Constitutional Law (Exam-level) Question Pack - Questions

1. A group of landowners filed suit in federal court challenging a newly enacted state ordinance that prohibited the construction of any permanent structures within 500 feet of designated wetland areas. The ordinance did not provide for compensation and applied retroactively to invalidate existing building permits. The plaintiffs alleged that the restriction effectively barred all economically viable use of several parcels and sought monetary damages for what they claimed was a regulatory taking.

The state argued that the ordinance was enacted to prevent long-term environmental degradation, citing scientific studies about flood risks and habitat preservation. It further asserted that no taking had occurred because the law did not physically invade private property and still allowed owners to retain title and use land for passive purposes like recreation. The state maintained that such zoning changes were part of its traditional police powers and did not trigger a duty to compensate.

The court must determine whether the ordinance, as applied to these landowners, constitutes a compensable taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Is the ordinance likely to be found unconstitutional as applied?

  1. Yes, because the ordinance results in a per se taking by retroactively revoking lawful building permits.
  2. No, because regulations adopted for environmental protection do not constitute takings absent physical invasion.
  3. Yes, because the ordinance deprives landowners of all economically beneficial use of their property.
  4. No, because the government acted under its police powers and retained title to the landowners' property.

2. A nonprofit organization filed suit in federal court challenging a new federal policy that limited access to certain government databases. The organization alleged the policy violated the public’s constitutional right to receive government information and hindered its work. It claimed injury based on staff delays, increased costs, and reduced ability to perform oversight.

The government moved to dismiss, arguing that the organization had not suffered a concrete or particularized injury and was raising only a generalized grievance about public access. The court noted that the plaintiffs were not directly regulated by the policy and had no individual entitlement to the databases under prior law. The organization responded that its mission depended on timely access and that the delays harmed its operations.

What is the court’s most likely basis for dismissal?

  1. The plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
  2. The challenge involves a political question inappropriate for judicial review.
  3. The plaintiffs lack standing because they suffered no legally cognizable injury.
  4. The issue is moot because the government may modify its policy at any time.

3. Congress passed a law requiring every state agency that receives federal funding to submit biannual compliance reports on its internal hiring and promotion practices. States that fail to submit reports lose access to discretionary federal grant funds. A state refused to comply, citing administrative burden and separation of powers concerns, and brought suit challenging the law’s constitutionality under the Tenth Amendment.

The federal government argued that the law did not compel states to legislate or take specific regulatory action, but merely conditioned access to discretionary funds. It maintained that Congress may attach conditions to federal spending when those conditions are related to the purpose of the funding and not unduly coercive. The state countered that the law infringed on its sovereign control over employment matters and required reallocation of agency resources.

The court must determine whether this statutory condition violates principles of federalism.

Should the court uphold the funding condition?

  1. No, because conditioning federal funds on compliance with employment reporting requirements violates state sovereignty.
  2. Yes, because states must adhere to any federal conditions imposed on spending programs.
  3. No, because the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from imposing administrative burdens on state agencies.
  4. Yes, because Congress may place reasonable conditions on federal spending that relate to the purpose of the funds.

4. During a declared public emergency, the President issued an executive order mandating private factories produce essential supplies under government contracts. One manufacturer refused, arguing that the President lacked authority to impose production duties without congressional approval. The government argued that emergency powers authorized direct economic control and that national security justified bypassing standard procedures.

In court, the manufacturer emphasized that Congress had declined to pass a law authorizing mandatory production and that the President was acting unilaterally. The government responded that the executive’s commander-in-chief and take care powers permitted swift action in the face of national threat. The manufacturer countered that military authority does not extend to the civilian economy.

What is the strongest constitutional argument against the executive order?

  1. It violates the Commerce Clause by regulating private businesses directly.
  2. It infringes on state sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment.
  3. It exceeds executive authority because no statute authorizes the action.
  4. It constitutes an unlawful taking under the Fifth Amendment.

5. A state passed a law banning the sale of imported electronics that did not meet certain recycling standards. A national retailer sued, arguing that the law interfered with federal environmental labeling requirements and created conflicting obligations for interstate commerce. The state argued its law protected natural resources and informed consumers, and that the federal labeling scheme did not expressly preempt state regulations.

In court, the retailer noted that complying with both federal and state standards was not possible because the products’ labeling was pre-approved at the national level. The state contended that its standards addressed disposal procedures, not labeling. The court reviewed the federal statute and determined that it created a uniform national standard for labeling and packaging.

What is the proper constitutional result?

  1. The state law is valid because environmental policy is a traditional state interest.
  2. The state law is valid because there is no direct conflict with federal standards.
  3. The state law is invalid because it discriminates against out-of-state businesses.
  4. The state law is invalid because it is preempted by federal regulations governing the same subject.

6. A state supreme court ruled against a company in a land-use dispute, relying solely on state law to interpret zoning regulations. The company petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari, claiming the ruling violated its Fifth Amendment rights against uncompensated takings. It argued that the state’s actions had effectively deprived it of economically viable use of its land.

The state supreme court opinion stated that its holding rested exclusively on state statutory interpretation, and that any federal constitutional issue was not preserved by the petitioner at trial. The petitioner's brief asserted that, regardless of waiver, the takings issue was central to the loss and that federal review was warranted.

The U.S. Supreme Court must now decide whether to hear the case.

Is the Supreme Court likely to grant review?

  1. Yes, because the Fifth Amendment issue deserves national resolution.
  2. Yes, because land-use regulations always implicate federal constitutional concerns.
  3. No, because the issue was waived at trial by the petitioner.
  4. No, because the state judgment rests on an adequate and independent state law ground.

