally published on the tribunal’s website and was unavailable to self-represented litigants during the hearing.
D) The applicant failed to raise procedural fairness concerns at the hearing and is therefore precluded from challenging the policy on judicial review.
5. The Treaty 9 First Nations initiate proceedings seeking a declaration that certain Crown actions breached oral promises made during treaty negotiations. The Crown relies on the written text, which is silent on the alleged promise. The First Nations introduce historical and oral evidence suggesting that federal officials made representations at the time of signing that were never included in the final document.
How will the court assess the scope and meaning of the treaty rights claimed?
A) The written terms of the treaty are conclusive and binding, and extrinsic evidence cannot alter or expand their plain meaning.
B) Courts will consider oral promises and historical context, and ambiguities are resolved in favour of Indigenous signatories.
C) Verbal promises made during negotiations are unenforceable unless incorporated into legislation or ratified through a formal amendment process.
D) Under the parol evidence rule, courts are precluded from considering extrinsic evidence to supplement or contradict the written text of solemn agreements such as treaties.
6. A tribunal member participates in a case involving a development dispute. It is later discovered that the same member had previously made public comments supporting the developer’s earlier project. The opposing party alleges a reasonable apprehension of bias and seeks to have the decision set aside.
What is the proper legal test to assess whether bias exists?
A) Whether the adjudicator disclosed any prior involvement or personal interest at the outset of the hearing and recused themselves if requested.
B) Whether a reasonable, informed person would believe the adjudicator might not decide the matter fairly.
C) Whether the final outcome appears justifiable and factually grounded, such that the adjudicator’s prior conduct is irrelevant.
D) Whether procedural fairness was respected through the hearing process, including equal opportunity for both parties to present their cases.
7. Daniella is preparing a direct Charter challenge in the Federal Court to the constitutionality of the Employment Insurance Act, arguing that certain provisions violate s. 15 of the Charter. After filing the claim, the Attorney General of Canada files a motion to strike, arguing the Federal Court has no jurisdiction to issue general declarations of constitutional invalidity under the Charter. Daniella insists that all federal laws should be challengeable in the court created by Parliament.
How will the court likely resolve this jurisdictional issue?
A) The Federal Court must refer all constitutional questions to the Supreme Court.
B) Federal jurisdiction is presumed for all matters involving federal laws.
C) Only the Federal Court of Appeal can hear Charter challenges.
D) The Federal Court lacks jurisdiction to hear direct constitutional challenges unless grounded in a statutory cause of action.
8. Leo is a U.S. citizen and member of an Indigenous group whose traditional territory crosses the Canada–U.S. border. He is arrested for fishing in Canadian waters and asserts a s. 35 right to do so based on his community’s historic practice. The Crown argues that s. 35 only applies to Canadian citizens and that Leo has no standing. Leo responds that his group occupied the land long before the border existed and that Canadian laws must respect that history.
How will the court determine whether Leo is entitled to s. 35 protection?
A) Section 35 only applies to Indigenous people who are residents of Canada.
B) Section 35 protects only those rights that are grounded in a treaty signed by Canada and ratified under federal legislation.
C) Aboriginal rights under s. 35 are contingent on ongoing residence within Canada by both the claimant and the modern rights-bearing community.
D) A non-citizen may assert a s. 35 right if they belong to a modern Indigenous community that descends from one present in Canada at the time of contact.
9. Isabelle is an unpaid support worker who has helped three different neighbours represent themselves before the Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) over the past year. At a recent hearing, opposing counsel objects to Isabelle’s participation, stating that she is now in breach of the Law Society Act's restrictions on non-licensees. The adjudicator pauses the hearing and asks Isabelle to justify why she should be permitted to continue acting as a representative in this fourth matter. Isabelle argues that she is just “helping people in her community” and didn’t know there was a limit.
What framework governs Isabelle’s ability to represent parties before Ontario tribunals, and what should the adjudicator consider?
A) The Law Society Act limits non-licensees to three tribunal appearances annually unless otherwise authorized, and the tribunal may exclude her under the SPPA.
B) Tribunal adjudicators cannot restrict participation unless the hearing is criminal in nature.
C) Because Isabelle is unpaid and provides assistance as a community volunteer, she may represent any number of individuals under the “good Samaritan” exception to the Law Society Act.
D) The SPPA guarantees the absolute right of parties to be represented by anyone they wish, subject only to consent from the opposing party.
10. Jacques, a public school teacher, discovers that an anonymous parent filed a complaint about him under the school board’s safe schools policy. He requests access to the complaint and any correspondence referring to him under MFIPPA. The board refuses to disclose the name of the complainant, citing personal privacy protections under s. 14(1). Jacques argues that he has a right to know who accused him of misconduct and to receive a copy of all documents that contain his name.
Which of the following best reflects the IPC’s likely approach to Jacques’s request?
A) Jacques is barred from receiving any information if the complainant has requested confidentiality, regardless of whether the complaint involves Jacques’s conduct.
B) The school board must disclose the full complaint, including the complainant’s identity, if Jacques is the subject of the records and the complaint triggered a formal investigation.
C) Jacques is entitled to access records containing his personal information, but the board may redact information that would identify the complainant if disclosure would be an unjustified invasion of their privacy.
D) The Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) is required to initiate a judicial review in Divisional Court before ruling on records that involve competing privacy claims.
11. The Mi’kmaq Nation in Nova Scotia brings a challenge to a Crown forestry license issued to a private corporation. The Nation alleges that the land in question is subject to an unresolved land claim and that the license was issued without any consultation. The Crown argues that consultation is not required because the Nation has not proven its title in court and the development will generate important public revenues. The Nation argues that the Crown’s duty was triggered by its own constructive knowledge of a credible claim.
Which test governs whether the Crown’s duty to consult was triggered in this context?
A) The duty to consult arises only after Aboriginal title has been judicially recognized or formally negotiated and ratified by both levels of government.
B) The Carrier Sekani test applies: the Crown has a duty to consult where (1) it has knowledge of a credible claim, (2) it contemplates conduct, and (3) that conduct may adversely affect the claimed right.
C) The Sparrow infringement test applies, and consultation is only triggered once the government intends to justify a proven infringement of a recognized Aboriginal right.
D) Since the land claim is unresolved and not federally adjudicated, only the Government of Canada can trigger consultation obligations under s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867.
12. Natasha files a judicial review application challenging a tribunal decision that upheld a discrimination complaint against her. The tribunal found that Natasha’s conduct during a rental application process was discriminatory, citing her email communications. Natasha argues that her emails were misunderstood and that the tribunal failed to consider relevant context. In its reasons, the tribunal acknowledged her explanations but found them unpersuasive. Natasha now seeks judicial review on the basis that the decision was unfair and reached the wrong conclusion.
How will the reviewing court most likely evaluate her application?
A) By re-evaluating the factual matrix to determine whether the tribunal correctly concluded that discrimination occurred, and substituting its own assessment of the evidence.
B) By dismissing the application outright, as judicial review is unavailable unless the enabling statute provides an express appeal mechanism.
C) By applying the reasonableness standard to determine whether the decision was within a range of acceptable outcomes, based on the evidence and reasons.
D) By setting aside the decision for failing to explicitly reference Charter values, regardless of the tribunal’s statutory mandate or factual findings.
13. An Ontario applicant brings a Charter challenge in the Divisional Court during a judicial review of a tribunal decision, arguing that the tribunal’s enabling legislation unjustifiably infringes s. 7 rights. The court is satisfied that the issue is properly raised and supported by the record. However, the applicant did not serve a new notice of constitutional question, having already served one during the original tribunal proceeding. The Attorney General of Ontario seeks to have the Charter issue struck for procedural non-compliance.
What is the correct procedural requirement in this situation?
A) A new notice of constitutional question must be served any time a court hears a constitutional issue.
B) The original notice served at the tribunal level is sufficient.
C) In Divisional Court judicial reviews, a new notice must be served even if the constitutional question was already raised below.
D) In Divisional Court appeals or reviews, only the notice of appeal must be served if the constitutional question was already raised below.
