Civil Procedure (Advanced) Question Pack - Questions
1. A blockchain‐based payments company incorporated and headquartered in State A entered into a merchant agreement with a major retailer based in State B. Under the contract, the retailer processed daily transactions worth $10 million through the company’s State A servers, which handled settlement, funds transfers, and chargeback resolution. Over 24 months, the retailer generated $480 million in volume, paid millions in fees into the company’s State A accounts, and participated in joint marketing webinars produced from State A studios. When the retailer suffered $3 million in fraud losses, it sued in federal court in State B for breach of contract and negligence.
The payments company moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, noting it has no offices, employees, property, or agents in State B and characterizing its contacts as purely digital. The retailer responded that the company purposefully availed itself of State B’s market by processing hundreds of millions of dollars there, tailoring its platform to State B’s payment rails, and negotiating contract amendments with its State B executives.
In reply, the payments company insisted that remote server operations and digital marketing cannot satisfy due‐process minimum‐contacts precedents. The retailer emphasized that its suit arises directly from the very transactions and support the company purposefully directed at State B.
How should the court rule on the personal‐jurisdiction motion?
A) Deny the motion because targeted digital processing and platform customizations establish specific jurisdiction.
B) Grant the motion because digital‐only operations without any physical presence cannot support jurisdiction.
C) Deny the motion because the company’s systematic and continuous transactions also establish general jurisdiction.
D) Grant the motion because purposeful availment requires in‐state offices or agents.
2. A medical‐device manufacturer headquartered in State C entered into a supply and maintenance contract with a regional hospital network in State D. The parties negotiated specifications and pricing via email and remote demos, but the devices were shipped to State D, installed on‐site by the manufacturer’s mobile teams, and maintained via remote diagnostics from State C. Over three years, the network paid $15 million and logged dozens of service‐ticket resolutions. When recurring malfunctions allegedly caused misdiagnoses, the network sued in federal court in State D for product liability and breach of implied warranty.
The manufacturer moved to transfer venue to State C under 28 U.S.C. 1391(b)(2) and 1404(a), arguing that manufacturing, R&D, warranty support, and key documents all reside in State C and that most witnesses live there. The network opposed, noting that installation, actual use, and patient harm occurred in State D, that its medical‐records evidence is in State D, and that State D has the predominant interest in adjudicating local healthcare disputes.
In reply, the manufacturer insisted its convenience and evidence location should control venue. The network emphasized that the locus of the wrong and the strong public interest in compensating local patients outweigh convenience arguments.
How should the court rule on the transfer motion?
A) Grant transfer because a substantial part of the events occurred in State C.
B) Deny transfer because the harm and use occurred in State D, giving that state a stronger interest.
C) Grant transfer because most documents and witnesses are in State C.
D) Deny transfer because the network’s choice of forum reflects its legitimate interest in local injury.
3. A boutique software consultancy in State E developed a bespoke analytics platform for a data‐science firm in State F. The contract required code delivery, user‐training webinars, and quarterly performance reviews, all performed remotely. Payments of $1 million were wired to the consultancy’s State E accounts. Months later, the client discovered that the platform miscalculated key risk metrics and withheld the final $250,000.
The consultancy sued for breach of contract in federal court in State E. The client moved to transfer under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a), arguing that its proprietary data, expert witnesses, and IT staff are all located in State F and that defending the suit in State E would impose undue travel costs. The client also noted its damages were suffered entirely in State F.
The consultancy opposed, stressing that all work, development, training, and billing occurred in State E, that its employees live and work there, and that its source‐code repository and design documents are maintained there.
How should the court rule on the transfer motion?
A) Deny transfer because the plaintiff’s chosen forum is where performance occurred.
B) Grant transfer because convenience of witnesses and location of evidence favor State F.
C) Deny transfer because the absence of a forum‐selection clause gives the plaintiff broad discretion.
D) Grant transfer only if the client posts a security bond for travel expenses.
4. A venture‐capital firm in State G funded a startup in State H under a subscription agreement that included a mandatory forum‐selection clause designating State H courts as exclusive for disputes. After a funding dispute, the firm sued in federal court in State G seeking declaratory relief and breach‐of‐fiduciary‐duty damages. The startup moved to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds, invoking the clause.
The firm opposed, claiming that most of its principals and crucial witnesses reside in State G and that State H’s courts lack the requisite expertise in complex financial litigation. It argued that private‐interest and public‐interest factors favor its chosen forum. The startup replied that the clause was negotiated by sophisticated counsel and embodies the parties’ agreed forum.
During briefing, the firm highlighted its inability to compel attendance of non‐party experts in State H and warned of witness‐availability issues. The startup emphasized that only extraordinary circumstances can overcome a valid forum‐selection clause.
How should the court rule on forum non conveniens?
A) Deny dismissal because the valid forum‐selection clause controls absent extraordinary inconvenience.
B) Grant dismissal because public‐interest factors favor the firm’s home forum.
C) Deny dismissal because the clause must be enforced even if inconvenient.
D) Grant dismissal but require the clause’s enforcement to be revisited if witnesses cannot appear.
5. A multinational pharmaceutical company sued a contract manufacturer in federal court in State J for breach of an exclusive‐supply agreement. During discovery, the manufacturer requested the company’s licensing agreements with other suppliers dating back ten years. The company objected and sought a protective order, arguing the licenses contain trade‐secret pricing and proprietary formulation data.
The court granted a limited protective order and ordered production of licensing agreements from January 2015 onward, subject to counsel‐eyes‐only restrictions. The company produced redacted agreements omitting pricing terms and formulation schedules. The manufacturer moved to lift the redactions, asserting that pricing data is essential to calculate lost‐profit damages.
The company responded that public disclosure of pricing data would cause irreparable competitive harm and that the protective order’s purpose is to shield trade secrets. The court must balance the manufacturer’s need for precise damages information against the company’s confidentiality interests.
How should the court rule on the motion to lift redactions?
A) Grant the motion but limit access to unredacted pricing data to counsel and expert witnesses under the existing protective order.
B) Deny the motion because the company’s confidentiality interests outweigh the manufacturer’s need.
C) Grant the motion and order public filing of pricing data in the record.
D) Deny the motion because the protective order cannot be modified after issuance.
6. A specialty chemicals distributor incorporated in State J entered into a long-term supply contract with a food processing company based in State K. The distributor delivered bulk solvent shipments over five years and processed payments through its State J headquarters. During the sixth year, the buyer withheld the final two installments, alleging contamination. The distributor sued for breach of contract in federal court in State J, and the buyer filed a third-party complaint under Rule 14 against a State K logistics firm that handled the distributor’s unbroken chain of custody.
The logistics firm moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing its joinder destroys complete diversity. The distributor responded that the indemnity claim falls within supplemental jurisdiction because it arises from the same transaction or occurrence. No federal claims involve the logistics firm apart from the Rule 14 third-party claim.
The buyer’s breach claim and the distributor’s third-party indemnity claim share operative facts involving contamination during transit. The distributor admits no independent basis for federal jurisdiction over the logistics firm and relies solely on 28 U.S.C. 1367(a) to support the third-party complaint.
How should the court rule on the third-party defendant’s motion to dismiss?
A) Deny the motion because the indemnity claim arises from the same transaction and supplemental jurisdiction under 1367(a) applies.
B) Grant the motion because Rule 14 prohibits impleader of non-diverse parties in a diversity case.
C) Grant the motion because 1367(b) excludes Rule 14 third-party claims that would destroy diversity.
D) Deny the motion and sever the third-party claim for remand under 1441(c).