7. A newly passed federal statute created a commission to oversee national cybersecurity. It authorized the President to appoint the commission’s chair directly, without Senate confirmation. After the President appointed a retired military officer to lead the group, a member of Congress filed suit, alleging that the statute violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution.

The plaintiff argued that the chair held significant authority, including budgetary control, subpoena power, and rulemaking influence, and was thus a “principal officer” who required Senate confirmation. The executive branch responded that the commission merely advised the President and that the chair did not wield independent enforcement authority. The courts had to determine whether the role qualified as a principal or inferior officer under constitutional standards.

What is the strongest argument that the appointment process is unconstitutional?

  1. Congress cannot delegate appointment power to the President without an advice-and-consent requirement.
  2. The commission chair exercises significant authority and must be treated as a principal officer.
  3. The Appointments Clause prohibits all presidential appointments not expressly approved by Congress.
  4. Advisory positions are not subject to constitutional scrutiny under the Appointments Clause.

8. A state enacted legislation banning direct-to-consumer shipment of wine by out-of-state retailers unless those retailers maintained a physical presence in the state. A national wine merchant challenged the law, arguing it violated both the dormant Commerce Clause and was preempted by federal shipping regulations. The state responded that it was exercising its authority under the Twenty-First Amendment to regulate alcohol.

In court, the merchant highlighted that in-state retailers could ship freely without restriction, and that the federal alcohol laws focused on labeling and safety, not on business models. The state countered that it was protecting local markets and preventing underage purchases. The trial court ruled for the state, but the merchant appealed, citing Supreme Court precedent invalidating similar protectionist schemes.

Which constitutional principle best supports the merchant’s claim?

  1. The state's law is preempted by the federal alcohol shipping statute.
  2. The Twenty-First Amendment permits uniform restrictions on alcohol distribution.
  3. The law discriminates against interstate commerce and violates the dormant Commerce Clause.
  4. The state's interest in preventing underage drinking exempts it from Commerce Clause scrutiny.

9. A city school district enacted a program offering additional tutoring benefits to students from low-income families. To qualify, students had to attend designated underperforming schools. A student attending a magnet school in the same district — but with comparable test scores — was denied access. Her parents sued, arguing that the policy violated equal protection by excluding similarly situated students based on school enrollment.

The district defended its program by citing the need to focus resources where improvement metrics and funding gaps were most severe. It emphasized that the program targeted schools, not individual students, and was rationally related to improving performance where it lagged behind. The plaintiffs countered that arbitrary lines between schools denied equal opportunity and punished students based on administrative geography.

What is the district's strongest defense?

  1. The policy is constitutional because education is not a fundamental right under federal law.
  2. The policy survives review because it serves a legitimate goal and does not involve suspect classifications.
  3. The policy is valid because students can always transfer if they wish to receive benefits.
  4. The policy is protected by state sovereign immunity and not subject to judicial review.

10. A man was arrested for standing outside a courthouse holding a sign that read “Judge X Is a Criminal.” He shouted accusations and refused to leave when asked. The state charged him under a law prohibiting defamation of public officials in proximity to official proceedings. The man asserted that his speech was protected under the First Amendment and related to pending cases involving the judge.

The state argued that the law targeted defamatory speech and was narrowly tailored to prevent undue influence on court operations. It claimed that the man’s statements were false, harmful, and made without evidence. The defendant responded that the law punished public criticism and that truth could not be adjudicated pretrial.

Is the law constitutional as applied to the defendant?

  1. Yes, because speech near a courthouse may be regulated to preserve judicial integrity.
  2. Yes, because defamatory speech is not protected under the First Amendment.
  3. No, because the law discriminates based on speaker identity.
  4. No, because public officials may not use criminal laws to punish criticism absent actual malice.


11. A woman was arrested for violating a curfew law enacted during a temporary civic crisis. The law prohibited all individuals from leaving their homes between midnight and 6 a.m. unless traveling to essential work or emergencies. The woman had stepped out for a brief walk due to anxiety and was fined. She sued, claiming the law infringed on her substantive due process rights.

The city argued that the curfew was temporary, applied equally to all residents, and was justified by heightened security risks. The woman asserted that physical movement and personal autonomy are fundamental liberties and that the law was overbroad. Evidence showed the city had not explored less restrictive alternatives and lacked data connecting nighttime presence with public harm.

Which constitutional standard of review should the court apply?

  1. Rational basis review, because the curfew addresses a general public concern.
  2. Intermediate scrutiny, because the law implicates quasi-fundamental privacy interests.
  3. Strict scrutiny, because the curfew burdens a fundamental right to bodily autonomy.
  4. Reasonableness review, because the penalty was a minor fine for nonessential conduct.


12. A city contracted with a private nonprofit to operate its public recreation centers, including hiring staff and setting membership policies. Under the agreement, the nonprofit was required to comply with local ordinances but retained discretion over programming and use of facilities. A resident was denied entry to a fitness class because she wore religious head coverings, which the nonprofit claimed violated its dress code for safety reasons.

The resident filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against both the city and the nonprofit, arguing that the exclusion was religious discrimination in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The city asserted it was not responsible for day-to-day decisions, while the nonprofit claimed it was a private entity not subject to constitutional scrutiny. The plaintiff argued that operating a public recreational space is a traditional government function, making the contractor a state actor.

The court must determine whether the nonprofit can be treated as a state actor for constitutional purposes.

Should the court treat the nonprofit’s conduct as state action?

  1. Yes, because operating municipal facilities is a traditional and exclusive public function.
  2. No, because private nonprofits are not subject to constitutional claims unless the city controls operations.
  3. Yes, because contractual agreements with municipalities always convert private conduct into state action.
  4. No, because constitutional protections do not apply to safety-related dress codes.