14. A school board issues a decision to expel a student permanently without offering written reasons. The student’s guardian files for judicial review, arguing that the absence of reasons made it impossible to know the board’s rationale. The board responds that its conclusion was obvious from the context of the incident and that a formal explanation was unnecessary.
What is the most likely legal outcome?
A) The court will find that the board breached procedural fairness by failing to provide reasons, especially given the significance of the decision.
B) The expulsion decision will be upheld, as tribunals and decision-makers are presumed to act reasonably and courts may infer reasons from the record if the rationale is apparent.
C) The application will be dismissed on the basis that educational disciplinary decisions fall within the discretionary purview of school boards and are not subject to judicial oversight.
D) Because the board has statutory authority to expel students, its failure to provide reasons is treated as a curable defect that does not invalidate the decision.
15. The federal government enacts the National Food Labelling Act, which mandates uniform packaging and nutritional warnings for all processed food products sold in Canada. Quebec, which has its own food labelling law with different requirements, objects and challenges the federal statute. It claims that food labelling is an intraprovincial matter under property and civil rights. The federal government defends the law under its criminal law power.
What approach will the court most likely take?
A) Invalidate the federal statute on the basis that it intrudes into exclusive provincial jurisdiction over commerce within the province and property and civil rights under s. 92(13).
B) Uphold the law if it serves a valid criminal purpose and includes a prohibition and penalty, even if it affects civil rights.
C) Find that neither government has jurisdiction.
D) Require joint administration between provincial and federal inspectors
16. During a discipline hearing before the College of Physiotherapists, Marcus is accused of professional misconduct arising from patient complaints. The college calls a key witness—a former patient who provides testimony alleging boundary violations. Marcus attempts to cross-examine the witness on prior inconsistent statements made to the investigator. The adjudicator interrupts, stating that Marcus’s questioning is too aggressive and curtails the cross-examination after just two questions. The witness leaves, and the tribunal proceeds to render its decision, heavily relying on the unchallenged testimony.
What aspect of Marcus’s procedural rights was compromised?
A) The tribunal’s evidence rules were not followed.
B) The adjudicator should have cautioned the witness before allowing testimony.
C) The college failed to properly notify Marcus of the allegation.
D) The right to cross-examine is a component of procedural fairness.
17. Sophie, a Canadian citizen of Inuit heritage, is charged under the Migratory Birds Convention Act for hunting outside a designated season. She argues that her right to harvest birds is constitutionally protected under s. 35. The Crown acknowledges her Indigenous identity but maintains that the hunting restriction is needed for conservation purposes. Sophie provides evidence that her community has harvested the species in question for generations and that no science supports the specific closure period.
What legal test will the court apply to determine whether Sophie’s rights were unjustifiably infringed?
A) The Sparrow test will be used, requiring the Crown to first demonstrate a prima facie infringement, followed by a justification analysis focusing on conservation and fiduciary duties.
B) The Oakes test applies to all constitutional rights.
C) Any charge affecting Indigenous subsistence rights must be dismissed automatically under the honour of the Crown unless supported by explicit consent from the Indigenous community.
D) Aboriginal harvesting rights are extinguished by statute when a valid regulatory purpose like conservation is invoked in the preamble or regulatory text.
18. Clara, a freelance journalist, submits a written request to a provincial ministry under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA) seeking internal briefing notes prepared for the Deputy Minister regarding long-term care policies during the pandemic. The ministry responds 38 days later, stating that the records are exempt under Cabinet records provisions and will not be disclosed. Clara notes that no extension notice was ever issued and that the response appears late. She files a complaint with the Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC), asserting that the delay violated the Act and that the exemption claim is overly broad.
Which of the following best describes the legal framework that applies to the ministry’s response timeline and its claim of exemption?
A) The ministry breached FIPPA by failing to respond within the 30-day timeline and by not issuing a valid time extension.
B) The Cabinet exemption automatically applies, and no response timeline exists for such records.
C) The IPC cannot investigate delay-based complaints without a court order.
D) All records prepared for senior decision-makers in the executive branch are excluded from FIPPA under s. 65(6), regardless of content or timing.
19. Andre, a non-citizen refugee claimant, argues that his exclusion from voting in municipal elections violates his equality rights under s. 15 of the Charter. He notes that he pays taxes and resides permanently in Canada. The province argues that voting is a democratic right reserved for citizens under s. 3 and that differential treatment based on citizenship is not discriminatory.
How will the court analyze this equality claim?
A) The court will find that s. 15 does not guarantee access to rights that are explicitly reserved for citizens, such as s. 3 voting rights.
B) The court will recognize that residence and taxation without representation are sufficient grounds to extend voting rights under s. 15, overriding the s. 3 limitation.
C) The court will hold that denying voting rights to non-citizens constitutes a violation of human dignity and must be struck down unless justified under s. 1.
D) The court will decline to hear the case, finding that electoral eligibility is a political matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament or the provincial legislature.
20. Jasmine is a paralegal who files an application for judicial review on behalf of a client after a tribunal denied their request for accommodation during a licensing examination. The tribunal dismissed the accommodation request with only a brief explanation, and Jasmine believes the panel failed to consider the medical evidence provided. She is told by the registrar’s office that judicial review is not available until the tribunal’s internal reconsideration process is used. Jasmine’s client is concerned that using that process will cause delay and prefers to go straight to court.
Which statement regarding the judicial review application in this context is correct?
A) The court has discretion to decline judicial review if the applicant fails to exhaust available remedies, but may still hear the case in exceptional circumstances.
B) The tribunal’s refusal creates a bar to all forms of review until the Attorney General consents.
C) Judicial review applications involving administrative accommodation denials must be deferred until all internal reconsideration procedures have been attempted and rejected twice under the tribunal’s procedural code.
D) Internal tribunal processes always supersede the right to seek judicial review.
21. A member of the Haida Nation files for judicial review, alleging that the provincial government failed to consult before approving a mining project near a sacred site. The Crown argues that the decision was made by an independent tribunal and that it is not personally responsible for consultation. The applicant argues that the Crown cannot delegate its constitutional duties and that the tribunal process failed to meet minimum standards of meaningful engagement.
How will the court assess whether the duty to consult was properly discharged?
A) If the decision was issued by an independent tribunal, the Crown has no further obligation to consult, even if the tribunal’s process lacked Indigenous participation or cultural sensitivity.
B) Only direct negotiations between the Crown and the Indigenous group can satisfy the duty to consult; third-party processes or delegated approvals are constitutionally insufficient.
C) The Crown may rely on tribunal processes to fulfill its duty, but if the process fails to achieve meaningful consultation, the Crown remains responsible to remedy the deficiency.
D) The Crown’s duty to consult arises only when an Indigenous party seeks injunctive relief and is otherwise discretionary depending on the resource sector involved.
22. Yasmin is a lawyer representing a journalist who has filed multiple FOI requests with various provincial ministries. One ministry responds by declaring Yasmin’s client to be a vexatious requester under s. 10(1)(b) of FIPPA and refuses to process further requests unless she seeks leave. The ministry argues the requests are repetitive and burdensome. Yasmin appeals to the IPC, arguing that the designation was made without procedural fairness.
What standard will the IPC apply in evaluating whether the vexatious designation was justified?
A) Whether the requester has a documented history of disciplinary or legal infractions that justifies heightened scrutiny under provincial access legislation.
B) Whether the requests submitted by the journalist were thematically similar or repeated in nature, regardless of intent or volume.
C) Whether the ministry consulted with the Auditor General.
D) Whether the institution has demonstrated that the requester’s pattern of access requests is an abuse of process under s. 10(1)(b), supported by evidence and a fair process.
23. A federal regulation requires all driver’s licence applicants to submit a digital photograph, including individuals with religious objections. Members of a small religious sect file a constitutional challenge under s. 2(a) of the Charter, arguing that the requirement violates their freedom of religion. The government defends the rule as necessary to prevent fraud and protect the integrity of the licensing system. The claimants propose an alternative: a non-photo ID card for members of faith-based groups.
How will the court assess the claim under the Charter?
A) The court will find a limit on s. 2(a), but uphold the regulation under s. 1.
B) The court will declare the regulation invalid because religious beliefs are absolute.