7. A technology licensor sued a software developer in federal court for copyright infringement. The developer moved for partial summary judgment on one of three asserted works and succeeded. The court denied Rule 54(b) certification of the partial judgment. Undeterred, the developer filed a notice of appeal immediately after the partial grant, seeking appellate review of infringement dismissal as to that work.
The licensor moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, pointing out that Rule 54(b) certification is required for interlocutory appeals of partial judgments. The developer responded that a grant of summary judgment is final as to that claim and thus appealable.
In opposition, the licensor emphasized the final-judgment rule’s requirement of 54(b) certification when multiple claims remain pending. The developer insisted that summary judgment alone confers finality as to the individual work.
How should the appellate court rule on the jurisdiction motion?
A) Deny dismissal because each summary judgment order is final on its own merits.
B) Grant dismissal because only orders certified under Rule 54(b) are appealable when multiple claims remain.
C) Grant dismissal because 28 U.S.C. 1291 final-judgment rule requires certification for partial orders.
D) Deny dismissal because summary judgments on individual claims are collateral orders.
8. A Fortune 500 corporation sued a former executive in federal court for breach of a noncompete agreement and tortious interference. Under Rule 26(a)(2)(B), the corporation disclosed a retained economist’s report estimating $20 million in damages but failed to provide the economist’s underlying data and calculations. The defendant moved to exclude the economist’s testimony under Rule 37(c)(1) and to compel full expert disclosures.
The corporation argued that the disclosure of conclusions meets the rule and that underlying data is work product. The defendant countered that without raw data and calculations, the report is unreliable and cannot be tested by cross-examination.
At a hearing, the corporation insisted disclosure of all calculations would reveal proprietary forecasting models. The defendant emphasized that expert opinions must rest on disclosed facts and data to ensure fairness.
How should the court rule on the motion to exclude expert evidence?
A) Deny exclusion because the economist’s report is a sufficient disclosure under Rule 26(a)(2).
B) Grant exclusion because the corporation improperly withheld underlying data, depriving the defendant of testing.
C) Grant partial relief by compelling production of calculations while preserving proprietary elements under protective order.
D) Deny exclusion but impose sanctions for incomplete disclosures.
9. A real estate developer filed suit in federal court on a multi-property construction contract with multiple joint-venture partners. One partner, a financial investor, argued it was never a contracting party and moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(7) for failure to join other necessary partners who have indemnity claims and potential liability. The developer responded that those interests are contingent and that joining additional partners would destroy diversity.
The alleged non-party partners have rights under the joint-venture agreement to contribution and indemnity if the developer’s claims succeed. The developer insists the suit can proceed without exposing partners to inconsistent obligations. The moving partner claims its substantial contractual interests will be impaired if not joined.
The court must decide whether the non-party partners are necessary and indispensable parties under Rule 19.
How should the court rule on the dismissal motion?
A) Deny the motion because indemnity rights alone do not trigger mandatory joinder under Rule 19.
B) Grant dismissal because the partners’ interests are substantial and would be impaired or inconsistent without their presence.
C) Deny dismissal but order joinder of the partners under Rule 19(a).
D) Grant dismissal only as to the moving partner’s portion if partners cannot be joined.
10. A software vendor sued a competitor in diversity court for misappropriation of trade secrets and breach of contract. The vendor moved for summary judgment supported by a declaration from its CTO and redacted internal emails. The competitor filed an affidavit under Rule 56(d) requesting access to unredacted emails and depositions of the CTO to challenge the declaration’s authenticity.
The vendor opposed, arguing that the redactions protect privileged communications and that the CTO’s live testimony would be cumulative. The competitor countered that redacted versions prevent meaningful cross-examination and that without depositions it cannot show the declaration is supported by personal knowledge.
During argument, the vendor suggested in-camera review of emails instead of full production. The competitor insisted that complete access and cross-examination are necessary to rebut the CTO’s statements.
How should the court rule on the Rule 56(d) request?
A) Deny the request, grant summary judgment, and accept the CTO’s declaration as conclusive.
B) Conduct an in-camera review of the redacted emails only, then rule on summary judgment.
C) Defer ruling on summary judgment, allow full CTO deposition and unredacted email production under confidentiality protections.
D) Grant summary judgment but require the vendor to produce unredacted emails for appellate record.
11. A commercial developer in State N and a residential homeowner in State O jointly sued FastSet Cement Co., a manufacturer incorporated in State B with its principal place of business in State C, in State N court for breach of warranty and personal‐injury claims stemming from a structural failure. The developer sought lost‐rent damages and repair costs; the homeowner sought personal‐injury compensation. FastSet was served on both plaintiffs.
The day after service, FastSet removed the entire action to federal court in State N under 28 U.S.C. 1441. Removal asserted diversity jurisdiction on the basis that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000 for each claim and that the developer and FastSet were diverse. FastSet did not address the homeowner’s nondiverse citizenship in the removal notice.
The developer responded that removal was defective because the homeowner’s claim lacks diversity and must be remanded. FastSet insisted that supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1367(a) covers the homeowner’s related personal‐injury claim since it arises from the same structural failure. No separate federal basis exists for the homeowner’s claim.
The court must determine whether supplemental jurisdiction under 1367(a) permits FastSet to keep the nondiverse homeowner’s claim in federal court or whether that claim must be remanded.
How should the court rule on the removal?
A) Deny the motion to remand because supplemental jurisdiction allows the related claim to proceed.
B) Remand the entire action because supplemental jurisdiction does not extend to plaintiffs joining independent claims in a diversity suit.
C) Remand only the homeowner’s claim and retain the developer’s claim in federal court.
D) Deny remand because diversity exists as to the developer and supplemental jurisdiction covers the homeowner’s claim.
12. A software developer in State P drafted a two‐defendant complaint in State Q court, naming Alpha Tech (incorporated in State R) and Beta Solutions (incorporated in State Q). Alpha was served on March 1. Beta was served on April 15. On May 1, Alpha filed a notice of removal under 28 U.S.C. 1441(a) and 1446(b), asserting complete diversity and that removal was timely within thirty days of Alpha’s service. Beta did not join in the removal.
The developer moved to remand, arguing that all served defendants must consent to removal under 1446(b)(2)(A) and that Beta’s absence from the removal notice requires remand. Alpha conceded it did not obtain Beta’s consent but argued removal timing and party alignment justified unilateral removal.
The court must decide whether removal is defective for lack of consent or otherwise valid. Although the thirty‐day window reset when Beta was served, this removal was filed after Beta’s service but without Beta’s joinder.
How should the court rule on the remand motion?
A) Deny the motion because removal was timely as to Alpha under 1446(b)(2)(B), and Beta’s consent is unnecessary.
B) Grant the motion because the thirty‐day window expired before removal was filed.
C) Grant the motion because all served defendants must join or consent to a removal notice.
D) Deny the motion because Beta’s subsequent service did not affect Alpha’s removal rights.
13. A state environmental agency held a public hearing and formally approved a high‐voltage transmission line permit over private property in State S. The agency’s final order included detailed findings on noise levels, electromagnetic field safety, and land‐use impacts. The permit was subject to judicial review in State S courts, and no appeal was ever filed.
Six months later, a group of affected property owners filed a diversity suit in federal court in State S for nuisance and trespass based on the transmission line’s ongoing operation. The power company moved for summary judgment on res judicata grounds, asserting that the agency’s order precludes relitigation of the permit’s legality. The owners argued that administrative decisions lack preclusive effect in federal court absent judicial entry of judgment.