13. A university student posted controversial political commentary on social media that criticized government immigration policies. The school suspended him, citing its code of conduct prohibiting speech that “casts the university in a negative light.” The student filed suit alleging a violation of his First Amendment rights. The university argued that his status as a student subjected him to community standards and that the code aimed to foster respectful dialogue.

The court considered whether the speech occurred on a university platform or represented official speech. It found the post was made on the student’s personal account with no university logos or endorsements. The student had not targeted any school official and had not disrupted classes or campus operations.

What is the strongest constitutional argument supporting the student’s claim?

  1. The university code is vague and chills protected political speech.
  2. The university code creates an unconstitutional prior restraint.
  3. The university code denies equal protection to minority viewpoints.
  4. The university code constitutes compelled speech by requiring institutional loyalty.

14. A national animal welfare group filed suit in federal court challenging a new federal regulation that narrowed inspection requirements for poultry facilities. The group alleged that reduced oversight increased the risk of consumer harm and animal mistreatment. It sought injunctive relief under administrative and constitutional grounds.

The government moved to dismiss for lack of standing, arguing that the group suffered no specific injury and could not assert generalized consumer or ethical interests. The plaintiffs responded that they expended resources monitoring compliance and were forced to divert staff away from other projects due to the regulatory change. They asserted organizational harm sufficient to support standing.

The district court must decide whether the group has Article III standing.

  1. Yes, because public interest groups may challenge unconstitutional laws.
  2. Yes, because monitoring regulatory compliance satisfies injury-in-fact requirements.
  3. No, because the group lacks statutory authority to enforce food inspection policies.
  4. No, because ideological disagreement with federal policy does not create standing.

15. Congress enacted a federal grant program offering funds to states that expand public parks in underserved neighborhoods. The law required qualifying states to designate at least 10% of the new land for federally funded ecological research. One state refused to comply with the designation and sued, arguing that the condition violated the Tenth Amendment.

The federal government countered that the grant was entirely voluntary and served a legitimate environmental purpose. It asserted that no state was compelled to change land policy and that the research condition directly related to the overall purpose of the funding. The state argued that earmarking land for federal use invaded local zoning authority and amounted to coercion.

Which argument most strongly supports the law’s constitutionality?

  1. The Supremacy Clause allows Congress to override state land use policies.
  2. The Spending Clause permits Congress to attach reasonable conditions to federal funds.
  3. The law is constitutional because ecological research is a compelling federal interest.
  4. The Tenth Amendment does not apply when the federal government acts for public welfare.

16. A state imposed a per-mile surcharge on out-of-state trucking companies using its highway system. Local companies operating within the state were exempt from the fee. The legislature justified the law by citing road wear, pollution, and long-term infrastructure costs tied to interstate shipping. A national carrier challenged the statute, claiming it unfairly burdened interstate commerce.

In court, the carrier showed that in-state companies caused comparable wear and emissions, yet paid no surcharge. The state responded that local shipping benefited the economy and that out-of-state companies could absorb higher costs. The carrier maintained that the law created protectionist favoritism and distorted competitive conditions.

Is the state law constitutional?

  1. Yes, because states may regulate highway use in the interest of safety and maintenance.
  2. Yes, because the surcharge applies only to businesses profiting from interstate commerce.
  3. No, because the law discriminates against out-of-state businesses without justification.
  4. No, because the federal government exclusively controls all interstate transportation.

17. A state prison instituted a policy denying all inmates access to computer tablets used for education and communication, citing security concerns. The tablets had previously allowed monitored messaging, legal research, and educational apps. A prisoner serving a long sentence challenged the policy under substantive due process, alleging the change hindered rehabilitation and access to counsel.

The state argued that prison conditions fall under broad administrative control and that no constitutional right guarantees access to electronic devices. The inmate responded that the tablets enabled contact with legal advisors and remote learning — elements critical to his development and rights. The state admitted the policy applied regardless of discipline history or demonstrated risk.

Which constitutional principle most supports the inmate’s claim?

  1. Right to free speech.
  2. Right to counsel.
  3. Protection against cruel and unusual punishment.
  4. Substantive due process interest in rehabilitation and legal access.

18. A city instituted a hiring policy for police officers that required all applicants to be between ages 21 and 35. A 42-year-old applicant with a long history in law enforcement was rejected solely due to age. He sued the city, arguing that the age restriction violated the Equal Protection Clause by arbitrarily excluding qualified applicants based on an overbroad classification.

The city defended its policy by citing physical demands and long-term pension planning. It asserted that younger recruits adapt more easily to tactical training and that workforce longevity was a fiscal priority. The plaintiff argued that age is not a proxy for ability and that no individualized fitness evaluation was provided.

Which standard of review applies to the age-based classification?

  1. Strict scrutiny, because employment exclusion burdens personal autonomy.
  2. Rational basis review, because age is not a suspect classification.
  3. Intermediate scrutiny, because age correlates with important government interests.
  4. Heightened scrutiny, because the classification affects a discrete and insular minority.

19. A public university required all students to pay a fee that supported on-campus services, including secular counseling, career workshops, and a religious student center. A student of a different faith sued, arguing that forced funding of a religious facility violated her Free Exercise rights and compelled financial support of a religion she did not follow.

The university responded that the fee supported a broad range of programs, and the religious center was only one among many student-run organizations. It emphasized that no student was required to attend any religious events, and that funds were distributed through viewpoint-neutral criteria. The student maintained that any support of religion via mandatory fees violated her conscience rights.

Is the fee structure constitutional?

  1. Yes, because viewpoint-neutral support of student groups does not violate Free Exercise.
  2. Yes, because religious centers serve secular social functions for students.
  3. No, because compelled funding of religion violates the Establishment Clause.
  4. No, because individual religious objection must override group-based allocation.