C) The regulation must be rewritten to accommodate all faiths.
D) The Charter does not apply to transportation laws.
24. Ravi, a municipal councillor, receives a constituent complaint alleging that a city staff member accessed their personal tax information without cause. Ravi contacts the city clerk and asks for the staff member’s access logs under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (MFIPPA). The city clerk refuses to release the logs, stating they contain “employment-related information” about the staff member and are exempt under labour relations provisions. Ravi argues that the logs are administrative records and do not disclose personal details about job performance or discipline.
Which legal rule determines whether the access logs can be disclosed?
A) Municipal councillors have automatic access to internal records when acting in an oversight role.
B) The logs are automatically excluded from MFIPPA if they involve employees.
C) Councillors must apply through the Auditor General to review employee conduct records.
D) Logs that document administrative access to personal information may be subject to disclosure unless they qualify as personal employment records.
25. The City of Toronto enacts a bylaw restricting the display of tobacco advertisements on city-owned property, including bus shelters and sports arenas. A national tobacco company challenges the bylaw, claiming it infringes federal jurisdiction over advertising standards and product labelling. The company points to the Tobacco and Vaping Products Act, a federal law that governs tobacco promotion nationally.
How will the court likely assess the constitutional validity of the bylaw?
A) The court will likely find that both laws can coexist and uphold the bylaw under the double aspect doctrine, provided there is no operational conflict.
B) The bylaw is constitutionally invalid under the doctrine of federal paramountcy, as the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over advertising and promotional standards for controlled substances like tobacco.
C) Advertising, marketing, and consumer information are exclusively matters of federal jurisdiction under s. 91(2), and municipal restrictions on expression are ultra vires even if authorized by provincial law.
D) The bylaw must be struck down because it places undue constraints on interprovincial commercial activity, thereby infringing the freedom of trade guaranteed under s. 121 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
26. British Columbia enacts the “Data Privacy and Retention Act,” which prohibits all entities operating in the province from storing personal data outside Canada. A telecommunications company operating under federal authority challenges the law, claiming that its cloud storage systems are integrated across North America and cannot be segmented by province. The province argues that the law is a valid exercise of its power over property and civil rights and seeks to protect the personal privacy of residents.
What constitutional doctrine is most likely engaged, and how would the court approach the challenge?
A) The doctrine of extraterritoriality will invalidate the provincial law.
B) The doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity may render the provincial law inapplicable to federally regulated telecoms if it impairs a core federal power.
C) The law is invalid because federal trade and commerce powers override all provincial rules.
D) The double aspect doctrine requires the court to uphold both the federal Telecommunications Act and the provincial data statute as long as they pursue distinct objectives, regardless of operational overlap.
27. A provincial government passes a law denying publicly funded fertility treatment to women over the age of 45. Martha, aged 46, challenges the law under s. 15(1), claiming that it discriminates on the basis of age and sex. The government argues that the law is based on medical evidence about declining fertility and the cost-effectiveness of treatment. Martha argues that the law imposes disadvantage based on gendered assumptions and perpetuates stereotypes about age and motherhood.
What analytical framework will the court apply?
A) A proportionality analysis under s. 1 of the Charter to determine whether the age restriction minimally impairs individual autonomy while achieving cost-containment objectives.
B) A policy deferential review grounded in medical necessity and resource allocation, assessing whether the exclusion is justifiable in the context of public health planning.
C) The Kapp two-part test: (1) distinction based on an enumerated or analogous ground; (2) whether it creates disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice or stereotypes.
D) A contextual balancing of legislative intent and subjective belief, assessing whether the claimant’s personal view of disadvantage outweighs the societal goal of efficient healthcare.
28. Luca is attending a tribunal hearing as a support person for his spouse, who is the applicant in a housing discrimination case. During the cross-examination of a key government witness, the adjudicator abruptly ends the questioning after only two minutes, stating that “we’ve heard enough.” The evidence in question goes to the heart of the allegation, involving the landlord’s past statements and conduct. Luca’s spouse objects, but the adjudicator insists that cross-examination is a privilege, not a right, and that time constraints require a streamlined process.
Which statement is most accurate in the context?
A) Cross-examination is optional at tribunals, so no breach occurred.
B) The adjudicator violated the applicant’s right to a fair hearing by unreasonably curtailing cross-examination on key evidence.
C) Time limits imposed by tribunals override the duty of fairness.
D) The objection was invalid because the support person cannot speak on the applicant’s behalf.
29. Daniel is a criminal defence lawyer bringing a Charter challenge to a mandatory minimum sentence under s. 12. To support the claim, he introduces statistical reports and academic articles showing that the law disproportionately affects Indigenous offenders. The Crown objects to the admissibility of some of the materials, noting that they were prepared by third parties and have not been tested through traditional rules of evidence. Daniel responds that the data helps establish the discriminatory effect of the law and its broader social context.
What is the most accurate statement about the admissibility of this kind of evidence?
A) Only sworn affidavits from government experts are admissible in Charter cases.
B) Legislative facts must be formally proved through viva voce testimony.
C) Social science evidence, including statistical reports and studies, is admissible to prove legislative facts, even if not tested through cross-examination.
D) Academic articles are not admissible unless previously recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada as authoritative in interpreting constitutional rights or sentencing norms.
30. Amal is a foreign-trained medical professional who applies for permanent residency under an economic stream aimed at skilled workers. She submits extensive documentation, including verified academic credentials, job offers from Ontario hospitals, and bank records demonstrating financial self-sufficiency. Despite this, her application is denied in a brief letter that simply states she “has not demonstrated an ability to successfully establish in Canada.” No reasons are provided, nor is there any indication that the evidence was meaningfully considered. Amal seeks judicial review of the decision, arguing that the outcome was arbitrary and failed to engage with the content of her application.
Which standard of review should the court apply in assessing the immigration officer’s decision?
A) The decision should be reviewed for correctness, as it involved a question of law.
B) The court should apply the Doré framework to balance discretion with Charter values.
C) The court should apply the reasonableness standard under Vavilov, requiring the decision to be justified, transparent, and intelligible.
D) The decision is not reviewable due to statutory discretion.
31. Julien is preparing closing submissions in a successful Charter challenge to a provincial statute. The court has found that the law violates s. 7 and is not saved by s. 1. Julien now seeks a remedy under s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, requesting that the offending provision be severed and read down to preserve its valid aspects. The province argues that the entire provision must be struck down and that severance would distort legislative intent.
How will the court evaluate Julien’s remedial request?
A) The court will assess whether severance or reading down would be consistent with the legislature’s objectives and preserve the statute’s functionality.
B) The court must strike down the entire provision in all cases where a constitutional violation is found, regardless of whether part of the law remains independently functional.
C) Severance and reading down are unavailable under s. 52(1), which requires complete nullification of any unconstitutional statutory text.
D) Reading down or partial invalidation may only proceed where the executive branch, through cabinet direction, confirms that the statutory amendment is consistent with political intent.
32. Vincent is representing himself in a licensing dispute before a regulatory tribunal. He raises multiple procedural objections throughout the hearing, including concerns about late disclosure by the regulator and bias from one of the panel members. The adjudicator acknowledges these concerns on the record but declines to deal with them during the hearing. In the final written decision, the tribunal finds against Vincent without addressing any of the objections he raised. Vincent believes the decision was pre-determined and that he was never given a genuine opportunity to respond to the regulator’s allegations.
What legal rule governs the adjudicator’s responsibility to address Vincent’s procedural objections?
A) Procedural objections, once raised orally on the record, are automatically preserved for appellate review and need not be addressed in the tribunal’s written reasons.
B) Procedural objections that go unaddressed may undermine the fairness and validity of the hearing under administrative law.
C) The tribunal may ignore objections unless they are filed in writing with the Divisional Court.
D) The adjudicator’s discretion on procedural matters is absolute and cannot be questioned.
33. Samuel brings a claim for damages in the Ontario Superior Court alleging that his rights under s. 2(b) were violated by a municipal bylaw enforced by a Crown agency. He seeks a Charter remedy under s. 24(1) and damages for misfeasance in public office. The Crown brings a motion under s. 17 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019 (CLPA, 2019), arguing that Samuel failed to obtain leave of the court before claiming misfeasance. Samuel maintains that his claim is primarily a Charter claim and that no leave is required.