The court must apply full faith and credit under 28 U.S.C. 1738 to determine whether collateral estoppel bars the owners’ federal claims. State S law treats judicially reviewable agency orders as entitled to preclusive effect on issues actually litigated and decided.
How should the court rule on the preclusion defense?
A) Deny summary judgment because only judicial judgments, not administrative orders, bind federal courts.
B) Grant summary judgment in full because the agency’s order precludes all issues related to the permit.
C) Grant summary judgment in part by giving preclusive effect to issues actually litigated in the administrative proceeding.
D) Deny summary judgment because nuisance claims involve different elements from permit‐lawfulness issues.
14. A general contractor sued two sub‐contractors in federal court in State T for construction defects. One sub-contractor, MasonryPro, moved to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a)(2), claiming a contractual indemnity interest and that its absence would impair its ability to protect that interest. The motion was filed four months after the original complaint, discovery had closed, and a trial date was set in four weeks.
The general contractor opposed mandatory intervention as untimely and argued that MasonryPro’s indemnity issues could be resolved in a separate action. MasonryPro alternatively requested permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) if intervention as of right was denied.
The court must evaluate timeliness and MasonryPro’s interest to determine whether intervention is appropriate and in which form. The contractor emphasizes prejudice from delayed intervention and potential disruption of scheduled trial.
How should the court rule on intervention?
A) Grant intervention as of right because MasonryPro’s contractual rights are directly at stake and must be protected.
B) Deny both mandatory and permissive intervention because MasonryPro’s motion is untimely and would prejudice existing parties.
C) Deny mandatory intervention as of right but grant permissive intervention due to common questions of law and equity.
D) Grant intervention as of right but impose conditions to prevent trial delay.
15. A plaintiff filed a discrimination suit in federal court alleging that a corporate officer, identified only as “John Doe,” retaliated against her in violation of Title VII. The complaint named ASCII Corp and “John Doe” and was filed on January 10. The plaintiff discovered the officer’s actual identity on March 20 and sought to amend her complaint on April 15 to replace “John Doe” with the officer’s real name. Service of the amended complaint was not effected until May 30, beyond the 90‐day service period under Rule 4(m).
The corporate officer moved to dismiss the retaliation claim against him as time-barred. The plaintiff argued that the amendment relates back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) because she was unaware of the officer’s identity at filing and that the timely filing tolls the service deadline.
The court must decide whether the relation‐back doctrine allows the amendment to relate to the original filing date, curing the late service.
How should the court rule on the officer’s motion to dismiss?
A) Deny the motion because the amendment relates back under Rule 15(c) when identity was unknown.
B) Grant the motion because Title VII’s administrative‐exhaustion deadlines supersede Rule 15(c).
C) Deny the motion because equitable tolling applies when plaintiff demonstrates diligent investigation.
D) Grant the motion because replacing Doe with the real name does not constitute a mistake concerning the party’s identity.
16. A group of eight plaintiffs filed separate but nearly identical suits in eight different districts against AutoParts Corp. Each complaint alleged that a faulty brake component sold nationwide caused accidents. One plaintiff in State Y filed in district Y, where the purchase order bore a forum-selection clause mandating disputes be litigated only in district Y. The plaintiffs jointly petitioned the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to centralize all eight cases before a single judge for pretrial proceedings.
The Panel granted centralization under 28 U.S.C. 1407, consolidating all actions in district Z. AutoParts Corp. objected, arguing that centralizing the State Y action violates the parties’ forum-selection clause. The petitioners replied that the clause cannot bind the Panel’s authority to centralize for coordinated pretrial proceedings.
In district Z, AutoParts moved under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) to transfer the State Y case back to district Y, citing the forum-selection clause. Plaintiffs opposed, arguing that 1404(a) is unavailable because the Panel’s 1407 order governs venue for pretrial.
How should the Panel and district Z court rule on centralization and transfer of the State Y action?
A) Vacate centralization of the State Y action because the forum-selection clause bars transfer under 1407.
B) Deny the 1404(a) transfer motion but remand the State Y action to district Y because the clause controls over the Panel’s order.
C) Enforce the Panel’s 1407 consolidation and deny transfer under 1404(a), because multidistrict centralization supersedes contractual forum clauses for pretrial.
D) Grant transfer under 1404(a), treating the clause as controlling despite the Panel’s authority.
17. A plaintiff filed an antitrust complaint against MegaCorp in federal court in State M. MegaCorp moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing failure to plead a plausible conspiracy. The court denied the motion. MegaCorp then answered and promptly moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) on the same grounds. The court denied that motion as well.
After discovery, MegaCorp moved for summary judgment. The plaintiff filed a Rule 56(d) affidavit seeking additional discovery on internal documents and witness depositions to oppose summary judgment. The court deferred briefing and ordered limited discovery. Upon completion, MegaCorp renewed its attack on pleading sufficiency via a second Rule 12(c) motion.
The plaintiff opposed, arguing that Rule 12(g)(2) prohibits successive motions after the first 12(c) denial. MegaCorp asserted that the second motion sought to test the complaint against the discovery record rather than the pleadings alone.
How should the court rule on MegaCorp’s successive Rule 12(c) motion?
A) Grant the motion because the post-discovery record reveals no genuine factual issues supporting the conspiracy claim.
B) Deny the motion because Rule 12(g)(2) bars successive Rule 12(c) motions once one has been denied.
C) Treat the motion as a Rule 56 motion and evaluate under summary-judgment standards.
D) Deny the motion as untimely and require MegaCorp to raise any deficiency via Rule 56.
18. A pharmaceutical distributor filed suit against a transporter in federal court in State N for breach of a shipping contract. The contract required delivery to warehouse N, but the distributor erroneously sued in State O, where only negotiations occurred. The transporter moved under Rule 12(b)(3) to dismiss for improper venue. Instead of seeking transfer under 28 U.S.C. 1406(a), the transporter asked the court under 1404(a) to transfer to State N.
The distributor opposed transfer, arguing that 1404(a) does not apply to venue objections and that the proper remedy is dismissal or transfer under 1406(a). The transporter replied that 1404(a) serves equitable interests and provides a better remedy than outright dismissal.
The court must decide whether to treat the transporter’s motion as a 1404(a) transfer or require application of 1406(a) to address improper venue.
How should the court rule?
A) Grant transfer under 1404(a) because convenience interests justify sending the case to State N.
B) Deny the 1404(a) motion and dismiss or transfer under 1406(a) as the distributor’s choice of venue was improper.
C) Convert the 1404(a) motion into a 1406(a) motion and transfer to State N in the interest of justice.
D) Deny both motions and retain the case because venue questions are waived by the transporter’s failure to timely object.
19. A city police officer named Doe filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 in federal court in State P asserting excessive-force claims against the city and five officers. The city and three officers moved for summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds. The district court denied immunity without specifying factual findings. The plaintiff then voluntarily dismissed all claims against two officers with prejudice.
The underlying case proceeded against the remaining defendants, resulting in a jury verdict for the city and officers on the merits. The three officers appealed the denial of qualified immunity prior to trial.
Which of the defendants’ appeals is properly before the appellate court?
A) The appeal of the immunity denial for all three officers, because qualified immunity orders are immediately reviewable under the collateral order doctrine.
B) The appeal of the immunity denial only for the two officers still in the case at trial.
C) No interlocutory appeals are proper, because qualified immunity can only be reviewed after final judgment.
D) The appeal of the immunity denial for the three officers who moved for summary judgment, even if some claims were later dismissed.