20. A high school teacher posted a video on her personal blog criticizing local education cuts and school board salaries. The school suspended her, stating the comments undermined morale and violated professional conduct rules. The teacher sued, claiming her speech was protected under the First Amendment because it addressed matters of public concern outside the scope of her employment.

At trial, the school argued that her public statements eroded institutional trust and created conflict among faculty. The teacher responded that she spoke as a citizen, not as an employee, and that her blog contained no insider information, official logos, or classroom references. She emphasized that the issue involved statewide budget matters and public officials’ compensation.

What is the strongest argument supporting her First Amendment claim?

  1. The speech occurred in a private capacity and addressed matters of public concern.
  2. Schools may not discipline teachers for any speech made outside school property.
  3. The school lacked authority to enforce professional norms beyond classroom settings.
  4. The suspension imposed an unconstitutional prior restraint on her political activity.

21. A university student filed suit against her college, claiming the school failed to provide adequate accommodations for her documented disability during remote exams. The case proceeded through discovery, but before trial began, the university issued a policy change granting broader disability accommodations and offered all students future benefits under the new system. Around the same time, the student graduated and no longer required the university’s services.

The university moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the student had obtained the relief she sought and that no remaining controversy existed. The student pushed back, asserting that the school’s actions were merely tactical and did not include an acknowledgment of past harm. She claimed the issue remained relevant to future students and was likely to recur without formal legal resolution. The university argued that its new policy applied prospectively and that the plaintiff’s individual stake had been extinguished.

Given these facts, is the student’s lawsuit likely to survive dismissal based on mootness?

  1. Yes, because her injury is likely to recur in similar circumstances.
  2. Yes, because court review is necessary to remedy reputational damage.
  3. No, because her graduation and the new policy render the controversy moot.
  4. No, because private universities are not subject to federal jurisdiction for student claims.

22. Congress enacted legislation authorizing a federal agency to oversee online political advertising. The law allowed the agency to define “targeted electoral messaging” and issue civil penalties for advertisements that failed to meet transparency requirements. A media company challenged the law in court, asserting that Congress had improperly delegated broad authority over political speech to an executive agency.

In defense, the government argued that digital advertising evolves rapidly and that Congress had provided sufficient guidelines for the agency to regulate paid content tied to elections. These included exemptions for personal blogs and unpaid commentary, and the agency was forbidden from regulating editorial news coverage. The company responded that the definitions were vague, the penalties were severe, and the law effectively let an unelected body police First Amendment activity.

Considering these facts, which constitutional principle is most relevant in evaluating the delegation of authority?

  1. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
  2. The First Amendment's protection of campaign expenditures.
  3. The Equal Protection Clause.
  4. The nondelegation doctrine under separation of powers.

23. A city passed an ordinance requiring ride-share drivers to undergo local drug screening and vehicle inspections, even if they were certified in neighboring states. The ordinance applied to all drivers entering the city and imposed fees for noncompliance. A national ride-share company filed suit, claiming the local law conflicted with federal transportation regulations governing independent contractors and vehicle safety standards.

The city argued that its regulation served critical safety goals and only applied while the drivers were physically operating within city limits. It emphasized that it had uncovered mechanical failures missed by neighboring jurisdictions and noted that the federal rules did not prohibit supplemental local inspections. The company responded that these overlapping obligations created confusion, increased costs, and contradicted the uniform standards set by federal law.

Based on this dispute, is the city’s ordinance preempted by federal transportation law?

  1. Yes, because transportation safety is reserved for exclusive federal regulation.
  2. Yes, because the ordinance directly conflicts with federal contractor classifications and safety protocols.
  3. No, because the ordinance regulates local conduct without altering employment status.
  4. No, because vehicle safety and drug screening are traditional matters of local concern.

24. A state passed a statute barring unmarried individuals from serving as foster parents through public child welfare agencies. The policy cited concerns about household stability and child development in nontraditional environments. A single adult applied to become a foster parent and was denied solely due to her marital status. She sued, arguing the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause by discriminating against unmarried applicants.

The state defended its policy by stating that children in foster care benefit from two-parent homes and that marriage served as a proxy for long-term stability. It noted that foster placements involved state discretion and that the policy had been in place for over a decade. The applicant provided evidence of her parenting qualifications and emphasized that many married applicants lacked relevant experience or training.

What level of scrutiny should the court apply to the state’s law?

  1. Strict scrutiny, because the statute infringes a fundamental right.
  2. Intermediate scrutiny, because it discriminates based on gender-related assumptions.
  3. Rational basis review, because marital status is not a suspect classification.
  4. Heightened scrutiny, because the classification impacts access to the parent–child relationship.

25. A nonprofit organization organized peaceful protests against land development policies, including petition drives, public marches, and awareness campaigns. The state denied the group access to a public conference space, citing concerns that its message conflicted with official policy goals of economic expansion and tourism. The nonprofit sued, alleging that the denial violated its freedom of speech and association.

The state argued that the venue was reserved for groups promoting civic collaboration and that limited resources justified exclusion of organizations perceived as adversarial. It claimed the policy was viewpoint-neutral and based on operational considerations. The nonprofit provided documentation showing that other advocacy groups — including industry lobbyists — regularly used the same space to promote development-friendly policies.

What constitutional principle best supports the nonprofit’s claim?

  1. The Equal Protection Clause bars viewpoint-based discrimination in public accommodations.
  2. The Establishment Clause prohibits selective access to publicly funded forums.
  3. The First Amendment bars viewpoint discrimination in access to government property.
  4. The Dormant Commerce Clause limits selective access to expressive marketplaces.

26. A public advocacy group filed suit in federal court challenging a recently enacted executive order that altered eligibility requirements for a federal housing program. The group alleged that its constituents, who were prospective applicants, would face discriminatory barriers under the new criteria. The complaint asked the court to enjoin implementation, citing violations of equal protection and statutory authority.