How will the court address the procedural interplay between s. 24 and the CLPA, 2019?
A) All claims for damages against public authorities, including those grounded in Charter violations, must receive prior judicial screening under s. 17 of the CLPA, 2019 to proceed.
B) Where a claim combines Charter relief with a tort alleging public office misconduct, the court must require the plaintiff to elect between constitutional and common law remedies at the outset of litigation.
C) The failure to obtain leave for the misfeasance claim mandates that the entire proceeding be struck, as the CLPA, 2019 bars bifurcated claims involving allegations of bad faith or abuse of power.
D) The Charter claim under s. 24(1) may proceed without leave, but the misfeasance claim will be stayed unless leave is obtained.
34. The federal government enacts the Environmental Protection of Major Waterways Act, which prohibits the discharge of pollutants into any navigable water body in Canada. The Act applies to all industrial facilities within 500 metres of a navigable waterway, including those subject to provincial environmental permits. The Quebec government challenges the legislation, claiming it intrudes into provincial jurisdiction over natural resources and property. The federal government argues that the law is valid under its trade and commerce power and its jurisdiction over navigation and shipping.
What constitutional test will the court apply to determine the law’s validity, and what outcome is most likely?
A) The court will apply the pith and substance doctrine and likely uphold the law as falling within federal jurisdiction over navigation and shipping under s. 91(10).
B) The court will apply the double aspect doctrine and strike the law on the basis that environmental protection has already been legislated by the province and cannot be subject to concurrent federal oversight.
C) The court will invalidate the federal law on the grounds that provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights under ss. 92(13) and (16) takes precedence in regulating land use and industrial emissions near waterways.
D) The court will refer the matter to the Council of the Federation for intergovernmental environmental harmonization, as constitutional disputes involving natural resources must be resolved through cooperative federalism.
35. Marcus applies to a municipal development board for permission to renovate a heritage building into a commercial event space. His application includes architectural plans, traffic studies, and support letters from neighbouring businesses. The board, in a one-page response, denies the permit on the grounds that the proposed renovations “lack harmony with the existing aesthetic of the district.” No hearing is held, and no appeal is available under the relevant municipal bylaw. Marcus believes the board acted arbitrarily and failed to follow a fair process. He seeks legal advice on how to proceed.
What public law remedy should Marcus pursue to challenge the board’s decision?
A) Initiate an application for mandamus to compel the development board to approve the permit on the basis that the statutory criteria were satisfied and the refusal was unreasonable.
B) Seek certiorari to quash the decision for failing to meet procedural fairness or jurisdictional standards.
C) Commence an application for certiorari to quash the decision on grounds that the board failed to adhere to principles of procedural fairness and issued a decision lacking justification, transparency, or intelligibility.
D) Petition the municipal council to overturn the decision.
36. Luca, a journalist, is denied access to government documents that contain information about police misconduct. The agency claims the records are exempt under privacy legislation. Luca argues that freedom of expression includes access to information, especially where it serves public interest and democratic accountability. He files a Charter claim under s. 2(b), asserting that the denial violates his freedom of the press.
What approach will the court likely take?
A) Reject the claim outright, holding that freedom of expression under s. 2(b) does not extend to obtaining state-held information, even where the public interest is engaged.
B) Require the government to disclose the requested documents in full, as any limitation on press access to public records presumptively violates the Charter.
C) Recognize that while s. 2(b) does not guarantee access to all information, it may protect access where it is essential to meaningful expression on matters of public interest.
D) Decline to hear the claim on the basis that disputes over freedom of information access are governed exclusively by statutory frameworks and fall outside the scope of constitutional adjudication.
37. Parliament enacts the National Climate Accountability Act, which imposes carbon emission caps on all industries, including provincial utilities. Alberta files a reference to its Court of Appeal, claiming the law infringes on provincial jurisdiction over natural resources and energy production. The federal government defends the law under the national concern branch of POGG, citing Canada’s international obligations.
How will the court likely analyze the constitutional validity of the federal statute?
A) The law will be declared ultra vires because jurisdiction over energy development and natural resources is constitutionally entrenched under s. 92A and falls exclusively within provincial legislative competence.
B) The statute will be upheld under the criminal law power if the court finds that the law contains a prohibition, penalty, and a valid criminal purpose, such as protecting public health or the environment.
C) It may be upheld under POGG if carbon emissions are found to be a matter of national concern with indivisible scope.
D) The law will only be constitutionally valid if it receives formal legislative assent or ratification by a majority of provinces under the principle of cooperative federalism.
38. Elena is the Executive Director of a non-profit that monitors public sector transparency. She submits an FOI request to the Ontario Energy Board seeking copies of audit reports from regulated utility companies. The OEB responds that the reports contain confidential financial data and are exempt under s. 17. Elena points out that some of the reports are already publicly posted on the utilities’ websites and argues the exemption is being misapplied.
What legal issue must the IPC resolve in reviewing this dispute?
A) Whether the Energy Board complied with its internal guidelines in assessing the reasonableness of the disclosure request and balancing competing public interest considerations.
B) Whether the information at issue truly meets the s. 17(1) exemption criteria, including whether it was supplied in confidence and whether disclosure would cause harm.
C) Whether the regulated utilities provided post-disclosure consent for the release of redacted versions of the documents pursuant to their contractual obligations with the OEB.
D) Whether the OEB erred in applying the personal privacy exemption under s. 21(1) to records that primarily involve institutional and commercial actors.
39. Carla is counsel for a non-profit organization challenging recent amendments to a provincial benefits statute that disqualifies individuals with multiple properties from receiving emergency housing subsidies. Her client, a 63-year-old with a 5% interest in a family cottage she cannot access or sell, was denied benefits. Carla alleges that the rule violates s. 7 and s. 15 of the Charter. The province points to a prior appellate decision that upheld similar rules. Carla argues that the decision should not bind the current proceeding because new social science evidence shows the rule has disproportionate effects on women and older adults. The case proceeds to a full trial.
How will the court evaluate the relevance of precedent in this context?
A) Courts are strictly bound by prior appellate decisions in Charter matters unless overruled by the Supreme Court of Canada, regardless of factual developments or changes in evidentiary context.
B) The court may depart from prior Charter rulings if there is a new legal issue or a significant change in evidence or circumstances.
C) Binding precedent applies only in criminal Charter litigation; in civil or benefits-related claims, trial courts retain full discretion to interpret constitutional rights independently.
D) The presence of social science evidence triggers an automatic s. 1 exemption.
40. Sophie is convicted of an offence under a law that mandates a minimum fine of $50,000. She earns less than $15,000 per year and cannot afford to pay. She challenges the fine under s. 12 of the Charter, claiming it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The government argues that mandatory fines ensure consistency and deterrence, regardless of personal income. Sophie argues that the fine will bankrupt her and destroy her ability to live independently.
How will the court assess the challenge?
A) The court will uphold the fine and order that it be paid in instalments over time, as financial hardship does not engage constitutional scrutiny under s. 12.
B) The court will assess whether the punishment is grossly disproportionate to the offence, and if so, find a breach of s. 12.
C) The court will invalidate the entire statute under s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, regardless of whether the fine could be constitutionally applied in other cases.
D) Monetary penalties do not attract Charter protection under s. 12 unless imprisonment is involved, as fines are not considered forms of punishment for the purposes of cruel and unusual treatment.
41. Jennifer is a lawyer representing a client whose application for a professional licence has been denied by a regulatory body. The denial was based on a discretionary power granted to the Registrar to refuse licences if issuing one would “not be in the public interest.” The enabling statute does not outline specific criteria or procedural requirements before such a decision is made. Jennifer intends to challenge the decision but is unsure where to begin.
What is the correct first step in assessing whether the regulatory body acted lawfully?
A) File a formal complaint with the provincial ombudsman alleging abuse of discretion and failure to provide procedural safeguards prior to the licence denial.
