MBE Simulated Practice Exam - Questions

Part A - Questions 1-100

1. A city apartment tenant experienced persistent nighttime noise from a nightclub located in the basement of her building. Music reverberated through the floor until 3 a.m., disrupting sleep. The tenant reported the issue multiple times, but the landlord declined to act, citing a long-term lease with the club. Other tenants had previously moved out due to similar complaints. No insulation had been installed between units, and the lease had not disclosed the existence of nightlife activity.

The tenant sued the landlord for private nuisance and rent reduction. The landlord argued that the club operated legally and met municipal sound codes. No official sound tests had been performed, but tenant testimony described regular physical discomfort and mental strain.

The jurisdiction recognizes nuisance where lawful activity causes substantial and unreasonable interference with residential enjoyment, regardless of zoning or licensing status.

Is the tenant likely to succeed?

No, because the nightclub was legally licensed and had priority tenancy.
Yes, because the landlord failed to mitigate recurring disruptions.
No, because the tenant could have moved or used noise protection.
Yes, because nuisance liability does not depend on legal compliance.

2. A defendant was charged with wire fraud following a federal investigation into a fake charity solicitation scheme. As part of its case, the government called a forensic auditor to explain how the defendant diverted funds from donor accounts into a shell company he controlled. The auditor testified using visual summaries of bank statements and noted patterns suggesting internal transfers timed around marketing emails.

On voir dire, defense counsel challenged the expert’s qualifications, emphasizing that the witness lacked certification as a CPA and had never audited a nonprofit entity. The prosecution responded that the expert has conducted financial tracing in more than 50 criminal cases and regularly trains agency investigators on bank fraud analysis.

Should the expert be permitted to testify?

No, because only certified auditors may testify in financial fraud cases.
No, because expertise in nonprofit finance is required to assess donor fund misuse.
Yes, because extensive experience and domain familiarity satisfy Rule 702.
Yes, because summary charts are always admissible when showing money flow.

3. A developer purchased a parcel bordering a public park and received written permission from the prior owner of an adjacent lot to use a 10-foot path for trail access. The permission was informal and never recorded. Over the next decade, the developer built and maintained the trail, promoting it for public walking tours and installing gravel and signage. Several nearby landowners used the trail regularly, and a local hiking club included it on its published maps.

When the adjacent lot was sold to a new owner, he objected to public use and installed a fence blocking access. The developer sued, asserting an easement by prescription. At trial, evidence showed that use had been open and continuous for more than ten years, but that the original landowner had occasionally maintained the path and made verbal comments thanking users for respecting the area. The jurisdiction requires ten years of open, notorious, adverse, and continuous use to establish a prescriptive easement.

Who is likely to prevail?

The developer, because public use of the trail was uninterrupted and clearly visible.
The developer, because a license may convert to easement if relied upon.
The new landowner, because the original owner’s permission defeats adversity.
The new landowner, because physical maintenance negates hostile occupation.

4. A defendant was charged with tampering with records during a government compliance audit. Prosecutors obtained a draft email saved to the defendant’s “Compliance” folder, created four hours before officials arrived. It read: “Move the budget chart to ‘archive’ and re-upload version from last year — no mention of travel funds.” Metadata showed it was typed on the defendant’s workstation but never sent.

At trial, the government moved to admit the draft to show awareness and intent. The defense objected under Rule 403, arguing that the draft’s ambiguity and informal tone would unfairly influence the jury. Defense counsel emphasized the phrase “archive” may reflect benign organization, not deletion, and that the document lacks finality.

Should the court admit the email draft?

No, because its probative value is substantially outweighed by risk of unfair prejudice under Rule 403.
No, because drafts that were not distributed lack relevance to actual conduct.
Yes, because the defendant’s authorship makes it a party-opponent statement under Rule 801(d)(2)(A).
Yes, because any document created before an audit is admissible in fraud cases.

5. In 1996, a man erected fencing and installed irrigation in what he believed was the boundary line of his newly acquired rural property. Over the next 27 years, he cultivated fruit trees, laid gravel paths, and used the strip for composting. The neighboring lot remained undeveloped, passing between two owners before being sold to a buyer who commissioned a survey in 2023. The survey revealed that an 11-foot strip used by the man actually belonged to the adjacent parcel.

The new neighbor demanded removal of fencing and restoration of her land. The man refused and asserted ownership by adverse possession. He presented decades of receipts, dated photographs, and affidavits verifying uninterrupted use and maintenance of the disputed land. No permission was ever requested or granted. The jurisdiction applies traditional adverse possession doctrine, requiring 20 years of open, exclusive, continuous, and hostile use. Mistaken belief qualifies as hostility under claim of right.

Who holds title to the disputed strip?

The man, because his possession satisfies all statutory elements of adverse possession.
The neighbor, because record title has not been formally conveyed.
The man, because fencing and cultivation establish a prescriptive easement.
The neighbor, because no written notice of adverse possession was recorded.

6. A homebuyer contacted a seller about a historic property advertised as “lovingly restored” and “electrically modern.” During a viewing, the seller pointed to new wall outlets and lighting as proof of updated wiring. After purchase, the buyer discovered that only superficial changes had been made, and most of the wiring remained outdated and hazardous. An electrician documented live wires without grounding and junction boxes missing insulation.

The buyer sued for misrepresentation, arguing reliance on the seller’s statements in making the purchase. The seller responded that he had not claimed full rewiring and that all improvements were cosmetic. He pointed to language in the sale agreement requiring independent inspection. The buyer argued that inspections could not detect behind-wall conditions and that the seller’s assertions induced reliance.

Under these facts, which theory best supports the buyer’s claim?

Fraud, based on intentional concealment of dangerous wiring.
Commercial disparagement, due to misstatement of market value.
Negligent misrepresentation, based on misleading factual claims and reliance.
Trespass, for physical intrusion of unsafe wiring post-sale.

7. A city installed a new traffic camera system to monitor red-light violations. Drivers cited under the program received automated tickets with links to brief footage and a payment portal. One man contested his ticket, claiming the footage only showed him turning right on red after stopping briefly. The city’s evidence included a timestamped video but no angle clearly showing his full stop. In a hearing, he argued the camera's viewpoint made his conduct appear illegal despite legal compliance.

What legal argument offers the strongest basis to challenge the citation?

Procedural due process, because the footage did not permit full defense.
Equal protection, since not all intersections were monitored uniformly.
Vagueness doctrine, based on uncertainty in red-light definitions.
First Amendment, because the citation discouraged public protest of traffic rules.

8. A woman conveyed her woodland property “to my brother for life, then to my granddaughter and her heirs, but if she ever conveys the property outside the family, then to my local charity.” Her brother lived on the land for 20 years until his death. Her granddaughter took possession, made renovations, and posted a listing on a rental platform, offering the property for short-term stays to traveling nurses and tourists. She signed two contracts allowing three-week visits by non-relatives.