The government moved to dismiss, asserting that the organization lacked standing because none of its named members had yet applied or been denied benefits under the revised rules. The group responded that its outreach operations had been disrupted by the new criteria, forcing it to expend staff time and funding to respond to community confusion. It argued that the law’s mere existence harmed the group's mission and triggered a legally cognizable injury.

At issue is whether the group’s claimed harms are sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for Article III standing.

  1. Yes, because equal protection challenges do not require personal denial of benefits.
  2. Yes, because interference with organizational resources satisfies the injury requirement.
  3. No, because none of its members were directly denied housing.
  4. No, because the group cannot assert constitutional rights on behalf of others.

27. Congress enacted a statute granting private citizens the right to sue state agencies for violations of newly codified voting protections. The law was based on Congress's authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and created a cause of action for discriminatory voting procedures. A state election board was sued under the new law by a group of registered voters challenging early voting limitations.

The state argued that Congress lacked power to authorize such lawsuits and that the law exceeded the boundaries of enforcement permitted by the Fourteenth Amendment. It maintained that the early voting procedures were facially neutral and had been adopted for administrative efficiency. The plaintiffs responded that the procedures imposed disproportionate burdens on communities of color and had no compelling justification.

Should the court uphold Congress’s authority to authorize the lawsuit?

  1. No, because Congress cannot regulate state election procedures.
  2. No, because enforcement under the Fourteenth Amendment is limited to preventing outright discrimination.
  3. Yes, because any burden on voting requires federal oversight.
  4. Yes, because Congress may enact prophylactic legislation to enforce constitutional protections.

28. A state environmental agency enacted rules prohibiting the use of a federally approved pesticide near schools and playgrounds, citing health risks to children. The federal regulatory agency responsible for pesticide approval had recently expanded authorization for broader use, including in residential areas. A chemical manufacturer challenged the state rule, asserting that the federal approval preempted conflicting local regulations.

The state defended its rule by arguing that the federal statute set minimum standards and explicitly allowed states to impose stricter safety measures. The manufacturer pointed to labeling requirements and uniform usage instructions as evidence of field preemption, and argued that varying state rules undermined national uniformity and created confusion for applicators.

Which statement best reflects the legal status of the state’s regulation?

  1. It is preempted because the federal law sets exclusive national standards for pesticide use.
  2. It is not preempted because federal law permits states to impose additional restrictions.
  3. It is preempted because labeling instructions override local safety concerns.
  4. It is not preempted because pesticide regulation is a matter of state police power.

29. A state adopted a policy requiring high school seniors to pass a civics exam to receive a diploma. One student with a diagnosed learning disability failed the exam three times, despite requesting testing accommodations. He was denied graduation and sued, alleging that the school had violated his procedural due process rights by failing to provide adequate notice and appeal opportunities.

The school argued that the civics requirement applied uniformly to all students and that multiple retesting opportunities had been offered. It acknowledged that some accommodation requests were delayed but claimed the delays did not affect the final result. The student pointed to inconsistent communication, lack of clear standards for appeals, and vague criteria for accommodation approval.

In determining whether the student's procedural due process rights were violated, what should the court primarily consider?

  1. Whether the civics exam is rationally related to educational standards.
  2. Whether the student had a fundamental right to graduate without discrimination.
  3. Whether the school provided sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard before denying graduation.
  4. Whether the exam format disadvantaged students with disabilities.

30. A city ordinance prohibited individuals from burning flags on public sidewalks, citing fire risks and community disturbance. A protester was arrested after igniting a small section of a flag while making a political statement during a peaceful demonstration. He was charged under the ordinance and asserted that his actions constituted symbolic expression protected by the First Amendment.

The city defended its law by claiming that the regulation was based solely on fire safety and not the content of the message. It argued that any burning posed a risk to bystanders and noted that prior incidents had caused property damage. The protester emphasized that the fire was quickly extinguished, caused no harm, and was integral to conveying his dissent.

What is the strongest constitutional argument in favor of the protester's position?

  1. Burning a flag is not speech and falls outside First Amendment protection.
  2. Government may not regulate expressive conduct based on its symbolism.
  3. Fire safety justifies restrictions on all forms of burning regardless of intent.
  4. The ordinance fails because it is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.

31. A nonprofit environmental group sued a state department of transportation in federal court, alleging that the agency’s highway expansion plan violated federal environmental review procedures. The suit sought an injunction preventing further construction until compliance was demonstrated. The state moved to dismiss, asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity and claiming that it was not subject to suit by a private party in federal court.

The plaintiffs countered that the state had accepted federal funds for the project and thereby waived sovereign immunity. They argued that the expansion was federally mandated and that states could not claim immunity while executing federal programs. The state maintained that accepting funds did not constitute express consent to litigation and that only Congress could abrogate immunity under clear statutory authority.

Should the court allow the lawsuit to proceed despite the state’s Eleventh Amendment claim?

  1. Yes, because federal environmental laws supersede state immunity.
  2. Yes, because private enforcement of federal rights is always permitted.
  3. No, because the state accepted federal funds and implicitly waived immunity.
  4. No, because private suits against states in federal court are barred absent express waiver or congressional abrogation.

32. Amid rising tensions in a disputed region, the President issued an executive agreement pledging military aid and logistical support to an allied foreign government. Congress was not consulted and no formal treaty was submitted for ratification. Several members of Congress filed suit in federal court, arguing that the agreement exceeded presidential authority and unlawfully circumvented the legislative branch.