B) Submit a direct request for clarification from the Registrar, as oral or written reasons must be provided in all cases where statutory discretion is exercised.
C) Analyze the source of the delegated power, including who holds it, what is delegated, and how the power is to be exercised.
D) Initiate a judicial review application in Federal Court seeking immediate intervention on the grounds of unreasonableness and procedural unfairness.
42. Ahmed is representing a test litigant challenging the constitutionality of a provincial regulation that limits housing subsidies to individuals under 65. Shortly after filing the claim, the test litigant becomes eligible for the subsidy due to a recent policy amendment, rendering the original basis of the claim irrelevant. The province moves to have the case dismissed as moot. Ahmed opposes the motion, arguing the issue is of continuing public interest and will likely evade review due to its temporary nature.
What legal framework governs the court’s ability to hear the case despite mootness?
A) The court cannot hear moot cases under any circumstances.
B) The Borowski test allows courts to hear moot cases if there is still an adversarial context and it is in the interests of justice to do so.
C) The Charter requires courts to consider all rights-based challenges regardless of mootness.
D) A claim is not moot if filed before a policy change.
43. Dion, a university researcher, submits a FOI request under FIPPA to a provincial ministry for anonymized datasets on youth justice programs. The ministry refuses to disclose the records, claiming they fall within the exemption for “advice to government” under s. 13. Dion appeals, arguing that the records contain statistical data and program outputs, not recommendations or policy options. The IPC agrees to review the ministry’s decision.
What is the correct approach to assessing whether these records are exempt?
A) The IPC must determine whether the records contain actual advice or recommendations, not merely background information or factual summaries.
B) All records used in internal government decision-making are automatically exempt under s. 13.
C) Statistical records are excluded from FIPPA’s scope under s. 65.
D) Advice to government includes all internal communication between staff and ministers.
44. Miriam is representing a Charter claimant in a collateral proceeding before a regulatory tribunal. The tribunal has jurisdiction over statutory interpretation but its enabling statute is silent on constitutional issues. Miriam argues that the tribunal should consider her client’s s. 2(b) claim and grant relief under s. 24(1) of the Charter. The tribunal chair expresses doubt about having such authority and asks for submissions.
How should Miriam frame her constitutional argument on jurisdiction?
A) Tribunals can only consider Charter issues when expressly authorized by their enabling statute.
B) Only superior courts may apply s. 24(1) of the Charter.
C) If a tribunal has authority to decide questions of law, it is presumed to have jurisdiction to apply the Charter, including under s. 24(1).
D) Tribunals cannot hear constitutional arguments unless the Attorney General intervenes.
45. Naomi is a self-represented party at a hearing before the Social Benefits Tribunal. The hearing is being conducted virtually via videoconference, and Naomi experiences consistent technical issues, including audio dropouts and screen freezing. Despite informing the tribunal at the outset of the hearing, the adjudicator insists that the matter must proceed due to scheduling constraints. During witness testimony, Naomi is disconnected for several minutes and misses key evidence presented by the opposing party. She raises her concerns again but is told that the panel cannot delay the proceeding. At the conclusion of the hearing, Naomi is told that a decision will be issued within 30 days. Three weeks later, she receives a denial of benefits that relies heavily on the testimony she missed.
What statement regarding procedural concerns in the context is most accurate?
A) The tribunal breached its digital operations protocol by failing to ensure equal bandwidth distribution for self-represented participants, which requires reporting to its oversight committee.
B) Once a hearing commences, tribunals are under no legal obligation to accommodate connectivity concerns unless a party demonstrates gross incompetence or bad faith by the opposing side.
C) Naomi was denied the right to meaningful participation in her hearing, breaching procedural fairness under the SPPA.
D) Virtual hearings do not require the same procedural protections as in-person hearings.
46. A federal law imposes a uniform minimum wage across all federally regulated workplaces, including banks, airlines, and telecommunications companies. Nova Scotia enacts its own higher minimum wage for all workplaces in the province, including federal undertakings. A telecommunications company headquartered in Halifax is unsure which standard applies.
How will this jurisdictional overlap be resolved?
A) The provincial wage rate will govern by default, as minimum employment standards are subject to the double aspect doctrine and apply uniformly to all workplaces operating within provincial boundaries.
B) The federal minimum wage applies to federally regulated employers, and the provincial standard is inapplicable due to interjurisdictional immunity.
C) The company is obligated to apply both standards concurrently and must adopt the higher wage as a matter of statutory harmonization and cooperative federalism.
D) The matter is resolved through administrative discretion delegated to the Canada Labour Code adjudicator, who may elect either standard based on operational fairness and regional economic considerations.
47. Leena, a retired school teacher, submits a request under MFIPPA to her former school board seeking all records that contain her name over the past 10 years, including internal correspondence among staff. The board agrees to process the request but issues a fee estimate of $480, citing the time required to search archived emails and redact third-party names. Leena believes the amount is excessive and asks for a waiver, stating she lives on a fixed income. The board denies the fee waiver and proceeds only after partial payment.
Which of the following describes Leena’s rights?
A) Fee waivers under MFIPPA are discretionary administrative decisions and not subject to external review unless the requester can demonstrate fraud or bad faith.
B) MFIPPA imposes a five-year statutory limit on access to personal information held in non-current or archived storage systems, and the board’s refusal is consistent with retention policies.
C) Leena can appeal the fee and waiver decision to the IPC, which has authority to order a reduction.
D) Archived records fall outside the scope of MFIPPA unless the requester provides a compelling reason for override; therefore, the board is not obligated to retrieve them unless directed by a court.
48. Tariq files a Charter challenge against a municipal bylaw that restricts street performers from using amplified sound, arguing it violates his freedom of expression under s. 2(b). The municipality admits that expression is limited but argues the bylaw is justified under s. 1, citing complaints from residents about noise. At trial, the city tenders a few written complaints and anecdotal statements but does not provide expert evidence or data to establish the necessity or effectiveness of the ban. Tariq argues that the municipality has failed to discharge its evidentiary burden under s. 1.
How will the court likely approach the s. 1 justification in this context?
A) Municipal regulations that address public order concerns are presumed to be proportionate, and the burden shifts to the claimant to rebut their reasonableness.
B) The government bears the burden of proof under s. 1 and must provide cogent evidence showing that the law advances a pressing objective in a minimally impairing way.
C) The Charter does not apply unless the claimant proves a measurable economic or livelihood impact from the restriction on expressive conduct.
D) Municipalities may rely on generalized public concern or past precedent without specific evidentiary support if their policy objective is non-controversial.
49. Alexis is representing a small family-owned catering business in a licensing dispute before the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT). The Registrar has issued a notice proposing to revoke the business’s food handling permit due to alleged health code violations. Alexis prepares documents and witnesses for a full oral hearing. Three weeks before the hearing date, she receives a notice from the LAT stating that the proceeding will be conducted by teleconference rather than in person. Alexis’s client, who has a documented hearing impairment and struggles to process audio-only communications, is alarmed by this change. Alexis submits a written request for the hearing to be held in person, attaching a physician’s letter confirming the impairment. The LAT denies the request, stating that teleconferencing is the tribunal’s standard format and no exception will be made unless technological failure occurs on the day of the hearing.
What legal rule governs Alexis’s objection, and how should the tribunal have assessed it?
A) The tribunal may deny hearing format changes under its own discretion without justification.
B) The tribunal is bound by its operational policy and cannot alter hearing formats without written regulations.
C) Tribunals may conduct electronic hearings but must reconsider where a party demonstrates significant prejudice.
D) All licensing disputes involving small businesses must be conducted in person unless the parties jointly agree to an alternate format under Rule 16 of the LAT’s procedural code.
50. Elena represents a client whose property was searched under a new provincial statute that allows regulatory officials to enter private homes without a warrant. She files a Charter application alleging a breach of s. 8. The province argues that because the legislation concerns civil enforcement, Charter standards are relaxed. Elena presents evidence showing that the search involved collection of personal information and disruption of the home environment.
What is the appropriate standard for s. 8 protection in this scenario?
A) Section 8 applies with full force even in regulatory contexts where privacy interests are high, such as the home.