20. A national consumer‐rights nonprofit filed a putative class action in federal district court in State U under the Fair Trade Practices Act, seeking damages and injunctive relief to stop deceptive fee disclosures. The complaint alleged uniform use of a misleading contract provision and requested certification under Rule 23(b)(3) for damages and (b)(2) for injunctive relief. Extensive discovery followed, including depositions, document production, and expert disclosures.
After briefing, the district court issued a detailed opinion denying class certification in its entirety, finding that common issues did not predominate for damages and that the injunctive class failed adequacy and typicality requirements. The court’s order did not include a Rule 54(b) certification of the non-final aspects. Proceedings in the underlying case continued, with the parties engaging in merits briefing and motion practice on individual claims.
Within 14 days of the class‐certification denial, the nonprofit filed a notice of appeal to the circuit court without seeking leave under Rule 23(f). The defendant moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that class‐certification decisions are interlocutory and only appealable via Rule 23(f). The nonprofit contended the order was final as to class status and could be appealed under 28 U.S.C. 1291 as effectively a final determination of class issues.
How should the appellate court proceed in evaluating jurisdiction over the appeal?
A) Hear the appeal because denial of class certification conclusively resolves class status and thus qualifies as a final decision.
B) Hear the appeal under the collateral‐order doctrine, since class‐certification rulings affect substantial rights separate from the merits.
C) Dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Rule 23(f) provides the exclusive mechanism for interlocutory appeals of class‐certification orders.
D) Dismiss the appeal because the district court’s failure to certify under Rule 54(b) renders the order non‐appealable.
21. A multinational logistics company headquartered in State A entered into a warehousing and distribution agreement with a regional supplier based in State B. The agreement included a clause requiring all disputes to be resolved in the state or federal courts of State A. After a series of late shipments and inventory discrepancies, the supplier filed suit in federal court in State B, asserting breach of contract and negligence. The logistics company moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3), citing the forum-selection clause and requesting transfer to State A under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a).
The supplier opposed the motion, arguing that the clause was buried in boilerplate terms and that litigating in State A would impose significant financial hardship on its small business. It also claimed that the clause was unenforceable because it was not specifically negotiated and would contravene public policy favoring access to local courts. The logistics company responded that the clause was clearly stated in the agreement, that both parties were sophisticated commercial entities, and that inconvenience alone is not a basis to disregard a valid forum-selection clause.
The district court must determine whether to enforce the clause and transfer the case, or whether the supplier’s objections justify retaining venue in State B. The court considers the enforceability of the clause under federal law and the weight it must give to the parties’ contractual choice of forum.
How should the court rule on the motion?
A) Deny the motion because the supplier demonstrated that enforcing the clause would be unduly burdensome and contrary to public policy.
B) Grant the motion because the clause is enforceable and the supplier’s inconvenience does not override the parties’ agreement.
C) Deny the motion because the clause was not specifically negotiated and is therefore unenforceable.
D) Grant the motion only if the logistics company agrees to cover the supplier’s litigation expenses in State A.
22. A plaintiff filed a diversity action in federal court in State C against a foreign manufacturer and its U.S. distributor, alleging product liability and negligence. The manufacturer, based in Country X, was served under the Hague Convention. The distributor, incorporated in State D, was served domestically. The manufacturer moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that it had no direct contacts with State C and that all sales were made through the distributor.
The plaintiff argued that the manufacturer placed its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation they would be sold in State C, and that the distributor’s marketing and sales activities in State C should be imputed to the manufacturer. The manufacturer replied that it had no control over the distributor’s sales territory and that it did not target State C specifically.
The court must determine whether the manufacturer’s conduct satisfies the minimum contacts requirement for specific jurisdiction under the stream-of-commerce theory.
How should the court rule on the manufacturer’s motion?
A) Grant the motion because the manufacturer did not purposefully direct its products to State C and had no control over the distributor’s sales.
B) Deny the motion because the distributor’s sales in State C establish general jurisdiction over the manufacturer.
C) Grant the motion because the Hague Convention prohibits jurisdiction based solely on stream-of-commerce placement.
D) Deny the motion because placing goods into the stream of commerce with awareness they may reach State C satisfies specific jurisdiction.
23. A federal district court in State E entered a preliminary injunction against a defendant in a trademark infringement case. The injunction prohibited the defendant from using certain marks pending trial. The defendant filed an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1), challenging the injunction’s scope and the district court’s factual findings. The plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the injunction was not immediately appealable because it did not alter the status quo.
The defendant responded that the injunction significantly changed its business operations and imposed immediate compliance costs, making it appealable under the collateral order doctrine. The plaintiff maintained that the injunction merely preserved the status quo and that any appeal should wait until final judgment.
The appellate court must determine whether it has jurisdiction to hear the appeal of the preliminary injunction.
How should the court rule?
A) Dismiss the appeal because the injunction did not alter the status quo and is not immediately appealable.
B) Hear the appeal because preliminary injunctions are appealable as of right under 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1).
C) Dismiss the appeal because the collateral order doctrine does not apply to injunctions in trademark cases.
D) Hear the appeal only if the defendant can show irreparable harm from compliance with the injunction.
24. A plaintiff filed a complaint in federal court in State F alleging fraud and breach of fiduciary duty against a former business partner. The defendant filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court granted the motion in part, dismissing the fraud claim but allowing the fiduciary duty claim to proceed. The plaintiff then filed an amended complaint reasserting the fraud claim with additional factual allegations.
The defendant moved to strike the amended fraud claim, arguing that the court’s prior dismissal was with prejudice and that the plaintiff did not seek leave to amend. The plaintiff responded that the court’s order did not specify whether dismissal was with or without prejudice and that Rule 15(a)(1)(B) permits amendment as of right within 21 days of a Rule 12 motion.
The court must determine whether the plaintiff was entitled to reassert the fraud claim in the amended complaint.
How should the court rule?
A) Deny the motion to strike because the plaintiff had a right to amend under Rule 15(a)(1)(B) within 21 days of the motion.
B) Grant the motion to strike because the plaintiff failed to seek leave to amend after a dismissal order.
C) Deny the motion to strike because the court’s silence on prejudice means the dismissal was without prejudice.
D) Grant the motion to strike because fraud claims require leave to amend under Rule 9(b).
25. A class action was filed in federal court in State G under Rule 23(b)(3), alleging deceptive advertising by a national retailer. The court certified the class and approved a settlement that included injunctive relief and a cy pres distribution of unclaimed funds to a consumer advocacy group. Several unnamed class members objected, arguing that the cy pres award was improper because it did not benefit the class directly.
The district court overruled the objections and entered final judgment. The objectors appealed, challenging the fairness of the settlement and the propriety of the cy pres distribution. The retailer moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the objectors lacked standing because they did not opt out or suffer individualized harm.
The appellate court must determine whether the objectors have standing to challenge the settlement.
How should the court rule?
A) Dismiss the appeal because only named plaintiffs have standing to challenge class settlements.
B) Hear the appeal because objectors to a class settlement have standing to appeal final approval.
C) Dismiss the appeal because cy pres distributions are discretionary and not subject to appellate review.
D) Hear the appeal only if the objectors can show they would have received a direct monetary benefit.
26. A plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit in State M alleging breach of contract and fraud against a defendant who resides in State N. The contract involved the sale of specialized industrial equipment, and the plaintiff alleged that the defendant knowingly misrepresented the equipment’s specifications during negotiations. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), arguing that he had no physical presence in State M and that all negotiations occurred via email and phone from State N. The plaintiff countered that the defendant had purposefully availed himself of State M by soliciting business from a company headquartered there and by shipping the equipment directly to State M.