The administration responded that the President holds broad power in foreign affairs and that executive agreements are a recognized mechanism for diplomatic engagement. It emphasized that no binding treaty obligations were created and that similar agreements had long been used in foreign policy matters. Plaintiffs argued that the scale and scope of support required congressional approval under the Constitution’s war and spending clauses.

Is the President’s use of an executive agreement likely constitutional?

  1. Yes, because executive agreements do not require Senate ratification and fall within the President's foreign affairs powers.
  2. No, because only Congress may authorize the use of public funds or military assets abroad.
  3. Yes, because Congress's silence amounts to implied consent for executive action.
  4. No, because all international commitments must be made through Article II treaty procedures.

33. A state imposed an environmental surcharge on all milk sold within its borders unless the milk was produced using sustainable practices certified by in-state regulators. Out-of-state producers challenged the law, arguing that it discriminated against interstate commerce and created protectionist barriers. The state asserted that it was safeguarding consumer health and promoting local environmental standards.

In court, the challengers presented evidence that equivalent sustainability certifications existed in other jurisdictions, but the state refused to accept any non-local verification. The surcharge made out-of-state milk significantly more expensive, and in-state producers were effectively exempt. The state maintained that uniform local standards ensured accountability and consistency.

Is the state's surcharge system constitutional under the Commerce Clause?

  1. Yes, because environmental regulation is a legitimate state interest.
  2. No, because it places a burden on milk producers beyond what is required for public health.
  3. No, because it discriminates against out-of-state commerce without sufficient justification.
  4. Yes, because states may favor local producers in the absence of federal regulation.

34. A public health emergency prompted a state to prohibit indoor gatherings exceeding fifty people. Religious institutions challenged the rule, arguing it burdened Free Exercise by limiting in-person services. The state defended the restriction by citing rising infection rates and asserting that the rule applied equally to all types of gatherings, secular and religious alike.

During litigation, the plaintiffs presented evidence that secular venues such as shopping malls and restaurants remained open without comparable limitations. They maintained that religious worship was singled out and burdened more severely than other forms of public assembly. The state responded that religious services typically involved prolonged indoor exposure, shared materials, and singing — elevating transmission risks.

Which constitutional principle should guide the court's analysis?

  1. Rational basis review, because the restriction involves emergency police powers.
  2. Strict scrutiny, because the rule draws distinctions between religious and secular conduct.
  3. Intermediate scrutiny, because the regulation affects both expressive and associational rights.
  4. No scrutiny is required because churches are voluntarily subject to health rules.

35. A city ordinance banned theatrical performances that depicted violent political revolutions, stating that such portrayals could incite unrest and undermine civic harmony. A local theater was fined after staging a play about historical uprisings. The theater sued, asserting that the law was a content-based restriction on artistic expression and violated the First Amendment.

The city argued that the ordinance did not ban speech outright but merely excluded certain depictions from publicly funded venues. It emphasized that the performances were provocative and drew protest activity, requiring increased security. The theater showed that other plays involving violence unrelated to politics were permitted without penalty.

Should the court strike down the ordinance on constitutional grounds?

  1. No, because governments may regulate inflammatory content in public spaces.
  2. Yes, because viewpoint discrimination violates the core of First Amendment protection.
  3. Yes, because public theaters are private venues and not subject to government rules.
  4. No, because public funding allows governments to set limits based on public interest.

36. A nonprofit advocacy group filed suit in federal court challenging a Department of Transportation policy that eliminated federal funding for certain bicycle safety programs. The group claimed the change would reduce public awareness and increase accidents, especially in high-risk urban areas. It did not identify a specific member affected by the funding cut but alleged institutional injury due to disruption of its educational outreach.

The government moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the group lacked standing because it could not show a concrete injury to itself or any individual member. The court noted that the group had not applied for federal funds under the prior program and did not have any contractual or statutory right to receive them. The group asserted that the loss of funding forced it to cancel future events and diverted staff to crisis planning.

If the court agrees with the government's standing argument, what is the most likely basis for dismissal?

  1. The case is moot because the funding decision has already taken effect.
  2. The plaintiff lacks standing because it cannot establish causation or redressability.
  3. The plaintiff lacks standing because it has not suffered a legally cognizable injury-in-fact.
  4. The case is barred by the political question doctrine, which precludes judicial review of budgetary decisions.

37. Congress passed a law prohibiting the sale of flavored vaping products nationwide, citing health risks to youth. A coalition of small businesses sued, arguing that the law exceeded Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause because their operations were local, regulated by state authorities, and did not involve interstate shipment. They emphasized that their products were manufactured and sold within one state and did not target online buyers.

In response, the federal government provided data showing that flavored products were often resold across state lines, triggered cross-border demand, and attracted suppliers from out-of-state manufacturers. It argued that even purely local conduct could be regulated when it had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The court reviewed the legislative record, which documented rising national usage and state-by-state inconsistencies in enforcement.

Is the federal prohibition likely constitutional under the Commerce Clause?

  1. No, because the law targets noncommercial activity outside federal authority.
  2. Yes, because intrastate sales may be regulated when they substantially affect interstate commerce.
  3. No, because enforcement of public health rules is reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.
  4. Yes, because Congress has plenary power over consumer goods and branding.

38. A state passed a law requiring pharmaceutical manufacturers to display a large black-box warning on packaging for certain prescription drugs — even if the drug had already received FDA approval with different labeling. A national manufacturer challenged the law, arguing that it conflicted with federal drug labeling standards and created confusion for both prescribers and patients.

The state defended the law by citing recent studies suggesting heightened risk associated with certain products and emphasizing its duty to protect public health. It claimed that federal approval set a baseline and that states retained authority to impose additional safety notices. The manufacturer responded that the FDA required standardized labeling and had explicitly rejected similar warnings during approval.

Is the state law likely preempted by federal regulation?