Upon discovering the arrangement, the charity brought an action for declaratory relief, arguing that the granddaughter's rentals triggered the conditional clause and that title should vest in it. The granddaughter countered that she had not conveyed any legal interest in the property, only temporary possession, and that even if the condition were triggered, the charity’s interest violated the Rule Against Perpetuities. The jurisdiction applies traditional RAP doctrine without charitable exemptions.

Does the charity currently hold valid title?

Yes, because conveying any possessory interest to a non-relative activates the clause.
No, because the shifting executory interest violates the Rule Against Perpetuities.
Yes, because rental agreements are legal conveyances of property rights.
No, because the brother’s life estate canceled all future limitations.

9. A man purchased an electric scooter and rode it home over uneven pavement. While descending a small curb, the front wheel locked and he fell, breaking his wrist. The manufacturer had recalled similar models for faulty steering sensors, but this unit was not included in the recall due to production date. The man sued under strict liability for design defect.

Internal reports showed that the locking mechanism failure had occurred across multiple batches, and that consumer complaints post-recall were common. The company denied defect, citing compliance with all vehicle safety standards and user instructions about curb descent.

Is the manufacturer likely liable?

No, because the scooter was not part of the official recall.
Yes, since falling after a small drop shows inadequate design.
No, because uneven terrain use falls outside normal operation.
Yes, because widespread malfunction in similar models suggests an inherent defect.

10. A contractor filed a federal lawsuit against a materials supplier for breach of contract after delays in the delivery of roofing tiles caused the contractor to miss a commercial project deadline. The contract specified delivery by June 1, and the complaint alleged delivery occurred two weeks late, resulting in liquidated damages charged by the property owner to the contractor. The supplier argued that global supply chain disruptions justified the delay and denied any liability for consequential losses.

During discovery, the supplier produced internal emails suggesting knowledge of shipment bottlenecks but chose not to notify clients in advance. The contractor moved for summary judgment, arguing that the delay was unjustified under the contract’s “time is of the essence” clause and that the supplier’s silence supported breach. The supplier opposed, citing industry norms and a force majeure clause referencing “unforeseen global disruptions.”

At the hearing, the court considered whether the force majeure clause covered the specific delay and whether the contractor’s financial losses were too remote to be recoverable.

How should the court evaluate the enforceability of the supplier’s defense?

By determining whether the contractor’s losses were foreseeable at the time of contracting.
By determining whether the supplier acted in good faith in managing delays.
By determining whether industry customs override express contract terms.
By determining whether the delay was caused by an event within the scope of the force majeure clause.

11. A buyer entered into a contract to purchase a parcel of farmland for $975,000. The agreement stated that closing would occur “on or before March 30,” and included a clause allowing cancellation or renegotiation if environmental hazards were identified. On March 10, the buyer discovered trace pesticide residue and a buried barrel labeled “waste” near the rear fence line. The inspection report estimated remediation costs at $50,000.

On March 12, the buyer contacted the seller and proposed a $45,000 price reduction. The seller declined and, on March 15, entered into a new contract with a backup buyer. The original buyer sued, claiming breach and asserting that her renegotiation request was expressly permitted by the contingency clause. The seller argued that the buyer’s counteroffer was a rejection of the original contract, freeing him to sell elsewhere. The jurisdiction enforces environmental clauses and requires clear cancellation for abandonment.

Who is likely to prevail?

The seller, because contingency clauses must be invoked by formal cancellation.
The seller, because counteroffers nullify the original agreement.
The buyer, because renegotiation was expressly permitted under the contract.
The buyer, because environmental hazards render a contract void as against public policy.

12. A buyer entered into a contract to purchase a vineyard for $2.1 million. The agreement stated that closing would occur “on or before August 31” and contained an inspection clause allowing the buyer to cancel or renegotiate upon discovering “environmental hazards affecting soil or groundwater.” On August 10, an environmental assessment revealed pesticide concentrations above legal limits in multiple sections of the southern field.

On August 12, the buyer emailed the seller and attached the report, proposing a $90,000 reduction to account for remediation. The seller replied that the request voided the original contract and said he had accepted a backup offer for the property. The buyer filed suit, arguing that the contingency clause explicitly permitted renegotiation and that she never canceled the agreement. The seller argued that the buyer’s proposal constituted rejection and that he acted within his rights.

The jurisdiction enforces inspection clauses strictly and considers price renegotiation part of acceptable contractual conduct unless the buyer expressly cancels the agreement. Courts require a clear indication of abandonment before recognizing the seller's right to transfer to another party.

Who is likely to prevail?

The seller, because discovery of hazards allows either party to terminate without liability.
The seller, because counteroffers nullify original contracts.
The buyer, because her price adjustment was permitted by the environmental clause.
The buyer, because pesticide concentrations render property title unmarketable.

13. Congress passed a statute offering states additional funding for public health initiatives, but only if they agreed to raise the legal age for purchasing energy drinks to 21. The law was designed to address health risks among teenagers and authorized the Department of Health and Human Services to withhold up to 40% of unrelated public health grants from states that failed to comply. Several states declined the condition and subsequently saw significant reductions in their existing funding allocations.

One affected state filed suit, arguing that Congress’s condition was coercive and violated the Tenth Amendment by intruding into traditional state policy decisions regarding commercial regulations. The federal government defended the law, claiming that it was an exercise of Congress’s spending power and that participation was voluntary. The government further asserted that the condition related to broader health goals and was reasonably connected to federal interests.

The court examined whether the financial penalty was so severe as to leave states with no real choice, and whether the condition was directly related to the purpose of the funding being affected. It considered how withholding large portions of unrelated health grants might pressure states into surrendering regulatory autonomy.

Is the statute constitutional?

Yes, because the federal government may attach reasonable conditions to voluntary funding.
Yes, because energy drink laws affect interstate commerce and public health.
No, because the condition is unrelated to the withheld funding and unduly coercive.
No, because states are entitled to equal distribution of federal health funds.

14. A defendant was convicted in state court for drug possession and sentenced to two years in prison. Six months later, federal prosecutors indicted him for possession of the same substances under federal narcotics laws, seeking a separate sentence. The defendant moved to dismiss the federal case, arguing that successive prosecution for the same conduct violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

The federal government argued that its charges were distinct because they arose under federal law and sought to vindicate separate sovereign interests. It emphasized that both state and federal authorities had jurisdiction over controlled substances and that each could pursue criminal enforcement independently. The defendant responded that the overlap created unfairness and subjected him to double punishment for identical conduct.

The court must determine whether the federal prosecution is constitutionally permissible after a state conviction for the same criminal act.

Should the court allow the federal case to proceed?

Yes, because federal and state governments may prosecute the same conduct under the dual sovereignty doctrine.
No, because the federal case seeks to punish the exact same act already prosecuted by the state.
Yes, because federal enforcement focuses on different substances and regulatory concerns.
No, because double jeopardy prohibits overlapping criminal sanctions without compelling justification.