The defendant argued that the plaintiff’s headquarters in State M was irrelevant because the contract was performed entirely in State N, where the equipment was manufactured and inspected before shipment. The defendant also emphasized that he did not initiate contact with the plaintiff but merely responded to inquiries. The plaintiff, however, pointed to the defendant’s repeated communications with its representatives in State M and the fact that the equipment’s delivery to State M was a key term of the contract.
How should the court rule on the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction?
A) Deny the motion because the defendant’s shipment of goods to State M constitutes purposeful availment.
B) Grant the motion because the defendant’s contacts with State M were insufficient to establish minimum contacts.
C) Deny the motion because the plaintiff’s claims arise out of the defendant’s business dealings with a company headquartered in State M.
D) Grant the motion because the defendant did not initiate contact with the plaintiff and performed the contract in State N.
27. A plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit in State O alleging that a pharmaceutical company’s defective drug caused severe injuries. The company moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that the complaint failed to plead sufficient facts to establish causation. The plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the drug was defective due to improper manufacturing but did not specify how the defect caused the injuries. The plaintiff argued that causation could be inferred from the severity of the injuries and the timing of the drug’s use.
The defendant countered that the plaintiff’s allegations were conclusory and failed to identify any specific defect in the drug or explain how that defect caused the injuries. The defendant also argued that the complaint did not rule out alternative causes for the injuries, such as preexisting conditions or other medications. The plaintiff responded that detailed causation evidence was unnecessary at the pleading stage and that the allegations were sufficient to put the defendant on notice of the claims.
Should the court grant the defendant’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)?
A) Grant the motion because the complaint fails to allege specific facts linking the defect to the injuries.
B) Deny the motion because causation can be inferred from the timing and severity of the injuries.
C) Grant the motion because Twombly and Iqbal require detailed factual allegations, which are absent here.
D) Deny the motion because the complaint provides sufficient notice of the claims to the defendant.
28. A federal district court in State P certified a class action under Rule 23(b)(3) involving claims of deceptive marketing against a national retailer. The retailer moved to decertify the class after discovery revealed significant variations in the marketing materials used in different regions. The retailer argued that the variations made it impossible to establish commonality and predominance, as required under Rule 23(a)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3). The plaintiffs countered that the core issue—whether the retailer’s marketing was deceptive—was common to all class members and that individual differences in the materials could be addressed during damages calculations.
The retailer also argued that the named plaintiffs were not typical of the class because they were exposed to marketing materials that differed significantly from those seen by other class members. The plaintiffs responded that the variations were minor and did not affect the central question of whether the retailer’s overall marketing strategy was deceptive.
Should the court grant the retailer’s motion to decertify the class?
A) Grant the motion because the variations in marketing materials defeat commonality and predominance.
B) Deny the motion because the core issue of deception is common to all class members.
C) Grant the motion because the named plaintiffs are not typical of the class.
D) Deny the motion because individual differences in marketing materials are irrelevant to class certification.
29. A plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit in State Q alleging that a competitor violated antitrust laws by engaging in predatory pricing. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff failed to present evidence of below-cost pricing or a dangerous probability of recouping losses. The plaintiff opposed the motion, submitting an expert report that estimated the defendant’s costs and concluded that its prices were below cost in certain markets. The defendant challenged the report’s methodology and argued that it was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.
The court must determine whether the plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient to survive summary judgment. The analysis focuses on whether the expert report provides a reliable basis for concluding that the defendant engaged in below-cost pricing and whether the plaintiff has presented evidence of a dangerous probability of recoupment.
Should the court grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment?
A) Grant the motion because the plaintiff failed to present evidence of a dangerous probability of recoupment.
B) Deny the motion because the expert report creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding below-cost pricing.
C) Grant the motion because the expert report’s methodology is unreliable and cannot support a finding of below-cost pricing.
D) Deny the motion because the plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to survive summary judgment.
30. A plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit in State R alleging that a software company breached a licensing agreement by failing to provide updates and technical support. The defendant moved to compel arbitration under the agreement’s arbitration clause, which required all disputes to be resolved through binding arbitration in State S. The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that the arbitration clause was unconscionable because it required the plaintiff to travel to State S and pay substantial arbitration fees. The defendant responded that the clause was negotiated by sophisticated parties and that the plaintiff had agreed to it voluntarily.
The court must determine whether the arbitration clause is enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The analysis focuses on whether the clause is procedurally and substantively unconscionable and whether the FAA’s strong presumption in favor of arbitration applies.
Should the court enforce the arbitration clause?
A) Grant the motion because the FAA requires enforcement of arbitration clauses unless they are invalid under state law.
B) Deny the motion because the arbitration clause is substantively unconscionable due to the high costs imposed on the plaintiff.
C) Grant the motion because the plaintiff voluntarily agreed to the arbitration clause during negotiations.
D) Deny the motion because the arbitration clause is procedurally unconscionable due to the unequal bargaining power of the parties.
31. A plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit in State A alleging that a supplier breached a long-term contract to provide raw materials at a fixed price. The supplier invoked the contract’s price adjustment clause, arguing that unforeseen market conditions had caused the cost of production to skyrocket, making performance commercially impracticable. The plaintiff countered that the supplier had failed to provide adequate notice of its intent to invoke the clause and that the market conditions were foreseeable at the time of contracting.
The supplier presented evidence showing that the price of the raw materials had increased by 300% due to geopolitical instability and supply chain disruptions. The plaintiff argued that the supplier could have mitigated the impact by sourcing materials from alternative suppliers or renegotiating terms with its own vendors. The supplier responded that such alternatives were not viable because they would have required significant capital investment and would have delayed delivery, violating the contract’s timeline.
The plaintiff also contended that the supplier’s invocation of the price adjustment clause was invalid because the clause required mutual agreement on the adjusted price, which had not been reached. The supplier argued that the clause allowed unilateral adjustment in cases of extreme market volatility and that the plaintiff’s refusal to negotiate was unreasonable. The court must determine whether the supplier’s invocation of the price adjustment clause is valid under the circumstances.
Should the court enforce the supplier’s invocation of the price adjustment clause?
A) Deny enforcement because the supplier failed to provide adequate notice of its intent to invoke the clause.
B) Grant enforcement because the price adjustment clause allows unilateral adjustment in cases of extreme market volatility.
C) Deny enforcement because the supplier could have mitigated the impact by sourcing alternative materials.
D) Grant enforcement because the supplier’s performance was commercially impracticable due to unforeseen market conditions.
32. A plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit in State B alleging that a competitor violated antitrust laws by engaging in exclusive dealing arrangements with key distributors. The plaintiff argued that the arrangements foreclosed competition in the relevant market and prevented new entrants from gaining access to distribution channels. The competitor moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff failed to define the relevant market or demonstrate substantial foreclosure.
The plaintiff submitted expert testimony defining the relevant market as high-end consumer electronics and showing that the competitor controlled 80% of the distribution channels within that market. The competitor countered that the expert’s analysis was flawed because it excluded lower-end electronics, which are reasonable substitutes. The plaintiff responded that lower-end electronics are not interchangeable with high-end products due to differences in quality and target consumers.
The competitor also argued that its exclusive dealing arrangements were procompetitive because they incentivized distributors to invest in marketing and customer service. The plaintiff countered that the arrangements harmed competition by reducing consumer choice and increasing prices. The court must determine whether the plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient to survive summary judgment.
Should the court grant the competitor’s motion for summary judgment?
A) Grant the motion because the plaintiff failed to define the relevant market accurately.
B) Deny the motion because the plaintiff presented evidence of substantial foreclosure in the relevant market.