B) Section 8 protections are not engaged unless the search is conducted for the purpose of gathering evidence in a criminal prosecution.
C) Warrantless searches of homes are always valid if authorized by statute.
D) The regulatory nature of the statute excludes the search from Charter scrutiny, as the distinction between civil and criminal enforcement removes the need for prior judicial authorization.
51. An Ontario tribunal issues a decision denying an employment standards claim. The reasons are vague and fail to explain how the tribunal evaluated conflicting testimony or documentary evidence. The panel summarizes the submissions in a cursory fashion and offers a final conclusion that simply states, “the applicant’s burden of proof was not met.” The losing party brings a judicial review application, arguing that the decision is unreasonable because it is unsupported by analysis.
What is the likely outcome of the review under the Vavilov standard?
A) The decision will be upheld unless it is proven that the tribunal acted in bad faith.
B) The court will substitute its own view of the facts to determine fairness.
C) The application will be dismissed because the tribunal has discretion in assessing credibility.
D) The court will likely find the decision unreasonable because it lacks justification, intelligibility, and transparency.
52. Daniel is incarcerated and challenges a prison policy that prohibits access to printed legal materials unless obtained through the prison library. He argues that this restriction violates his right to liberty and security of the person under s. 7 and impedes his access to justice. The correctional service contends that the policy promotes order and reduces contraband. Daniel asserts that the policy is arbitrary and overbroad because there is no evidence linking printed materials to safety risks.
How will the court assess this claim?
A) The policy is constitutionally immune from review unless it has been subject to parliamentary debate or statutory scrutiny.
B) The court will examine whether the policy is overbroad or arbitrary in relation to its stated objective, consistent with the principles of fundamental justice.
C) Incarcerated individuals do not benefit from the protections of s. 7, as liberty is already lawfully suspended through valid sentencing.
D) The policy is automatically upheld in deference to institutional expertise in corrections and security management.
53. Nikhil is appearing before the Ontario Labour Relations Board on behalf of a workers’ association contesting an unfair labour practice ruling. A week before the hearing, the employer’s counsel serves a motion to strike the association’s affidavit evidence, arguing that the documents were not disclosed in accordance with the tribunal’s 30-day rule. Nikhil attempts to file a brief responding to the motion but is told that no submissions will be accepted until the hearing date. On the morning of the hearing, the tribunal adjudicator rules on the motion without hearing Nikhil’s response and excludes the evidence. The hearing proceeds and concludes that same day, resulting in a decision adverse to the association.
Which statement about Nikhil’s clients' procedural rights is correct?
A) They were denied the right to be heard on a motion that materially affected the fairness of the proceeding.
B) They were not entitled to respond because the affidavit was late.
C) They lost the right to cross-examine the opposing party.
D) They should have appealed the motion separately before the hearing.
54. Helen is a public health official in Alberta who issues a regulation requiring all public protest organizers to obtain a permit and provide a contact list of participants. A group of environmental activists challenges the regulation, arguing that it infringes their freedom of peaceful assembly and expression under s. 2 of the Charter. The province defends the regulation as a necessary public health measure to ensure contact tracing in the event of disease spread. The activists argue the requirement is overly intrusive and deters participation, especially among marginalized groups. The case proceeds to a Charter challenge.
How will the court likely evaluate this regulation?
A) The court will find an infringement of s. 2(b) and s. 2(c) of the Charter and will assess whether the limitation is demonstrably justified under s. 1.
B) The regulation is immune from challenge because it was enacted in a public health emergency.
C) Freedom of peaceful assembly is not a freestanding constitutional right, and courts will not scrutinize provincial restrictions imposed for administrative convenience or safety.
D) Charter rights are only triggered when protest-related conduct results in criminal prosecution or detention, so pre-emptive regulation is outside judicial scrutiny.
55. Noelle represents a small logistics company whose commercial vehicle operating license was abruptly revoked by a provincial transportation tribunal. The tribunal issued no notice of hearing and gave no opportunity to respond to the allegations before finalizing its decision. The only explanation received was a one-paragraph letter stating that the company was “no longer suitable to operate in the public interest.” When Noelle inquires about internal appeal mechanisms, she is told that the statute includes a finality clause and does not provide for reconsideration or appeal. She considers bringing an application for judicial review, but opposing counsel argues that the finality clause ousts the court’s jurisdiction.
What is the correct legal framework governing Noelle’s ability to seek judicial review in this case?
A) Judicial review is available only if the statute is silent on internal appeal mechanisms.
B) A finality clause completely bars review by the court in the absence of constitutional claims.
C) A finality clause may limit statutory appeals but cannot prevent judicial review of administrative decisions for fairness or legality.
D) Judicial review of administrative decisions is unavailable unless the matter involves penal consequences or arises in the context of quasi-criminal proceedings.
56. The Parliament of Canada enacts a national ban on the marketing of sugar-sweetened beverages, citing rising obesity rates and health care costs. The law applies to all commercial advertising, including that conducted within a single province. The Province of Alberta challenges the legislation, claiming that health promotion and regulation of local commerce fall under provincial jurisdiction and that the federal law overreaches into property and civil rights.
Which constitutional doctrine is most relevant, and what is the likely result?
A) The court will apply the national concern branch of the POGG power and may uphold the law if obesity prevention is found to be a matter of national dimension.
B) The court will strike down the law as ultra vires because it targets local economic activity, which falls within the exclusive domain of provincial legislative authority under s. 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867.
C) Federal jurisdiction over advertising may only extend to interprovincial or international communications, so the law will be valid solely to the extent that it regulates cross-border commercial messaging.
D) The doctrine of federal paramountcy will be invoked to invalidate Alberta’s provincial health statutes to the extent of any inconsistency with the federal advertising ban.
57. Duncan is dismissed from his public-sector job during his probationary period. He is not given any explanation or opportunity to respond to allegations against him. The enabling statute excludes probationary employees from the procedural protections that apply to permanent staff. Duncan argues that the dismissal was arbitrary and seeks advice on his procedural entitlements.
What legal doctrine is most applicable to his situation?
A) Common law duty of fairness, as articulated in Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk.
B) Statutory immunity provisions operate to shield discretionary administrative decisions from review, even where the decision results in personal hardship or reputational damage.
C) The doctrine of substantive ultra vires applies when a decision maker misinterprets their enabling legislation, but does not govern dismissals carried out under broadly worded discretionary clauses.
D) The doctrine of legitimate expectations under the Charter applies only when a public authority has promised a specific procedural outcome and then fails to deliver it.
58. Ezra is the subject of a tribunal order requiring the immediate closure of his independent health facility due to “ongoing risks to the public.” The tribunal decision was rendered under statutory authority that permits emergency orders. Ezra’s counsel files for judicial review, arguing that the tribunal erred by not holding a hearing before issuing the order. The tribunal responds that the statute allows for summary action in cases of imminent harm.
What will the court consider in evaluating whether procedural fairness was owed?
A) Whether Ezra signed a waiver of hearing rights.
B) Whether the circumstances justified a modified or minimal form of procedural fairness due to urgency.
C) Whether the tribunal conformed strictly to the rules of evidence applicable in civil proceedings and made findings based on affidavit evidence alone.
D) Whether the facility’s prior regulatory history provided automatic grounds for bypassing fairness considerations under delegated emergency powers.
59. Jason, a permanent resident, is denied a professional licence by the provincial law society due to a policy limiting access to Canadian citizens. He challenges the decision under s. 6(2)(b) of the Charter, claiming that it restricts his right to pursue a livelihood in any province. The law society argues that the Charter only protects citizens and that provincial residency requirements are within the province’s authority. Jason maintains that permanent residents are explicitly protected under s. 6(2) and that the denial is discriminatory.
Which is the most accurate constitutional analysis?
A) The Charter does not apply because the law society operates independently of government control and performs a self-regulatory function under enabling legislation.
B) Section 6(2)(b) protects both citizens and permanent residents, and Jason can challenge the restriction as violating his mobility rights.
C) Section 6 applies only to interprovincial movement and not professional licensing.
D) The policy is constitutionally immune from Charter scrutiny because professional self-regulation is protected under the doctrine of subsidiarity and the division of powers.