15. A plaintiff sued two companies in federal court under diversity jurisdiction, alleging fraud related to the sale of a commercial property. One company was the seller, and the second provided a property inspection prior to the transaction. The complaint asserted that both defendants concealed defects in the building’s foundation. The seller moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), asserting that the plaintiff had not pleaded fraud with particularity. The inspection company filed a separate motion, arguing that its limited involvement could not support joint liability.

The plaintiff opposed both motions and submitted the inspection report, emails from the seller referencing “structural improvements,” and correspondence between the two defendants discussing renovation scheduling. The plaintiff contended that the defendants cooperated to present a false impression of the property and pointed to overlapping statements about its condition.

The court must assess whether the fraud allegations satisfy pleading standards.

What is the appropriate test for evaluating the plaintiff’s complaint?

Whether the plaintiff pleads facts supporting each element of fraud with particularity under Rule 9(b).
Whether the inspection company’s involvement creates a plausible inference of conspiracy.
Whether the complaint alleges at least one misleading statement of fact.
Whether any defendant failed to disclose known defects at the time of sale.

16. A local theater group installed a set piece on stage consisting of a narrow platform elevated three feet off the ground. During dress rehearsal, an actor stepped backward off the platform and twisted his ankle. The director had blocked the scene near the edge and asked actors to improvise movement but gave no specific warnings. No tape markings or spotlights indicated the platform boundary, and one actor later said he almost fell during an earlier run-through.

The injured actor sued for negligence, arguing that the set design created a concealed hazard and that the theater failed to implement proper safety protocols. The group claimed the fall was unforeseeable, given the platform’s visibility and limited height. Internal emails showed the director dismissed multiple concerns about stage safety during production.

The jurisdiction treats performance venues like other workplaces, imposing a duty to mitigate known risks where physical injury is foreseeable and precautions are inexpensive and practical.

Is the theater group likely liable?

Yes, because blocking actors near the edge without marking or warning created a foreseeable hazard.
No, since performers are presumed to understand stage layout risks.
Yes, as dress rehearsals are supervised and must comply with workplace safety standards.
No, because the platform was visible and not unusually high.

17. Police officers arrested a man during a routine traffic stop after discovering an outstanding warrant for unpaid fines. After handcuffing him, one officer retrieved the man’s smartphone from the center console and unlocked it using facial recognition. Without a warrant or consent, the officer opened messaging apps and reviewed texts and photos. The search revealed GPS-tagged images from an earlier burglary investigation, and the man was charged with property offenses.

At trial, the defense moved to suppress the phone evidence, arguing that warrantless examination of digital content violated the Fourth Amendment. The prosecution argued that the search was valid under the search incident to arrest doctrine and emphasized that smartphones are personal effects under current law. They maintained that because the phone was unlocked and readily accessible, no separate warrant was required.

The court had to determine whether searching the contents of the phone without judicial authorization fell within constitutional boundaries. The defense cited precedents limiting device searches due to the volume of private data they contain, distinguishing phones from items like wallets or backpacks.

Which ruling is most consistent with constitutional law?

Admit the phone data, because search incident to arrest includes digital devices.
Suppress the data, because the officer exceeded the scope of a lawful traffic stop.
Suppress the data, because cellphones require a warrant before digital content is accessed.
Admit the data, because the phone was already unlocked and accessible.

18. A homeowner recorded an express easement granting “footpath access only” over a private wooded trail to her neighbor. For a decade, the neighbor used the path for hiking and jogging. Eventually, she sold her home to a health retreat that offered daily guided walks along the same trail. Within a year, the retreat installed gravel, widened sections of the path, and added electric shuttles to assist guests with mobility limitations.

The servient landowner noticed increased erosion and drainage issues and sent a letter requesting the retreat cease motorized use. The retreat responded that its activities were aligned with the original easement’s purpose and were necessary for inclusive access. It argued that the modifications were minor and improved safety for users. The landowner filed suit seeking injunctive relief to restrict the scope of use. The jurisdiction enforces easements by their express language and allows adaptive use only when the scope is ambiguous and the servient estate is not physically burdened.

Who is likely to prevail?

The retreat, because safety upgrades and accessibility advances serve the original intent.
The retreat, because public access does not modify the easement's scope.
The landowner, because motorized vehicles materially exceed “footpath” use.
The landowner, because erosion and alteration of the trail burden the servient estate beyond its original intent.

19. A construction worker filed suit in federal court against an insulation manufacturer, alleging that prolonged exposure to its products caused him to develop a respiratory condition. The worker, domiciled in State A, had worked at multiple job sites around the region. The manufacturer is incorporated and headquartered in State B, and denied ever supplying insulation to the worker’s employer.

During early discovery, the worker’s attorney deposed the manufacturer’s president and asked about historical distribution records. The president admitted the company had long supplied products to building contractors in State A but claimed it never contracted with the worker’s employer directly. Shortly after, the manufacturer moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff had no evidence showing actual use of its insulation at any relevant job site.

The worker’s attorney requested additional time to complete document subpoenas and contractor depositions to establish a link. He filed a declaration detailing the pending investigative steps and the need for further discovery to oppose the motion.

What is the strongest basis for denying the manufacturer’s summary judgment motion?

The plaintiff’s credibility regarding exposure should be resolved by a jury.
The manufacturer did not affirmatively prove that its insulation was not present.
The motion was premature because the parties had not yet conferred about discovery.
The plaintiff demonstrated that more time is needed for discovery and supported the request with specific facts.

20. A luxury homebuilder contracted with a steel supplier for beams to be used in a multi-story residential project. The agreement stated “Grade A structural beams suitable for private residential construction, certified and labeled by supplier,” with delivery scheduled in three staggered shipments. The first shipment contained unlabeled beams, though the supplier assured they met Grade A specs.

When a city inspector reviewed the materials, she questioned the lack of certification and temporarily halted construction. The builder contacted the supplier and requested immediate labeled replacements. The supplier refused, stating certification was implied and that labeling wasn’t standard for residential jobs. The builder canceled the remaining shipments and sourced steel elsewhere.

The supplier sued for breach, seeking payment for the initial delivery and damages from contract termination.

Did the homebuilder act properly in canceling the contract?

Yes, because the lack of labeling constituted breach of a clear delivery term.
No, because the beams were structurally suitable and usable.
Yes, because the inspector’s halt showed that certification was material to progress.
No, because labeling was not required under standard residential practices.

21. A plaintiff sued a university for negligence after collapsing staging injured several performers during a student event. A university staffer testified at trial that he was never aware of any prior concerns about the platform. On cross-examination, plaintiff’s counsel asked whether he remembered telling a university investigator, “That stage was sketchy long before—everyone knew it wobbled during rehearsals.” The witness replied that he didn’t recall making any such comment.

Plaintiff then sought to admit the investigator’s report summarizing the staffer’s statement, signed by both the investigator and the witness. Defense counsel objected on hearsay grounds, noting that the staff member denied memory and that the report was part of an informal post-incident meeting, not sworn testimony. Plaintiff responded that the signed statement contradicted the live testimony and was admissible to impeach credibility.

Should the court allow the report into evidence?