C) Grant the motion because exclusive dealing arrangements are presumptively procompetitive.
D) Deny the motion because lower-end electronics are not reasonable substitutes for high-end products.
33. A plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit in State C alleging that a real estate developer breached a contract to purchase land. The contract included a specific performance clause requiring the developer to complete the purchase if the plaintiff fulfilled all conditions. The developer moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff failed to deliver clear title to the property, which was a condition precedent to performance. The plaintiff countered that the title defect was minor and could be resolved before closing.
The developer argued that the title defect exposed it to potential litigation and that the contract explicitly required clear title as a condition precedent. The plaintiff responded that the defect was immaterial and that the developer’s refusal to proceed was a breach of the implied duty of good faith. The court must determine whether the plaintiff’s failure to deliver clear title excuses the developer’s performance under the contract.
Should the court enforce the specific performance clause?
A) Grant the motion to dismiss because the plaintiff failed to satisfy a condition precedent.
B) Deny the motion to dismiss because the title defect was immaterial and could be resolved before closing.
C) Grant the motion to dismiss because the developer’s refusal to proceed was justified under the contract terms.
D) Deny the motion to dismiss because the implied duty of good faith requires the developer to proceed despite minor defects.
34. A plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit in State D alleging that a competitor violated trade secret laws by misappropriating proprietary software algorithms. The plaintiff sought an injunction to prevent the competitor from using the algorithms, arguing that they were developed through years of research and were not publicly available. The competitor moved to dismiss, arguing that the algorithms were not trade secrets because they were disclosed in a patent application filed by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff countered that the algorithms disclosed in the patent application were only partial and that the full algorithms remained confidential. The competitor argued that the partial disclosure was sufficient to render the algorithms non-secret and that the plaintiff failed to take reasonable steps to protect their confidentiality. The court must determine whether the plaintiff’s algorithms qualify as trade secrets under applicable law.
Should the court grant the competitor’s motion to dismiss?
A) Grant the motion because the algorithms were disclosed in the patent application and are not trade secrets.
B) Deny the motion because the plaintiff demonstrated that the full algorithms remained confidential.
C) Grant the motion because the plaintiff failed to take reasonable steps to protect the algorithms’ confidentiality.
D) Deny the motion because partial disclosure does not negate trade secret protection for the undisclosed portions.
35. A plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit in State E alleging that a financial advisor breached fiduciary duties by recommending high-risk investments without disclosing conflicts of interest. The advisor moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate actual damages because the investments ultimately generated a profit. The plaintiff countered that the breach of fiduciary duty caused emotional distress and exposed the plaintiff to unnecessary financial risk.
The advisor argued that fiduciary duty claims require proof of actual damages and that emotional distress is insufficient to sustain the claim. The plaintiff responded that the advisor’s failure to disclose conflicts of interest violated the duty of loyalty and that damages are not always required to establish liability. The court must determine whether the plaintiff’s fiduciary duty claim can proceed despite the lack of actual damages.
Should the court grant the advisor’s motion for summary judgment?
A) Grant the motion because fiduciary duty claims require proof of actual damages.
B) Deny the motion because the advisor’s breach of the duty of loyalty establishes liability regardless of damages.
C) Grant the motion because emotional distress is insufficient to sustain a fiduciary duty claim.
D) Deny the motion because exposure to financial risk constitutes harm under fiduciary duty law.
36. A plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit in State F alleging that a pharmaceutical company violated the False Claims Act (FCA) by submitting fraudulent claims to Medicare for reimbursement. The plaintiff, a former employee of the company, alleged that the company knowingly marketed a drug for off-label uses not approved by the FDA and concealed adverse side effects from regulators. The company moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff failed to plead fraud with particularity as required by Rule 9(b).
The plaintiff’s complaint included general allegations that the company’s sales representatives were instructed to promote the drug for off-label uses and that internal emails showed awareness of the adverse side effects. However, the plaintiff did not identify specific claims submitted to Medicare or provide details about the alleged fraudulent billing practices. The company argued that the lack of specific examples of false claims was fatal to the complaint.
The plaintiff countered that the fraudulent scheme was systemic and that it was unreasonable to expect a former employee to have access to specific billing records. The plaintiff also argued that the complaint provided sufficient detail to put the company on notice of the claims and that discovery would reveal the specific false claims. The court must determine whether the plaintiff’s allegations satisfy the heightened pleading standard under Rule 9(b).
Should the court grant the company’s motion to dismiss?
A) Grant the motion because the plaintiff failed to identify specific false claims submitted to Medicare.
B) Deny the motion because the plaintiff alleged a systemic fraudulent scheme with sufficient particularity.
C) Grant the motion because Rule 9(b) requires detailed allegations of fraudulent billing practices.
D) Deny the motion because discovery will reveal the specific false claims.
37. A plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit in State G alleging that a competitor violated the Lanham Act by making false and misleading statements about the plaintiff’s product in advertising campaigns. The plaintiff alleged that the competitor’s advertisements falsely claimed that the plaintiff’s product was unsafe and that the competitor’s product was superior in quality. The competitor moved for summary judgment, arguing that the statements were non-actionable opinions and that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate actual harm.
The plaintiff submitted consumer surveys showing that the competitor’s advertisements caused a significant decline in the plaintiff’s market share and that consumers believed the false claims. The competitor argued that the surveys were unreliable because they failed to account for other factors affecting market share, such as changes in consumer preferences and economic conditions. The plaintiff responded that the surveys were conducted by reputable experts and provided strong evidence of causation.
The competitor also argued that its statements were protected under the First Amendment as commercial speech and that the plaintiff failed to prove the statements were made with actual malice. The plaintiff countered that the Lanham Act does not require proof of malice and that the competitor’s statements were false factual assertions, not protected opinions. The court must determine whether the plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient to survive summary judgment.
Should the court grant the competitor’s motion for summary judgment?
A) Deny the motion because the plaintiff presented evidence of causation through consumer surveys.
B) Grant the motion because the competitor’s statements were non-actionable opinions.
C) Deny the motion because the competitor’s statements were false factual assertions, not protected opinions.
D) Grant the motion because the plaintiff failed to prove actual malice.
38. A plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit in State H alleging that a bank violated the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) by failing to disclose key terms in a mortgage agreement. The plaintiff alleged that the bank did not clearly disclose the annual percentage rate (APR) or the total cost of the loan over its term. The bank moved for summary judgment, arguing that the disclosures complied with TILA’s requirements and that any omissions were immaterial.
The plaintiff presented evidence that the bank’s disclosures were buried in fine print and that the APR was miscalculated, resulting in an understatement of the loan’s total cost. The bank countered that the plaintiff signed the agreement acknowledging receipt of all required disclosures and that the alleged errors were minor and did not affect the plaintiff’s decision to enter into the loan.
The plaintiff argued that TILA imposes strict liability for disclosure violations and that the bank’s failure to provide accurate and conspicuous disclosures was a clear violation. The bank responded that strict liability does not apply to immaterial errors and that the plaintiff suffered no actual harm. The court must determine whether the bank’s disclosures violated TILA and whether the plaintiff’s claim can proceed.
Should the court grant the bank’s motion for summary judgment?
A) Deny the motion because TILA imposes strict liability for disclosure violations.
B) Grant the motion because the plaintiff acknowledged receipt of all required disclosures.
C) Deny the motion because the bank’s failure to provide accurate and conspicuous disclosures violated TILA.
D) Grant the motion because the alleged errors were immaterial and did not affect the plaintiff’s decision.