  1. No, because states may require health warnings beyond federal standards.
  2. No, because drug labeling is not exclusively a federal function.
  3. Yes, because conflicting warnings undermine federal uniformity and are expressly preempted.
  4. Yes, because pharmaceutical regulation belongs solely to Congress.

39. A public high school expelled a student after he refused to participate in a required group presentation for history class, citing personal anxiety and opposition to the topic. The school maintained that group presentations were part of the curriculum and essential for building collaborative skills. The student’s parents requested an alternative assignment, but the school declined, saying accommodation would undermine academic standards.

The student appealed to the school board and was denied reinstatement. The family then filed suit in federal court, claiming a violation of procedural due process. They argued that the expulsion occurred without formal notice, that no disciplinary hearing was held, and that school policies were applied arbitrarily. The school responded that academic sanctions were not disciplinary and thus did not require procedural safeguards.

Which factor most supports the student’s due process claim?

  1. The school failed to justify the assignment’s pedagogical necessity.
  2. The student’s refusal was based on expressive rights, not conduct.
  3. The expulsion implicated a property interest in public education, triggering procedural protections.
  4. The school imposed discipline without state legislative approval.

40. A city required street performers to obtain a permit before performing in public spaces. The permit application asked for personal identification, performance type, and expected audience size. A mime was denied a permit after listing her performance as “silent protest.” She sued, claiming the denial constituted viewpoint discrimination and infringed on her freedom of expression.

The city responded that her application was vague and misleading, and that large protest-related events required separate clearance for safety planning. It emphasized that permits had been granted to similar performers and that the denial was based on logistical concerns. The mime pointed out that other acts with equivalent crowd estimates had received permits without issue, and argued that her protest-themed act was rejected solely due to its message.

Is the city's denial of the permit likely unconstitutional?

  1. Yes, because public permits cannot restrict performance types in public forums.
  2. Yes, because the denial is based on viewpoint and violates the First Amendment.
  3. No, because cities may limit performance types that draw large crowds.
  4. No, because expressive conduct does not require permit protection.

41. A group of citizens filed suit in federal court challenging the President’s refusal to implement a provision of a newly enacted foreign aid statute. The law directed emergency funding to a specific country and set deadlines for delivery, but the executive branch issued a statement claiming that conditions on the ground made compliance impractical. The plaintiffs argued that the President’s actions undermined legislative authority and violated separation of powers by refusing to enforce a valid law.

The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief ordering the release of funds. The government moved to dismiss, asserting that the matter involved a nonjusticiable political question because it implicated the conduct of foreign affairs and discretionary executive judgment. The court considered the nature of the relief sought, whether there were judicially manageable standards for enforcement, and whether resolution would express disrespect for coordinate branches.

Is the lawsuit likely to be barred by the political question doctrine?

  1. Yes, because separation of powers prohibits judicial review of executive discretion.
  2. Yes, because foreign aid funding decisions are exclusively delegated to the legislative branch.
  3. No, because the judiciary may interpret and enforce statutory mandates absent foreign affairs entanglement.
  4. No, because political questions involve elections and voting, not budgeting disputes.

42. Congress passed a bill with broad bipartisan support limiting non-compete clauses in employment contracts. The bill was sent to the President, who objected to one section and signed the remainder into law while issuing a memorandum stating that the disputed provision would not be enforced. Several labor organizations challenged the action, asserting that the President had unconstitutionally exercised a line-item veto.

The government responded that the President retains discretion in enforcing statutes and that the memorandum merely stated policy priorities, not a formal rejection of part of the law. The court examined whether the President’s action constituted an attempt to alter or nullify duly enacted legislation without following constitutional procedures. It considered whether the memorandum had binding legal effect or changed enforcement obligations.

Did the President's action likely violate constitutional limits on executive power?

  1. Yes, because selectively nullifying a provision amounts to an unconstitutional line-item veto.
  2. Yes, because the President lacks discretion to decline enforcement of any statute.
  3. No, because internal memoranda lack legal force and do not impact statutory interpretation.
  4. No, because the provision was not essential to the bill's overall function.

43. A state enacted a law requiring all online retailers to pay a data processing surcharge for each transaction involving residents of that state. The law exempted retailers with a physical presence in the state, citing added infrastructure investment. A group of national e-commerce platforms challenged the law, claiming it discriminated against interstate commerce and artificially favored local firms.

At trial, the state defended the law as a neutral economic measure designed to recover costs related to cybersecurity and fraud monitoring. It emphasized that in-state companies contributed to tax revenue and operated under physical regulation. The plaintiffs pointed out that identical services were offered across borders and that exempting local businesses undermined the principle of economic neutrality.

Is the state law likely to survive scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause?

  1. Yes, because states may recoup costs related to infrastructure and fraud.
  2. Yes, because the law applies only to electronic transactions and does not regulate goods.
  3. No, because the law imposes discriminatory economic burdens on out-of-state sellers.
  4. No, because state data regulations are preempted by federal privacy laws.

44. A municipal housing authority implemented a rule disqualifying applicants with visible tattoos associated with gang symbolism. A man who had completed a rehabilitation program and worked as a community mentor was denied housing under the rule. He sued, alleging that the policy violated his equal protection rights by failing to consider individual circumstances and perpetuating stereotypes.

The authority responded that visible gang tattoos were correlated with community disturbances and posed risks to tenant safety. It cited internal statistics showing increased complaints and criminal activity associated with certain symbols. The plaintiff emphasized that his tattoos were historical, faded, and unrelated to any current conduct — and that he had never received a warning or citation for misconduct.

Should the court find the housing policy unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause?

  1. No, because public housing authorities may exclude applicants for safety-related reasons.
  2. No, because the rule satisfies rational basis review by serving a legitimate governmental interest.
  3. Yes, because it discriminates based on expression and triggers heightened scrutiny.
  4. Yes, because personal appearance is a suspect classification.