No, because post-incident investigations lack reliability and are usually inadmissible.
Yes, because Rule 613 permits prior inconsistent statements to impeach even when a witness denies memory.
No, because impeachment requires direct acknowledgment from the witness.
Yes, because any signed statement is admissible regardless of its context.

22. A consumer advocacy group sued a pharmaceutical company in federal district court, seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) to stop the national sale of a sleep aid allegedly causing severe cognitive side effects. The complaint alleged violations of federal health regulations and cited clinical studies suggesting harm in certain populations. The advocacy group requested immediate injunctive relief, asserting that members across several states were actively suffering injury and that delay would risk irreparable harm.

The company responded that the drug had received FDA approval and that no enforcement actions were pending. It also argued that the group failed to notify the company before seeking emergency relief and did not provide sufficient proof that its members faced immediate harm. The company moved to deny the TRO on procedural grounds, challenging both the evidentiary basis and compliance with required formalities.

The court scheduled a hearing to determine whether the TRO should issue prior to evaluating any preliminary injunction. No prior orders were entered, and no discovery had occurred yet.

What is the most likely result?

The TRO will be granted, because the complaint alleges serious risks to public health and prompt judicial action is appropriate.
The TRO will be denied, because the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient factual support demonstrating imminent harm.
The TRO will be granted, because FDA approval does not bar equitable relief in federal court.
The TRO will be denied, because the plaintiff failed to provide notice or satisfy procedural requirements for emergency relief.

23. A small county board in a semi-rural district voted to begin each monthly zoning commission meeting with an invocation offered by local volunteers from various religious organizations. The board opened the invitation process to all clergy and spiritual leaders within the county, including representatives from minority faiths and secular humanist groups. The volunteers were given discretion to offer invocations of their choosing, so long as they remained respectful and brief.

Over the course of a year, the board hosted a variety of invocations — ranging from Christian and Jewish prayers to a Native American blessing and a philosophical reflection from a local professor. Attendees were not required to participate or stand, and the invocations were delivered before any business or roll call began. A group of residents filed suit, alleging that the board’s practice violated the Establishment Clause because prayers were held in an official government setting and risked aligning public policy with specific religious perspectives.

At trial, the board presented its invocation records, showing diversity of participants and no screening or content control over what was said. It argued the practice was ceremonial and consistent with long-standing traditions at all levels of government. The residents emphasized that even well-intentioned prayers could signal implicit endorsement or pressure dissenting attendees. The court was tasked with determining whether the board’s invocation practice crossed constitutional lines or fell within accepted ceremonial bounds.

Should the court strike down the invocation practice as unconstitutional?

Yes, because the presence of prayer at a government meeting always violates the Establishment Clause.
Yes, because inclusion of religious content at official gatherings risks coercing dissenters.
No, because the practice is inclusive, ceremonial, and does not endorse a specific religion.
No, because local governments may freely incorporate any faith-based practice into public functions.

24. A man punched another during an argument outside a bar, causing him to fall and hit his head on the curb. The victim briefly lost consciousness, stood up dazed, and walked away. Several hours later, he collapsed at home and died from internal bleeding. Medical examiners testified that the head trauma led to delayed symptoms. The defendant was charged with homicide and claimed he was unaware the punch caused serious injury.

At trial, the defense argued that the victim’s decision to walk away and not seek help was an intervening cause. They emphasized that the man continued drinking after the fight and declined medical attention. The prosecution responded that the defendant’s conduct caused a chain of events resulting in death and that voluntary choices after the injury did not sever legal causation.

The jury must decide whether the original punch proximately caused the fatal injury, or whether the victim’s choices absolved the defendant.

Which factor most supports the homicide charge?

That the defendant punched first and did not assist the victim afterward.
That the victim declined medical help, making the death unforeseeable.
That the punch initiated the chain of events, and medical testimony supports causation.
That the fight was mutual and not premeditated.

25. A defendant was tried for armed robbery but the case ended in a mistrial after a juror collapsed and could not continue. The judge declared the mistrial without polling the remaining jurors or consulting the parties. Days later, the prosecution refiled the same charges, and the defendant moved to dismiss based on double jeopardy grounds, arguing that the first trial had proceeded to closing arguments and that the judge’s decision lacked a finding of manifest necessity.

At the hearing, the prosecution asserted that a juror’s incapacitation justifies mistrial and that no verdict had been reached. The defense responded that the judge acted unilaterally, without confirming whether the rest of the jury could proceed or if alternatives existed. They argued that manifest necessity requires serious deliberation and that reflexive mistrials undermine finality.

The court must determine whether retrying the case violates the defendant’s constitutional protections under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

What is the strongest argument for dismissal?

That the trial had reached closing arguments and should have continued.
That the prosecution failed to prove guilt in the first trial.
That the judge declared a mistrial without finding manifest necessity.
That double jeopardy always applies after jury selection.

26. A small-town restaurant hired a local contractor to redesign its outdoor patio, including installing a retractable awning, tile flooring, and custom lighting. The agreement specified that the materials would be weather-resistant and sourced from the restaurant’s chosen vendors. Installation was to be completed by May 15 to coincide with summer opening events. The contractor missed the deadline, citing a vendor backlog, and installed a fixed awning and basic tiles that didn’t match the agreed aesthetic.

When the restaurant reviewed the work, it noted that the lighting had also been wired improperly and caused power outages in the building. The contractor claimed the substitutions were functional and superior, but the restaurant refused final payment and demanded compensation for lost revenue and repair costs. A new contractor had to redo portions of the installation.

The original contractor sued for breach, asserting that his work was complete, timely enough, and structurally sound. The restaurant argued that the modifications and errors defeated the contract’s design and operational purpose.

Was the restaurant justified in refusing payment?

Yes, because the contractor’s material substitutions and lighting error breached express terms.
No, because the work was structurally sound and could be adjusted later.
Yes, because missing the exact deadline and altering design features caused operational disruption.
No, because the vendor delay was outside the contractor’s control

27. A caterer booked a gala event for $20,000 with a $5,000 deposit. The contract allowed cancellation with no penalty up to 14 days before the event. The venue canceled 7 days before, citing budget issues. The caterer had already purchased ingredients and scheduled staff, incurring unrecoverable costs of $8,000.

The venue argued that the deposit covered prep losses. The caterer sued for recovery of out-of-pocket costs, presenting invoices and staff confirmations to support the claim. The food could not be repurposed and payroll was not avoidable.

What amount is the caterer most likely entitled to recover?

$5,000.
$8,000.
$13,000.
$15,000.

28. A man attended a party at a friend’s house and brought his gym bag, which he left in the host’s bedroom. Several hours later, the police arrived after a noise complaint and asked the host for permission to search the premises. The host consented, and during the search officers found the man’s bag, opened it, and discovered a loaded firearm and several unmarked prescription bottles. The man, found asleep in another room, was arrested and charged with unlawful possession of a firearm and controlled substances.