39. A plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit in State I alleging that a software company breached a licensing agreement by failing to provide promised updates and technical support. The company moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff failed to comply with the agreement’s dispute resolution clause, which required mediation before filing suit. The plaintiff countered that the company waived its right to enforce the clause by failing to respond to multiple requests for mediation.
The company argued that the plaintiff’s requests for mediation were informal and did not comply with the procedural requirements outlined in the agreement. The plaintiff responded that the company’s refusal to engage in mediation rendered compliance futile and that the dispute resolution clause should not bar the lawsuit. The court must determine whether the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the dispute resolution clause precludes the lawsuit.
Should the court grant the company’s motion to dismiss?
A) Deny the motion because the company waived its right to enforce the dispute resolution clause.
B) Grant the motion because the plaintiff failed to comply with the procedural requirements for mediation.
C) Deny the motion because the company’s refusal to mediate rendered compliance futile.
D) Grant the motion because the dispute resolution clause is enforceable and bars the lawsuit.
40. A plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit in State J alleging that a competitor violated trade secret laws by misappropriating proprietary customer data. The plaintiff sought damages and an injunction, arguing that the data was obtained through unauthorized access to its servers. The competitor moved for summary judgment, arguing that the data did not qualify as a trade secret because it was not adequately protected.
The plaintiff presented evidence that the data was stored on password-protected servers and that employees were required to sign confidentiality agreements. The competitor argued that the plaintiff failed to implement additional security measures, such as encryption, and that the data was accessible to third-party vendors. The plaintiff responded that the measures taken were reasonable under the circumstances and that the competitor’s unauthorized access demonstrated the data’s value.
The competitor also argued that the data was publicly available through other sources and that the plaintiff failed to prove it derived independent economic value from its secrecy. The plaintiff countered that the data was compiled through proprietary methods and that its value lay in the compilation, not the individual pieces of information. The court must determine whether the plaintiff’s customer data qualifies as a trade secret.
Should the court grant the competitor’s motion for summary judgment?
A) Deny the motion because the plaintiff demonstrated reasonable efforts to protect the data.
B) Grant the motion because the data was not adequately protected through encryption.
C) Deny the motion because the data’s value lay in its proprietary compilation.
D) Grant the motion because the data was publicly available through other sources.
41. A plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit in State K alleging that a manufacturer breached a contract to supply custom-designed components for a renewable energy project. The contract included a clause requiring the manufacturer to meet strict performance specifications and delivery deadlines. The manufacturer failed to deliver the components on time, citing delays caused by a global shortage of raw materials. The plaintiff argued that the manufacturer’s failure to deliver constituted a material breach and sought damages for lost profits.
The manufacturer countered that the delays were excused under the contract’s force majeure clause, which covered supply chain disruptions. The plaintiff argued that the manufacturer failed to notify them of the delays in a timely manner, as required by the clause, and that the shortage was foreseeable at the time of contracting. The manufacturer responded that it had made reasonable efforts to mitigate the impact of the shortage, including sourcing alternative materials, but was unable to meet the specifications without the original materials.
The plaintiff also contended that the manufacturer’s mitigation efforts were insufficient because it failed to explore all available alternatives, such as subcontracting production to third parties. The manufacturer argued that subcontracting would have violated the contract’s confidentiality provisions and that the plaintiff’s proposed alternatives were impractical. The court must determine whether the manufacturer’s invocation of the force majeure clause is valid under the circumstances.
Should the court enforce the force majeure clause to excuse the manufacturer’s performance?
A) Deny enforcement because the manufacturer failed to notify the plaintiff of the delays in a timely manner.
B) Grant enforcement because the global shortage of raw materials qualifies as a force majeure event.
C) Deny enforcement because the manufacturer’s mitigation efforts were insufficient.
D) Grant enforcement because subcontracting production would have violated the contract’s confidentiality provisions.
42. A plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit in State L alleging that a competitor violated antitrust laws by engaging in predatory pricing to drive the plaintiff out of the market. The plaintiff argued that the competitor sold its products below cost in key markets and that the pricing strategy was intended to eliminate competition. The competitor moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff failed to present evidence of below-cost pricing or a dangerous probability of recouping losses.
The plaintiff submitted an expert report analyzing the competitor’s pricing strategy and concluding that its prices were below cost in certain markets. The competitor challenged the report’s methodology, arguing that it failed to account for economies of scale and other cost-saving measures. The plaintiff responded that the competitor’s pricing was unsustainable and that its losses in the targeted markets demonstrated a predatory intent.
The competitor also argued that its pricing strategy was procompetitive because it benefited consumers by lowering prices. The plaintiff countered that the strategy harmed competition by reducing consumer choice and creating barriers to market entry. The court must determine whether the plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient to survive summary judgment.
Should the court grant the competitor’s motion for summary judgment?
A) Grant the motion because the plaintiff failed to present evidence of a dangerous probability of recouping losses.
B) Deny the motion because the plaintiff presented evidence of below-cost pricing and predatory intent.
C) Grant the motion because the expert report’s methodology is unreliable and cannot support the plaintiff’s claims.
D) Deny the motion because predatory pricing strategies harm competition by reducing consumer choice.
43. A plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit in State M alleging that a software company breached a licensing agreement by failing to provide promised updates and technical support. The company moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff failed to comply with the agreement’s dispute resolution clause, which required arbitration before filing suit. The plaintiff countered that the arbitration clause was unconscionable because it required arbitration in a distant jurisdiction and imposed excessive fees.
The company argued that the arbitration clause was negotiated by sophisticated parties and that the plaintiff voluntarily agreed to its terms. The plaintiff responded that the clause was procedurally unconscionable because the company had superior bargaining power and substantively unconscionable because the fees were prohibitively expensive. The company countered that the fees were standard in the industry and that the plaintiff’s claims of unequal bargaining power were unsupported.
The plaintiff also argued that the arbitration clause violated public policy by effectively barring access to justice for individuals with limited financial resources. The company responded that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) establishes a strong presumption in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements and that the plaintiff’s arguments were insufficient to overcome this presumption. The court must determine whether the arbitration clause is enforceable under the FAA.
Should the court enforce the arbitration clause?
A) Grant the motion because the FAA requires enforcement of arbitration clauses unless they are invalid under state law.
B) Deny the motion because the arbitration clause is procedurally and substantively unconscionable.
C) Grant the motion because the plaintiff voluntarily agreed to the arbitration clause during negotiations.
D) Deny the motion because the arbitration clause violates public policy by barring access to justice.
44. A plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit in State N alleging that a competitor violated trade secret laws by misappropriating proprietary manufacturing processes. The plaintiff sought damages and an injunction, arguing that the processes were developed through years of research and were not publicly available. The competitor moved for summary judgment, arguing that the processes did not qualify as trade secrets because they were disclosed in industry publications.
The plaintiff countered that the publications only described general aspects of the processes and that the specific details remained confidential. The competitor argued that the plaintiff failed to implement adequate security measures, such as restricting access to the processes or requiring employees to sign non-disclosure agreements. The plaintiff responded that the processes were protected through physical security measures and that the competitor’s unauthorized access demonstrated their value.
The competitor also argued that the processes were independently developed through reverse engineering and that the plaintiff failed to prove misappropriation. The plaintiff countered that the competitor’s reverse engineering claim was unsupported and that the timing of the competitor’s use of the processes coincided with the unauthorized access. The court must determine whether the plaintiff’s manufacturing processes qualify as trade secrets.
Should the court grant the competitor’s motion for summary judgment?
A) Deny the motion because the plaintiff demonstrated reasonable efforts to protect the processes.