60. Lena is a licensed practical nurse who is subject to a disciplinary investigation by her regulatory college. She receives a summary letter informing her that her licence has been suspended due to “serious ethical breaches” following a complaint. She was never given notice of a hearing, never saw the evidence against her, and was not given an opportunity to respond. The enabling statute authorizes the college to take interim action but does not specify procedures for doing so. Lena files for judicial review, alleging a denial of natural justice.
What governs Lena’s entitlement to procedural fairness in the absence of express statutory procedures?
A) The tribunal’s internal policy manual determines the correct process.
B) The tribunal’s actions are protected by qualified privilege.
C) The matter is purely private and not reviewable.
D) The common law duty of fairness applies and is informed by the Baker factors.
61. Marion, a private citizen, suspects that her local police service has shared surveillance footage of her property with another agency without her consent. She submits a request under MFIPPA to the police requesting access to the footage and details of the disclosure. The police respond that the footage is part of an ongoing investigation and therefore exempt under law enforcement provisions. Marion argues she has a personal right to know whether her privacy was violated.
What legal framework governs this request and the police service’s response?
A) MFIPPA entirely exempts police services from disclosure obligations where investigative content is involved, regardless of the requester’s identity or the nature of the information sought.
B) A requester’s personal privacy interest in the footage automatically overrides institutional claims of confidentiality under the law enforcement exemption.
C) Investigative records must be disclosed to any party with a potential privacy interest unless the institution has obtained a sealing order or parallel court direction.
D) MFIPPA allows institutions to withhold records if disclosure would interfere with law enforcement, but this exemption is discretionary and must be justified.
62. Mina is preparing a Charter application challenging a provincial rule that limits the availability of legal aid to individuals without dependents. Her client, an unemployed adult, was denied representation in a complex family law proceeding. The province argues that legal aid is a policy matter and not constitutionally required. Mina counters that denying legal representation in cases involving fundamental interests violates s. 7.
What must Mina establish to succeed on the s. 7 claim?
A) That the absence of legal representation undermines the client’s subjective sense of dignity and offends the values underpinning s. 15 of the Charter.
B) That the client’s life, liberty, or security of the person was engaged, and that the deprivation was not in accordance with principles of fundamental justice.
C) That the rule creates a distinction based on economic status and perpetuates disadvantage, thereby violating substantive equality under s. 15, regardless of whether any liberty interest is triggered.
D) That the Charter imposes a general positive obligation on governments to fund legal aid in all civil proceedings affecting economically vulnerable individuals.
63. Ethan applies for a rent-geared-to-income housing subsidy from a local housing authority. After months of waiting, he receives a one-sentence decision stating that his application is denied for “non-cooperation.” No further explanation is given, and Ethan asserts that he was never contacted for any additional documents. He later discovers that internal staff notes refer to an email he never received. Ethan brings a judicial review application, claiming the decision was opaque and unsupported by the record.
What must the court assess under the Vavilov framework in reviewing this decision?
A) Whether the housing authority complied with provincial administrative guidelines and adhered to procedural timelines set out in its internal policies.
B) Whether Ethan’s initial application materials, when reviewed independently by the court, establish eligibility for rent-geared-to-income housing on a balance of probabilities.
C) Whether the decision was reasonable, meaning it was justified in light of the record, transparent in its reasoning, and intelligibly explained.
D) Whether the board’s internal notes were based on truth.
64. The federal government authorizes a pipeline expansion through territory claimed by the Ktunaxa Nation, including a site they regard as spiritually sacred. The Ktunaxa argue that the approval process failed to consider the deep religious significance of the area and assert that both s. 35 Aboriginal rights and s. 2(a) Charter protections were violated. The Crown argues that environmental consultation occurred, and that while the site is spiritually important, no tangible restriction on religious practice was imposed by the project.
How will the court assess the dual claim based on Aboriginal rights and Charter freedom of religion?
A) The court will apply the Sparrow and Oakes tests independently and may reject the Charter claim if the infringement is not substantial.
B) Aboriginal religious claims are excluded from s. 35.
C) The duty to consult is automatically satisfied where a Charter claim is raised.
D) Charter and Aboriginal claims must be litigated separately.
65. A criminal accused brings a constitutional challenge to a provision of the Criminal Code during trial, arguing that it violates s. 11(d) of the Charter. Crown counsel objects that no notice of constitutional question has been served. The accused responds that the court can address Charter issues at trial without formalities. The trial judge is unsure whether the case can proceed on this basis.
What is the correct procedural statement in this context?
A) A notice of constitutional question must be served under s. 109 of the CJA, and failure to do so may preclude a remedy unless the court grants an exception.
B) Charter challenges raised in criminal proceedings are inherently urgent and therefore exempt from formal notice requirements, provided the accused raises the issue clearly on the record.
C) A trial judge may hear the Charter challenge but must reserve any ruling on the merits until the issue is re-litigated as a civil reference under s. 8 of the Reference Re Reform Act.
D) Where the accused is self-represented and facing potential incarceration, procedural requirements like notice under s. 109 are automatically deemed waived to protect the right to a full defence.
66. Adriana appears as counsel in a licensing matter before the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario. During the hearing, opposing counsel repeatedly raises irrelevant objections and makes inflammatory comments about Adriana’s client’s past business conduct. Despite multiple warnings, the behaviour continues. At the close of the hearing, Adriana requests that the tribunal award costs against the opposing counsel for bad faith conduct that prolonged the hearing and caused unnecessary delay. The tribunal chair responds that while the behaviour was troubling, the AGCO lacks jurisdiction to award costs.
Under what conditions can a tribunal award costs, and what statutory provision governs this authority?
A) Tribunals may always award costs if they find one side acted unprofessionally.
B) Costs are determined by the Superior Court, not tribunals.
C) A tribunal may award costs only if it has established rules under s. 25.1 of the SPPA that authorize such remedies in cases of bad faith, frivolousness, or vexatious conduct.
D) Tribunals must impose costs automatically in favour of the successful party unless the chair finds the losing party acted in good faith throughout the proceeding.
67. Ontario passes a law regulating all aspects of online wagering and classifies certain games as prohibited for consumer protection reasons. A federally licensed online gaming operator challenges the law, arguing that gaming is a matter of federal criminal law and that the provincial restrictions are inconsistent with the Criminal Code framework, which allows licensed exceptions.
How will the constitutional issue likely be resolved?
A) The province may regulate all gambling because it affects health.
B) The federal law is invalid to the extent it licenses gambling, which is primarily a provincial economic activity under s. 92(13).
C) The doctrine of federal paramountcy will apply if the provincial law frustrates the purpose of the federal Criminal Code scheme.
D) The double aspect doctrine will preserve both laws, since they pursue distinct purposes: crime prevention versus consumer welfare.
68. Amira files a Charter application in a family court proceeding, challenging the constitutionality of a provincial statute that bars unmarried couples from making equalization claims. She seeks a declaration under s. 52(1) and also a s. 15(1) remedy in the form of an adjusted spousal support award. The opposing party argues that the family court lacks jurisdiction to make constitutional declarations, especially where monetary consequences follow. Amira argues that family courts routinely decide Charter questions and that no jurisdictional issue exists.
What will determine whether the family court has authority to grant constitutional remedies in this case?
A) Whether the impugned legislation falls under federal or provincial jurisdiction under the Constitution Act, 1867, and whether the court has inherent jurisdiction to adjudicate such disputes.
B) Whether both parties have filed written consent to have the Charter issue adjudicated within the family law proceeding.
C) Whether the family court has jurisdiction over questions of law and is properly constituted to grant s. 52(1) or s. 24(1) remedies.
D) Whether Amira has introduced expert evidence demonstrating the economic disadvantage caused by the statutory exclusion in support of her spousal support claim.
69. Zachary, a constitutional litigator, is preparing to argue that a provincial law limiting access to public demonstrations violates s. 2(b) and is not saved by s. 1 of the Charter. The government concedes that a limitation exists but argues that it is minimally impairing. Zachary seeks to introduce evidence that other jurisdictions use less restrictive alternatives, including real-time permits and mobile response teams, to manage protests without blanket prohibitions. The Crown objects, claiming that foreign law is irrelevant and inadmissible.