At trial, the man claimed he had no idea the items were in his bag, stating that he had lent it to a coworker earlier in the week and hadn't checked the contents. The prosecution emphasized that the bag was zipped closed and placed in a private area where the defendant had access. The host testified that no one else had entered the room, and surveillance showed the man placing the bag inside before mingling with guests.

The issue turns on whether the defendant had sufficient control and awareness of the contents to establish constructive possession of the illegal items.

Which argument most supports conviction?

That the defendant maintained exclusive access to the bag and placed it deliberately.
That another person may have planted the items without the defendant’s knowledge.
That the bag’s presence at a party suggests shared possession.
That the host’s consent to search nullifies any Fourth Amendment violation.

29. In 1994, a couple purchased a suburban lot and installed fencing along what they believed to be their southern boundary. Within the fenced area, they built a shed, planted fruit trees, and installed a gravel driveway segment. For the next 29 years, they maintained the area exclusively. The neighboring parcel remained vacant and changed owners twice, with no surveys conducted or objections raised.

In 2023, the new neighbor commissioned a survey and discovered that the couple’s improvements extended 12 feet into her property. She demanded removal of all fixtures and restoration of the encroached land. The couple refused, citing adverse possession and providing detailed evidence of their open, exclusive, continuous, and hostile use dating back nearly three decades. No permission was ever granted or discussed.

The jurisdiction applies standard adverse possession rules, requiring 20 years of uninterrupted open, notorious, exclusive, and hostile possession. It accepts mistaken boundaries under claim of right as satisfying hostility when the possessor treats the land as their own.

Who holds title to the disputed strip?

The couple, because their use meets all requirements for adverse possession.
The neighbor, because record title remains intact absent formal conveyance.
The couple, because fencing and physical improvements demonstrate claim of right.
The neighbor, because mistaken belief about boundaries defeats hostility.

30. Police received a tip that a man selling concert tickets on the street corner had outstanding warrants. Officers approached him, requested ID, and searched his backpack without asking consent. Inside, they found counterfeit tickets, small bags of marijuana, and cash. The man was arrested and charged with possession and fraud. He moved to suppress the evidence, claiming the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

At the hearing, the prosecution argued that the tip and public setting allowed officers to briefly detain and investigate. They insisted that the man’s backpack was within his reach and posed potential risk. The defense emphasized that no arrest had occurred at the time of the search, that the tip was anonymous, and that the man did not consent. Officers admitted they had no warrant or probable cause when they opened the bag.

Should the court suppress the contents of the backpack?

Yes, because no arrest had occurred and the search lacked probable cause or consent.
No, because tips about street crime justify immediate safety searches.
No, because the evidence was in plain view once the backpack was opened.
Yes, because backpacks are protected areas requiring warrants in public spaces.

31. A new theater group commissioned a set designer to build modular scenery for its fall production. The agreement outlined specific elements, including interchangeable panels and built-in lighting that could be operated from the tech booth. Completion was scheduled two weeks before opening night to allow for rehearsal integration.

The designer delivered the panels on time, but failed to install lighting, claiming that the theater’s electrical system wasn’t compatible with his plans. The group scrambled to rent portable lighting and adjusted blocking during tech rehearsals. After opening night, it paid half the agreed amount and refused the remainder, citing incomplete delivery and production disruption.

The designer sued for full payment, arguing that the panels met structural specifications and that the lighting was an optional enhancement based on cooperation with theater staff.

Was the theater group within its rights to withhold payment?

No, because the designer delivered the scenery as agreed, and lighting was a collaborative feature.
No, because the theater's electrical limitations prevented full compliance.
Yes, because failure to deliver the integrated lighting system breached a specific contractual obligation.
Yes, because the production had to make costly adjustments due to the missing component.

32. During an investigation into leaked diplomatic materials, a congressional committee subpoenaed internal communications from senior executive staff. The President invoked executive privilege and refused to produce emails, stating that the disclosures would impair foreign policy discussions and chill internal debate. The committee sued, arguing that privilege could not block oversight in cases involving suspected misconduct.

The administration responded that executive privilege protects confidential communications necessary for effective governance and that allowing legislative intrusion into strategic deliberations undermines separation of powers. It emphasized that the emails included national security implications and foreign relations strategy. The committee countered that its inquiry concerned potential wrongdoing—not policy advice—and that withholding documents obstructed constitutional oversight.

What is the strongest argument that the President’s invocation of privilege is unconstitutional?

Executive privilege may not be used to conceal misconduct from congressional investigation.
Presidential communications are subject to review when national security is not directly involved.
The committee is entitled to internal executive discussions whenever policy outcomes affect legislation.
Separation of powers does not apply when documents are created by unelected staffers.

33. A landowner granted his neighbor an easement “for pedestrian access across the southern pathway,” which was recorded and used regularly for walking. Five years later, the neighbor sold her property to a nature retreat company that began running daily guided hikes using the trail. Over time, the company widened the path, added gravel, and began offering battery-powered scooters for elderly guests during busy seasons.

The servient landowner observed rutting, increased erosion, and drainage issues along the trail. He sent two written notices requesting restoration and cessation of motorized travel, both of which were ignored. He eventually filed for injunctive relief, asserting that the original easement did not authorize vehicle use and that the retreat’s alterations materially burdened his property. The retreat center argued that all enhancements served the original purpose of pedestrian access and that no structural damage had occurred.

The jurisdiction enforces express easements according to their plain language and permits modest evolution of use only when consistent with original scope and absent material burden. Courts generally favor servient owners when the physical condition of the land is adversely affected.

Who is likely to prevail?

The retreat company, because accessibility modifications are consistent with modern easement expectations.
The retreat company, because no structural damage was documented.
The servient landowner, because motorized travel exceeds the scope of “pedestrian access.”
The servient landowner, because rutting and erosion show material burden.

34. A film director hired a composer to write original score segments for a short project premiering at a festival. The agreement stipulated three themes matching the mood and pacing of the final cut and required that they be delivered in fully orchestrated format by July 1. The composer sent rough digital sketches and promised full versions in two weeks, citing studio delays. The director used alternate music and excluded the composer’s work from the film.

The composer demanded payment, arguing that the sketches had value and reflected the work’s foundation. The director refused, explaining that the contract required finished music and the delay affected festival prep.

Is the composer entitled to payment?

Yes, because the rough versions were useful and provided a creative framework.
No, because the contract required completed themes by the stated date.
Yes, because orchestration can follow delivery, especially if sketches were timely.
No, because the director’s reliance on alternate music terminated the composer’s claim.

35. A city approved a plan to acquire private residential homes using eminent domain to expand a publicly owned convention center and accompanying hotel. Officials claimed that the new development would generate substantial tax revenue and attract tourism, thereby serving a public purpose. Several homeowners refused to sell, and after receiving notices of condemnation, they sued under the Fifth Amendment, arguing that the city’s taking was not for public use.

In response, the city argued that the project was publicly funded and owned, and that convention centers and related amenities historically qualify as public infrastructure. It emphasized that no private developer would own the final product, and that public access would be broadly available. The homeowners pointed to internal planning documents that suggested lease arrangements with private operators and VIP housing zones for event sponsors, and claimed the “public use” rationale was a pretext for economic favoritism.