B) Grant the motion because the processes were disclosed in industry publications.
C) Deny the motion because the competitor’s reverse engineering claim is unsupported.
D) Grant the motion because the plaintiff failed to prove misappropriation.
45. A plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit in State O alleging that a financial advisor breached fiduciary duties by recommending high-risk investments without disclosing conflicts of interest. The advisor moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate actual damages because the investments ultimately generated a profit. The plaintiff countered that the breach of fiduciary duty caused emotional distress and exposed the plaintiff to unnecessary financial risk.
The advisor argued that fiduciary duty claims require proof of actual damages and that emotional distress is insufficient to sustain the claim. The plaintiff responded that the advisor’s failure to disclose conflicts of interest violated the duty of loyalty and that damages are not always required to establish liability. The court must determine whether the plaintiff’s fiduciary duty claim can proceed despite the lack of actual damages.
Should the court grant the advisor’s motion for summary judgment?
A) Grant the motion because fiduciary duty claims require proof of actual damages.
B) Deny the motion because the advisor’s breach of the duty of loyalty establishes liability regardless of damages.
C) Grant the motion because emotional distress is insufficient to sustain a fiduciary duty claim.
D) Deny the motion because exposure to financial risk constitutes harm under fiduciary duty law.
46. A plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit in State U alleging that a contractor breached a construction contract by failing to complete a commercial building project on time. The contract included a liquidated damages clause requiring the contractor to pay $15,000 per day for delays. The contractor argued that the delays were caused by the plaintiff’s failure to provide timely approvals for design changes and that the liquidated damages clause was unenforceable because it constituted a penalty.
The plaintiff countered that the contractor failed to request approvals in a timely manner and that the liquidated damages clause was a reasonable estimate of the damages caused by delays. The contractor presented evidence showing that the actual damages incurred by the plaintiff were significantly lower than the amount specified in the clause. The plaintiff responded that actual damages were difficult to calculate at the time of contracting and that the clause was intended to incentivize timely performance.
The contractor also argued that the liquidated damages clause was unconscionable because it imposed an excessive financial burden. The plaintiff countered that the clause was negotiated by sophisticated parties and reflected industry standards for similar projects. The court must determine whether the liquidated damages clause is enforceable under applicable contract law.
Should the court enforce the liquidated damages clause?
A) Grant enforcement because the clause reflects a reasonable estimate of damages and was negotiated by sophisticated parties.
B) Deny enforcement because the actual damages were significantly lower than the amount specified in the clause.
C) Grant enforcement because liquidated damages clauses are always enforceable in commercial contracts.
D) Deny enforcement because the clause imposes an excessive financial burden on the contractor.
47. A plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit in State V alleging that a competitor violated the Lanham Act by using a confusingly similar trademark to market its products. The plaintiff argued that the competitor’s use of the mark caused consumer confusion and diluted the distinctiveness of the plaintiff’s brand. The competitor moved for summary judgment, arguing that the marks were not similar enough to cause confusion and that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate actual harm.
The plaintiff presented survey evidence showing that a significant percentage of consumers believed the competitor’s products were affiliated with the plaintiff’s brand. The competitor argued that the survey was flawed because it failed to account for differences in the products’ packaging and marketing channels. The plaintiff responded that the overall similarity of the marks outweighed any differences in presentation.
The competitor also argued that its use of the mark was protected as fair use because it described a characteristic of its products. The plaintiff countered that the competitor’s use was not descriptive but rather intended to capitalize on the plaintiff’s goodwill. The court must determine whether the plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient to survive summary judgment.
Should the court grant the competitor’s motion for summary judgment?
A) Grant the motion because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate actual harm.
B) Deny the motion because the competitor’s use of the mark was not protected as fair use.
C) Grant the motion because the marks were not similar enough to cause confusion.
D) Deny the motion because the plaintiff presented survey evidence of consumer confusion.
48. A plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit in State W alleging that a bank violated the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) by denying a loan application based on the plaintiff’s marital status. The plaintiff alleged that the bank required a co-signer for married applicants but not for single applicants, which constituted unlawful discrimination. The bank moved for summary judgment, arguing that its policy was based on legitimate creditworthiness considerations and was applied uniformly to all applicants.
The plaintiff presented evidence showing that the bank’s policy disproportionately affected married applicants and that the bank failed to provide a clear explanation for the requirement. The bank argued that married applicants often have joint financial obligations that increase the risk of default and that the co-signer requirement was a reasonable measure to mitigate this risk. The plaintiff responded that the bank’s policy was not supported by statistical evidence and that it unfairly penalized married applicants.
The bank also argued that the ECOA allows lenders to consider marital status as a factor in assessing creditworthiness, provided it is not the sole basis for a decision. The plaintiff countered that the bank’s policy effectively treated marital status as the sole determining factor for requiring a co-signer. The court must determine whether the bank’s policy violates the ECOA.
Should the court grant the bank’s motion for summary judgment?
A) Grant the motion because the ECOA allows consideration of marital status in credit decisions.
B) Deny the motion because the plaintiff presented evidence of disparate impact on married applicants.
C) Grant the motion because the bank’s policy was based on legitimate creditworthiness considerations.
D) Deny the motion because the bank failed to provide statistical evidence supporting its policy.
49. A plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit in State X alleging that a competitor violated trade secret laws by misappropriating proprietary customer lists. The plaintiff sought damages and an injunction, arguing that the lists were compiled through extensive research and were not publicly available. The competitor moved for summary judgment, arguing that the lists did not qualify as trade secrets because they were accessible through public directories.
The plaintiff presented evidence showing that the lists included detailed customer preferences and purchasing histories, which were not available in public directories. The competitor argued that the plaintiff failed to implement adequate security measures, such as restricting access to the lists or requiring employees to sign non-disclosure agreements. The plaintiff responded that the lists were stored on secure servers and that access was limited to authorized personnel.
The competitor also argued that it independently developed its own customer lists through legitimate means and that the plaintiff failed to prove misappropriation. The plaintiff countered that the timing of the competitor’s use of the lists coincided with unauthorized access to the plaintiff’s servers. The court must determine whether the plaintiff’s customer lists qualify as trade secrets.
Should the court grant the competitor’s motion for summary judgment?
A) Deny the motion because the timing of the competitor’s use supports an inference of misappropriation.
B) Grant the motion because the lists were accessible through public directories.
C) Deny the motion because the plaintiff demonstrated reasonable efforts to protect the lists.
D) Grant the motion because the plaintiff failed to prove misappropriation.
50. A plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit in State Y alleging that a financial advisor breached fiduciary duties by recommending high-risk investments without disclosing conflicts of interest. The advisor moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate actual damages because the investments ultimately generated a profit. The plaintiff countered that the breach of fiduciary duty caused emotional distress and exposed the plaintiff to unnecessary financial risk.
The advisor argued that fiduciary duty claims require proof of actual damages and that emotional distress is insufficient to sustain the claim. The plaintiff responded that the advisor’s failure to disclose conflicts of interest violated the duty of loyalty and that damages are not always required to establish liability. The court must determine whether the plaintiff’s fiduciary duty claim can proceed despite the lack of actual damages.
Should the court grant the advisor’s motion for summary judgment?
A) Deny the motion because exposure to financial risk constitutes harm under fiduciary duty law.
B) Grant the motion because fiduciary duty claims require proof of actual damages.
C) Deny the motion because the advisor’s breach of the duty of loyalty establishes liability regardless of damages.
D) Grant the motion because emotional distress is insufficient to sustain a fiduciary duty claim.