What is the correct legal approach to Zachary’s evidence at the minimal impairment stage of the Oakes test?
A) Courts are bound to accept the legislature’s justification at face value unless a Charter violation is egregious or discriminatory.
B) The minimal impairment analysis only requires that the law be “rational,” not that it be the least impairing option available in comparative contexts.
C) Courts will exclude evidence from other jurisdictions unless those laws have been subject to Canadian judicial review and found constitutionally valid.
D) Courts may consider the existence of less impairing alternatives in Canada or abroad to evaluate whether the law impairs rights more than necessary.
70. Leila is preparing to bring a constitutional challenge to a provincial employment regulation that she believes infringes freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter. She plans to seek a remedy under s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. Leila does not name either level of government as a party, assuming that the court can make the necessary ruling on the validity of the regulation without government involvement. After receiving an adjournment request from the Crown, she learns that she was required to provide advance notice of the constitutional issue.
What procedural requirement did Leila fail to comply with, and what is the legal consequence?
A) She failed to include the Queen in Right of Ontario as a co-defendant, voiding the application.
B) She failed to serve an expert report on religious practice, barring Charter adjudication.
C) She failed to serve a notice of constitutional question under s. 109 of the Courts of Justice Act, which precludes a remedy unless the court orders otherwise.
D) She failed to seek leave from the Divisional Court, which is mandatory in all Charter challenges.
71. A federally licensed railway company begins construction of a new interprovincial line that will cross environmentally sensitive wetlands in Manitoba. The provincial government issues an injunction, citing its environmental protection legislation and requiring the company to undergo an additional impact assessment. The company argues that it is immune from provincial requirements due to its federal designation under the Canada Transportation Act.
How will the court resolve this conflict between federal and provincial authority?
A) The railway must comply with both federal and provincial laws as long as there is no express conflict between them, under the cooperative federalism model.
B) The doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity may render the provincial law inapplicable if it impairs the core of federal jurisdiction over interprovincial undertakings.
C) The double aspect doctrine will preserve the application of both federal and provincial legislation because environmental protection is a shared responsibility.
D) The doctrine of federal paramountcy will apply because the provincial injunction directly contradicts a valid federal statute.
Case-based Questions
Case 1
Green Harvest Inc. is a federally incorporated company that operates an organic food distribution network across multiple provinces. In response to rising environmental concerns, the federal government passed the National Eco Labelling Act (NELA), which establishes standards for eco-labelling food products traded interprovincially. Shortly after, Ontario enacted the Sustainable Food Packaging Act (SFPA), requiring all food distributors to use biodegradable packaging and display a provincial eco label. Green Harvest complies with the federal standards but not the provincial ones, arguing that dual compliance is expensive and confusing. It is charged under the SFPA for non-compliance. In its defence, Green Harvest argues that the provincial law is ultra vires, or alternatively, inoperative due to federal paramountcy or interjurisdictional immunity. The Ontario court must now determine the validity and operability of the SFPA as it applies to Green Harvest.
Questions 72 to 74 refer to Case 1
72. What is the first step the court must take in determining whether the Ontario SFPA is constitutionally valid?
A) Determine whether the federal NELA occupies the field and precludes Ontario from legislating.
B) Determine whether the provincial law frustrates the purpose of the federal scheme.
C) Identify the pith and substance of the SFPA and classify it under a head of provincial power.
D) Decide whether federal incorporation gives Green Harvest immunity from provincial law.
73. If the court finds that both the SFPA and the NELA are valid laws but that Green Harvest cannot practically comply with both, which constitutional doctrine is most likely to render the SFPA inoperative?
A) Pith and substance.
B) Ancillary powers.
C) Interjurisdictional immunity.
D) Federal paramountcy.
74. Can Green Harvest successfully argue that it is constitutionally immune from the application of Ontario’s SFPA due to its status as a federally incorporated interprovincial business?
A) Yes, because provincial laws cannot affect federally incorporated companies at all.
B) No, because the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity has been abolished by the courts.
C) Only if the provincial law impairs the core competence of a federal head of power, such as federal incorporation or interprovincial trade.
D) Yes, if the company’s operation spans more than two provinces and is regulated by a federal board.
Case 2
Eastside Legal Clinic, a non-profit organization advocating for access to legal aid, challenges a recently enacted Ontario regulation that drastically reduces funding for legal services in low-income housing districts. The clinic brings an application in the Superior Court of Justice seeking a declaration under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 that the regulation violates s. 7 and s. 15 of the Charter. To support the claim, the clinic tenders affidavits from clients who lost access to representation, Brandeis briefs with social science data on the effects of poverty and legal exclusion, and Hansard excerpts showing that the government was warned about discriminatory impacts during legislative debate. No notice of constitutional question is served until six days before the scheduled hearing. The Attorney General objects and asks the court to refuse to hear the application. The clinic also asks the court to read in a funding obligation to the regulation as a Charter-compliant remedy.
Questions 75 to 77 refer to Case 2
75. What is the primary legal risk of Eastside Legal Clinic serving the notice of constitutional question only six days before the hearing?
A) The court will automatically adjourn the hearing for 60 days.
B) The court may decline to grant any Charter remedy due to procedural prejudice.
C) The court will instead transfer the matter to the Divisional Court.
D) The court must permit the Attorney General to cross-examine the clinic’s witnesses.
76. Which of the following is true about the evidentiary materials Eastside submitted to prove a Charter breach?
A) Brandeis briefs and Hansard excerpts are inadmissible unless formally proven by expert testimony.
B) Only sworn affidavits may be used to prove legislative facts in Charter proceedings.
C) Legislative facts may be proven through a wide range of sources including Hansard, social science articles, and Brandeis briefs.
D) Hansard is only relevant when the law contains a clear purpose clause.
77. If the court finds a breach of the Charter and considers ordering a remedial amendment, what is the legal rule it must apply?
A) The court may amend legislation freely so long as the result benefits the applicant.
B) The court may read in or down a provision only if doing so aligns with the legislature’s intent.
C) The court must suspend its decision for 12 months to allow the government to respond.
D) The court may rewrite the regulation if the Attorney General declines to participate.
Case 3
Bennett is a licensed paramedic whose registration is under review by the College of Paramedicine following a complaint regarding improper administration of medication in the field. The College schedules a hearing under the SPPA and notifies Bennett that the proceeding will be conducted electronically. Bennett’s lawyer requests an in-person hearing citing the need to cross-examine a complainant with cognitive challenges. The tribunal denies the request, stating that its rules default to electronic hearings. At the hearing, the College introduces a written complaint form completed by a supervising physician who is not available for cross-examination. Bennett objects, arguing that the document is hearsay. The tribunal admits it, noting that it is relevant and goes to the professional conduct in question. Later, the tribunal limits cross-examination of another witness after several repetitive questions. Bennett’s lawyer is now considering whether to seek judicial review.
Questions 78 to 80 refer to Case 3
78. Was the tribunal within its authority under the SPPA in choosing to proceed with an electronic hearing?
A) No, the SPPA requires all professional conduct hearings to be held in person.
B) Yes, if the tribunal’s rules authorize electronic hearings and no party proves significant prejudice.
C) No, a request for in-person hearing must always be granted if credibility is in issue.
D) Yes, provided the parties give written consent to electronic format.
79. Was the tribunal entitled to admit the supervising physician’s written complaint as evidence?
A) No, the SPPA prohibits the admission of hearsay without cross-examination.
B) Yes, tribunals can admit relevant evidence even if it would be inadmissible in court.
C) No, unless the document was sworn and attested.
D) Yes, but only if both parties consent to its inclusion in the record.
80. Was the tribunal permitted to limit Bennett’s cross-examination of a witness after several repetitive questions?
A) Yes, tribunals may reasonably limit cross-examination once full and fair disclosure has been achieved.
B) No, the right to unlimited cross-examination is protected by procedural fairness.
C) No, only courts can restrict cross-examination in professional discipline hearings.
D) Yes, but only if Bennett’s lawyer consents on the record.