The court must decide whether the planned taking satisfies the constitutional requirement of public use. The homeowners argued that economic gain alone does not qualify and that the involvement of private interests renders the plan suspect. The city maintained that the facilities served civic functions and offered broad community benefits that justified limited condemnation.

Should the court uphold the taking?

Yes, because increased revenue and public infrastructure are valid public purposes.
No, because the project includes private management and exclusive zones not available to the public.
Yes, because public ownership satisfies the use requirement even if leasing occurs.
No, because hotels and convention centers do not serve traditional government functions.

36. A 19-year-old man attended a music festival and met a girl who told him she was also 19. They spent the evening together and later went back to his campsite, where they engaged in consensual sexual intercourse. The next morning, the girl revealed she was actually 15 and had used a friend’s ID to gain entry. She expressed regret and told her parents, who contacted the police. The man was arrested and charged under the state’s statutory rape statute, which prohibits sexual activity with individuals under 16 and does not mention any mental state requirement.

At trial, the defense argued that he reasonably believed the girl was over the age of consent based on her statement and presentation. The prosecution insisted that the statute imposed strict liability, meaning that mistake of fact—even reasonable mistake—was no defense. The defense pointed to prior state court decisions interpreting similar statutes as permitting a mistake-of-age defense when the defendant’s belief was objectively reasonable and based on affirmative representations.

Should the jury be allowed to consider the defendant’s mistake-of-age defense?

No, because all statutory rape laws impose strict liability.
Yes, because the defense presented evidence of deception by the victim.
No, because mistake of fact is only a defense to specific intent crimes.
Yes, if the jurisdiction permits a reasonable mistake-of-age defense based on precedent.

37. A plaintiff sued a multinational chemical company for injuries caused by long-term exposure to toxins near a manufacturing site. The jury awarded $2 million in compensatory damages and $75 million in punitive damages, citing the company's repeated failure to implement known safety measures. The defendant moved to reduce the punitive award, arguing that it violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The trial court declined to reduce the amount, stating that the company’s conduct was reckless and that the award was necessary to deter future violations. On appeal, the company emphasized that the punitive damages were nearly forty times the compensatory amount and exceeded typical ratios deemed constitutional in similar cases. The plaintiff responded that the ratio was justified given the potential harm and that courts had discretion to uphold larger awards when misconduct was egregious.

The appellate court was tasked with reviewing whether the punitive damages award violated the company’s constitutional rights under substantive due process principles governing excessive penalties.

Should the court find the award unconstitutional?

Yes, because any punitive award exceeding ten times compensatory damages is per se invalid.
Yes, because punitive damages cannot exceed compensatory damages in federal civil litigation.
No, because juries may award any amount of punitive damages based on misconduct.
No, because punitive damages are subject to constitutional limits, but egregious conduct may justify higher ratios.

38. A state senator was sued for defamation after making public comments accusing a local union of corruption during a televised committee hearing. The union claimed the remarks were false and harmed its reputation. The senator moved to dismiss under legislative immunity, arguing that the statements were made in the course of official legislative business and were protected by the Speech or Debate Clause.

The union responded that while the hearing was public, the remarks exceeded formal inquiry and involved personal attacks not germane to legislation. It claimed that immunity applied only to core legislative acts—not media appearances or commentary. The senator countered that the comments were part of a broader review of labor oversight laws and were made during the questioning of witnesses in an official proceeding.

The court must now decide whether the senator’s comments are protected by legislative immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution.

Should the court dismiss the suit?

No, because defamatory speech is never protected by legislative privilege.
Yes, because statements made during official hearings fall within legislative immunity.
No, because media broadcasts remove the protection of official context.
Yes, because legislative immunity extends to all public policy discussions.

39. A tech entrepreneur signed a contract with a video production company to create a product demo featuring both animation and live testimonials. The agreement specified “two scripted video segments totaling 3–4 minutes, using professional voiceover and licensed background music.” The entrepreneur provided examples and expected a polished promotional reel for investor presentations.

The company delivered two clips totaling under two minutes, one without music and one with awkward audio transitions. When asked for revisions, the company claimed the project scope was open to interpretation and that licensing new music exceeded the budget. The entrepreneur rejected the materials and declined to make the final payment.

The video firm sued for breach, citing delivery of two segments and basic compliance with the agreement’s intent.

Is the entrepreneur liable for breach of contract?

No, because the videos failed to meet specific length, audio, and licensing requirements.
Yes, because the firm delivered two video clips suitable for use.
No, because investor-facing materials require higher production standards than were met.
Yes, because slight deviations in length and music choice are common in video projects.

40. A public high school implemented a policy allowing administrators to access students’ personal smartphones during school hours if they suspected a violation of school rules involving communication, such as bullying or unauthorized group coordination. A student was called to the office for using her phone in class and was required to unlock it. The assistant principal scrolled through her private messages and photo albums, later citing several posts as grounds for suspension. The student sued, arguing that the phone search violated her Fourth Amendment rights.

The school district defended the search as a necessary extension of its authority to maintain order and safety in a digital environment. Officials claimed that the search was limited in scope and focused only on items connected to potential rule infractions. The student countered that her phone contained sensitive personal content unrelated to school conduct and that no warrant or parental notice had been issued. She emphasized that cellphones now serve as a modern extension of personal identity and should receive heightened protection.

The court must determine whether the school’s search of student phones without individualized suspicion or limits violates the Fourth Amendment. The student asserted that her expectation of privacy was reasonable and that the intrusion was excessively broad, while the school maintained that its disciplinary goals justified flexible procedures.

Should the court find the search unconstitutional?

No, because students have diminished privacy rights in school.
Yes, because phones contain personal content not subject to school search.
Yes, because the search was overly intrusive and lacked sufficient justification.
No, because schools may inspect personal devices to maintain discipline.

41. A woman created a fake online profile and messaged a stranger offering $1,000 to “rough up” her coworker, whom she disliked. The stranger responded ambiguously, saying “Let me think about it,” and then reported the message to police. Investigators tracked the profile to the woman’s IP address and arrested her for criminal solicitation. During interrogation, she admitted sending the message but said she never expected anyone to act on it and thought she was “just venting.”

At trial, the defense argued that the act was mere fantasy and not a true attempt to incite violence. The prosecution emphasized that offering money and providing specific details — including the coworker’s address — showed serious intent. They charged solicitation rather than attempt, noting that the crime was incomplete and no overt acts had occurred beyond the request.

The jury must decide whether the elements of criminal solicitation have been met.

Which fact most strongly supports the solicitation charge?

That the stranger didn’t agree to carry out the plan.
That the woman provided money, targeting details, and expressed purpose.
That the woman was frustrated and emotionally unstable.
That no violence occurred and no agreement was reached.