45. A journalist published an article alleging misconduct by local officials in distributing emergency aid. Before publication, the city obtained a court order prohibiting the newspaper from printing the report, citing pending investigations and potential damage to public trust. The paper challenged the order, arguing that it amounted to prior restraint and violated freedom of the press.

In court, the city maintained that the information was based on leaked documents not yet verified and that premature reporting could compromise witness cooperation. The journalist testified that the article was sourced through public records and whistleblower interviews, and that publication served the public interest. The court considered whether the order was narrowly tailored and essential to protect compelling interests.

Is the court order likely constitutional under the First Amendment?

  1. Yes, because emergency circumstances justify temporary restraint of unverified reports.
  2. No, because prior restraints are presumptively unconstitutional and rarely justified.
  3. Yes, because the content involves government operations subject to confidentiality.
  4. No, because only federal courts may issue prior restraints on speech.

46. A federal agency adopted a regulation modifying inspection protocols for food production facilities. A consortium of academic researchers submitted a formal request to the agency asking whether the change would be deemed constitutional if challenged under the due process clause. The agency referred the question to the Department of Justice, which issued a detailed analysis concluding the regulation would likely survive judicial scrutiny.

The researchers used the DOJ’s analysis to support a grant proposal, but they later sued the agency, alleging that the regulatory change was unconstitutional and that the prior assessment had misled them. The lawsuit sought a declaratory judgment stating that the regulation was invalid under the Constitution. The agency moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs were not directly regulated and had not suffered any concrete harm from the rule.

The court must determine whether the case presents a justiciable controversy suitable for federal adjudication.

  1. Yes, because academic groups may bring constitutional challenges if they are affected by federal policy.
  2. No, because issuing an advisory opinion is outside the scope of Article III jurisdiction.
  3. Yes, because misrepresentations in an advisory opinion create redressable harm.
  4. No, because research groups lack standing unless engaged in regulated conduct.

47. Congress passed a law imposing a tax on all non-reusable plastic containers sold by retail businesses. The law applied nationwide and included penalties for failure to report the volume of containers sold. A group of retailers sued, alleging that the law was not a true tax but rather a regulatory penalty and that Congress had exceeded its constitutional taxing authority.

In defending the statute, Congress cited environmental concerns and claimed the measure would both raise revenue and encourage behavioral change. The government pointed to the Internal Revenue Code’s structure and clarified that funds collected under the new provision would be deposited into the general treasury. The plaintiffs responded that the revenue impact was negligible and the law’s primary function was coercion.

Which is the best argument supporting the constitutionality of the statute?

  1. Congress may tax commercial products related to environmental harm under the Commerce Clause.
  2. Congress may use its taxing power to promote legitimate public interests, even if revenue is minimal.
  3. A tax is unconstitutional if its primary purpose is regulation rather than revenue.
  4. A tax must be neutral in application to pass constitutional scrutiny.

48. A state law required all contractors doing business with public schools to submit to fingerprinting and extensive criminal background checks, regardless of job description. A federal employee tasked with inspecting cafeterias for USDA compliance was denied access to a school building for refusing to comply with the state’s contractor screening procedures. The employee’s agency filed suit on his behalf, claiming the state had interfered with federal operations.

The state argued that its rule applied to all individuals entering school grounds and was essential to protect children. It noted that the federal worker was not engaged in instruction or oversight of children and therefore could easily comply. The federal government maintained that states may not impose conditions on the execution of federal duties or screen federal personnel beyond what Congress authorized.

Does the state law violate intergovernmental immunity?

  1. No, because fingerprinting applies equally to all personnel entering schools.
  2. No, because safeguarding minors justifies screening of all visitors.
  3. Yes, because states may not regulate federal employees in their official capacity.
  4. Yes, because screening infringes the federal government’s right to set contract conditions.

49. A state passed a law prohibiting hormone therapy for minors, even with parental consent and physician approval. A teenager and her parents sued, arguing the law violated her substantive due process rights by intruding on medical decisions made within the family. The state defended the statute by citing concerns about irreversible effects and long-term health outcomes, emphasizing its interest in protecting children from early decisions with permanent consequences.

During trial, medical experts testified that supervised hormone treatment can significantly reduce anxiety and improve quality of life for youth with diagnosed gender dysphoria. The plaintiffs emphasized that the ban did not allow for individualized assessment and prevented doctors from exercising medical judgment. The court was asked to determine whether the law unconstitutionally burdens the minor’s right to receive appropriate medical care.

Should the law be struck down on substantive due process grounds?

  1. Yes, because family medical decisions fall within a protected liberty interest.
  2. No, because states may regulate non-emergency procedures for minors.
  3. Yes, because minors are entitled to equal access to treatment options.
  4. No, because the law is neutral and applies to all minors equally.

50. A city ordinance prohibited distributing political flyers on car windshields in public parking lots. A grassroots campaign group placed flyers during a local election and was fined under the ordinance. The group sued, arguing that the restriction violated its First Amendment rights by suppressing low-cost political speech in public forums.

The city defended the law as a litter control measure, emphasizing that flyers often blew into streets or clogged storm drains. It claimed that the ordinance was content-neutral and applied to all flyers, regardless of message or source. The group responded that no less burdensome alternatives were considered, and that other forms of printed advertising, like coupons and event flyers, were tolerated without penalty.

Is the ordinance likely constitutional?

  1. Yes, because environmental concerns justify flyer restrictions.
  2. No, because the law imposes content-based limits on political speech.
  3. No, because time, place, and manner restrictions must leave open alternative channels.
  4. Yes, because flyers placed on private property may be regulated to prevent trespass.