42. A public university implemented a policy requiring all recognized student organizations to include a miniature national flag in any table display or promotional materials used at campus events. The policy was intended to foster civic unity and to remind students of the university’s commitment to pluralism and constitutional values. A student pacifist organization objected, stating that the forced use of the national flag was contrary to its anti-nationalist principles. The group refused to comply and was denied event space and funding.

The university defended the policy as a symbolic inclusion requirement rather than a message mandate. Officials claimed that the presence of the flag did not constitute compelled speech and that the university retained broad authority to regulate the use of campus resources for publicly funded expression. The organization argued that the flag was a political symbol associated with military action and federal policy, and that its inclusion altered the group’s expressive identity in violation of First Amendment protections.

The group sued in federal court for injunctive relief, asserting that the university’s policy imposed a viewpoint requirement on expressive activity and forced student groups to adopt a symbol they rejected. They pointed to precedent holding that the government cannot force private groups to engage in speech they do not endorse, and emphasized that denial of funding and access constituted a material consequence tied to compelled expression.

Should the court strike down the flag inclusion requirement?

No, because the flag serves as a neutral civic symbol that does not interfere with group expression.
Yes, because university event rules are subject to rational basis review and the policy fails it.
Yes, because compelled symbolic speech violates the First Amendment when tied to funding or access.
No, because the university has discretion to condition recognition on symbolic expression standards.

43. A man was walking past a fenced-in electrical substation located in an industrial part of town. A warning sign was posted near the entrance, but one panel of the fence had fallen inward, leaving an opening. Curious, the man stepped inside and began taking photos of the equipment. While walking near a control cabinet, he tripped on a loose wire and sustained a shock that caused burns and nerve damage. The utility company argued that the man was a trespasser and that the site was not designed for public access.

The man sued for negligence, claiming the company failed to maintain safe barriers and that the opening made entry appear permissible. He also pointed to the absence of secondary warning signs or staff presence. A city inspection log noted that the fence panel had been loose for several weeks and that internal maintenance requests had been deferred.

The jurisdiction applies traditional landowner liability rules, recognizing a limited duty to trespassers to avoid willful or reckless harm and, in some cases, to correct known hazards where entry is foreseeable.

Is the utility company likely liable?

No, because trespassers assume the risk of known industrial hazards.
Yes, because the broken fence created a foreseeable risk of entry.
No, because landowners have no duty to warn trespassers.
Yes, because utilities owe a heightened duty to protect the public from latent electrical danger.

44. A group of landowners filed a federal lawsuit against a mining company, claiming that blasting operations near their properties caused structural damage and reduced property values. The suit alleged state-law claims for nuisance, negligence, and trespass, and was filed in a district where the plaintiffs resided and the damage allegedly occurred. The mining company moved to dismiss for improper venue, arguing that its operations were headquartered in another district and that all blasting activities were conducted outside the current forum.

The plaintiffs responded that physical harm occurred within the chosen district, that the effects of the operations were felt there, and that the company had entered into purchase agreements and access easements with property owners in the forum. The mining company maintained that venue was improper because it had no office, staff, or direct presence in the district and claimed the dispute should be resolved near its corporate headquarters.

The court must determine whether venue is proper under federal law.

What is the best basis for venue in the district where the landowners filed suit?

The mining company’s headquarters location as the place of decision-making.
The location where the harmful conduct originated.
The district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.
The residence of the plaintiffs when the damage was discovered.

45. During a heated protest, a man raised a baseball bat and shouted at a passerby, “I’ll smash your skull if you don’t walk away!” The passerby retreated and later filed a complaint. The man was arrested and charged with battery. He had never physically touched or made contact with the alleged victim. Witnesses described the bat being swung close but never making impact. At trial, the prosecution emphasized the threat and weapon, but the defense contended that no physical contact occurred.

The judge instructed the jury on both assault and battery, explaining that assault covers threats of imminent harm while battery requires physical contact. The prosecution argued that the bat’s proximity created real danger and psychological trauma, which justified a battery charge. The defense maintained that despite the threat, no touching occurred and the appropriate charge was limited to assault.

What is the proper charge based on the facts?

Battery, because the weapon's presence escalated the threat.
Assault, because no physical contact occurred.
Aggravated assault, because the weapon created intent to cause serious harm.
Attempted battery, because the bat was raised and swung.

46. A buyer signed a contract to purchase a parcel of undeveloped land for $765,000. The agreement stated closing would occur “on or before December 31” and included a clause allowing the buyer to cancel or renegotiate if “hazardous materials or waste” were discovered prior to closing. On December 10, an environmental consultant identified buried drums near the property’s south boundary labeled with corrosive warning symbols. A preliminary remediation estimate exceeded $40,000.

The buyer sent the report to the seller on December 12 and proposed a $35,000 price adjustment. The seller refused and, on December 14, executed a deed conveying the parcel to a backup buyer. The original buyer filed suit, claiming breach and arguing that her request was authorized by the contingency clause. The seller claimed that by proposing a discount, the buyer had rejected the original contract and forfeited any right to enforce it.

The jurisdiction enforces contingency clauses by their terms and does not consider good faith price renegotiation to be rejection unless expressly stated. Courts require clear cancellation or abandonment before releasing sellers from performance obligations.

Who is likely to prevail?

The seller, because price renegotiation constitutes rejection of the offer.
The seller, because inspection results were inconclusive.
The buyer, because her adjustment proposal preserved contract rights.
The buyer, because environmental hazards render the property unmarketable.

47. A homeowner installed decorative ground lights across her front yard. One evening, a mail carrier walked slightly off the paved path to avoid an icy patch and tripped on a concealed fixture, breaking his ankle. The homeowner argued that the lights were standard landscaping and visible during daylight. She also noted that the carrier deviated from the marked walkway without permission.

The postal service claimed the fixture was low to the ground, unlit during early evening hours, and not easily distinguishable under light snowfall. Internal records showed prior minor injuries on similar yards, but no reports involving this home.

The jurisdiction applies premises liability rules to property owners, requiring them to take reasonable precautions to protect foreseeable entrants — including delivery personnel — from hidden dangers not easily avoided.

Is the homeowner likely liable?

Yes, because the lights were difficult to spot and created a tripping hazard.
No, since the mail carrier left the designated path voluntarily.
Yes, as weather and visibility made the hazard unpredictable.
No, because no prior complaints had been recorded on the property.

48. A federal grant program offered funds to community centers to build athletic facilities, but required recipients to certify that they would not host any event promoting the use of alcohol or tobacco. A youth advocacy group sought funding to construct a multi-use performance space, but refused the certification, citing plans to host community health debates that included speakers critical of prohibition-style messaging. Their application was denied, and they filed suit alleging a violation of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.

The government defended the requirement, asserting that the grant served a public health purpose and that promoting substances contrary to that goal would undermine the program. It emphasized that centers remained free to hold any events without grant funds, and that certification applied only to federally supported programs. The group argued that conditioning money on restricting speech—even where the content was informational—constituted compelled silence and viewpoint discrimination.

What is the strongest argument that the government’s certification requirement violates the Constitution?

The certification excludes groups based on their policy preferences, creating an equal protection issue.
The restriction forces centers to adopt government messaging as a condition of speech.
The grant conditions chill protected speech by penalizing content critical of government policy.
The certification discriminates among groups based on internal programming criteria.

49. A man diagnosed with schizophrenia was arrested after trespassing at a private warehouse and claiming government agents were “beaming messages” through the walls. He refused to answer questions during intake and insisted he was the president of an underground nation. The court ordered a competency evaluation, and two psychologists found that while the man had delusional beliefs, he understood the charges and could cooperate with legal counsel.

At the competency hearing, defense counsel argued that the man’s inability to distinguish reality rendered him unfit to stand trial. Prosecutors noted that he answered basic questions, showed awareness of court procedures, and had previously participated in civil hearings. One expert testified that his condition did not prevent rational understanding of the proceedings or ability to assist counsel.

The judge must decide whether to proceed with trial or order continued mental health treatment until competency is restored.

Which standard governs competency to stand trial?

Whether the defendant can distinguish right from wrong at the time of the offense.
Whether the defendant suffers from any diagnosed mental condition.
Whether the defendant understands the nature of the proceedings and can assist counsel.
Whether the defendant’s prior history shows criminal capacity.

50. A health supplement startup contracted with a web developer to create an e-commerce platform with customized user profiles, cart functionality, and a dietary quiz tied to purchase recommendations. The written agreement stated, “Beta testing must be complete by August 20, and all core features functional by September 1.” The developer delivered a partial build on August 25, with cart and profiles working, but the quiz was buggy and produced inconsistent recommendations.

The startup requested fixes, but the developer said the quiz was in progress and that September 1 was the real milestone. On that date, the quiz remained problematic and the site crashed under basic load tests. The company terminated the contract, hired a second firm, and refused payment for the second phase.

The developer sued for breach, claiming that substantial work was completed and delays were within normal startup scope.

Was the startup entitled to terminate the contract?

No, because core functions like the cart and profiles were completed.
No, because startup development timelines often involve iterative refinement.
Yes, because the quiz was an essential feature tied to purchase and its failure breached performance.
Yes, because the missed beta and final milestones justified termination.

51. A startup founder sued an accelerator program in federal court for breach of contract. The complaint alleged that the program had promised equity investment, mentorship, and workspace but failed to deliver any of those benefits. The startup, incorporated in State A, filed suit in its local district. The accelerator is incorporated in State B and has its headquarters and main program site there.

The accelerator moved to dismiss, claiming that the contract required disputes to be litigated exclusively in State B and that venue was improper in State A. The founder admitted the agreement included a forum-selection clause but argued that enforcing the clause would be unfair and hinder access to legal remedies. The court is evaluating whether dismissal or transfer is appropriate.

What is the likely outcome?

The case will be dismissed, because forum-selection clauses must be strictly enforced.
The case will proceed in State A, because the plaintiff is entitled to sue in her home forum.
The case will be transferred to State B under the forum-selection clause and § 1404(a).
The case will be dismissed, because personal jurisdiction over the defendant is lacking.

52. A homeowner retained a roofing company to replace shingles and gutters damaged by a storm. The written agreement included a clause stating that “all work shall comply with local building codes and materials approved by the HOA.” During installation, the company used a darker shingle tone and attached standard gutters instead of the HOA-required style.

When the HOA conducted its inspection, it rejected the work and fined the homeowner for noncompliance. The homeowner contacted the roofing company, which responded that the substituted materials were weather-tough and widely used. It refused to redo the work without additional payment. The homeowner hired a second firm to correct the violations and withheld the remainder of the original payment.

The roofing company sued, asserting that it completed the agreed work and the homeowner was unfairly penalized by association rules.

Did the roofing company materially breach the contract?

No, because it delivered structurally sound roofing with high-grade materials.
Yes, because its substitutions violated clear HOA and contractual requirements.
No, because HOA guidelines are separate from contractor responsibilities.
Yes, because failure to adhere to code and appearance terms compromised the homeowner’s obligations.

53. A defendant was charged with wire fraud after misrepresenting business income to investors. To explain irregular transactions, the government called a forensic economist who traced spreadsheet anomalies to fabricated invoices. The expert had twenty years of experience reviewing commercial ledgers and regularly testified in federal cases involving white-collar crimes.

On voir dire, defense counsel noted that the expert lacked an accounting certification and had never worked in a corporate finance department. They argued the expert’s conclusions were speculative and failed Daubert’s methodological rigor. The prosecutor responded that the expert’s analysis involved accepted techniques—trend detection, temporal mapping, and audit benchmarking.

Should the expert be allowed to testify?

No, because lack of licensing and corporate experience renders the methodology unreliable.
No, because economic modeling must be published in peer-reviewed literature to qualify.
Yes, because experience-based pattern recognition satisfies Rule 702 qualifications.
Yes, because the expert’s methodology is reliable and relevant under Daubert.

54. A buyer signed a contract to purchase a hillside parcel for $610,000. The agreement provided that closing would occur “on or before June 30” and included an inspection clause allowing cancellation or renegotiation if “any environmental condition negatively affecting soil quality” were discovered. On June 2, the buyer’s inspector reported widespread soil instability caused by buried construction debris and recommended remediation.

The buyer contacted the seller with the report and proposed a $30,000 reduction to account for removal and repair. The seller declined and instead executed a deed to a third-party buyer on June 10. The original buyer filed suit, asserting breach of contract and claiming that the renegotiation request was authorized by the inspection clause. The seller argued that the buyer’s discount request constituted rejection and voided the agreement.

In this jurisdiction, courts interpret such clauses strictly and uphold renegotiation rights where explicitly granted. Abandonment or cancellation must be express and unequivocal, and courts generally do not infer rejection from a reasonable attempt to adjust price under a valid clause.

Who is likely to prevail?

The seller, because execution of the deed occurred before the closing deadline.
The seller, because environmental issues do not affect legal title.
The buyer, because her discount proposal properly invoked the inspection clause.
The buyer, because environmental hazards render property transactions unenforceable without remediation.

55. A woman ordered a custom desk from a local woodworker who advertised eco-friendly materials and handcrafted finishes. The contract specified reclaimed oak and water-based varnish. Upon delivery, the desk had a strong chemical odor and a glossy surface more consistent with synthetic lacquer. The woman experienced respiratory irritation and sought medical care. When confronted, the woodworker admitted using leftover conventional materials from a previous job to save time.

She sued for breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation, claiming the product differed materially from what was promised and caused her physical harm. The woodworker argued that the desk still functioned properly and looked excellent, and that minor material substitutions were common in custom builds. He stated the odor would fade and any harm was unforeseeable.

The jurisdiction allows tort recovery for negligent misrepresentation in commercial contracts when inaccurate factual assertions cause physical injury and involve material reliance.

Is the woman likely to prevail?

No, because the desk met functional expectations.
Yes, because she suffered physical harm due to a material misrepresentation.
No, because the substitution involved non-defective materials.
Yes, because all contract breaches are actionable in tort.

56. A guest at a hotel called the front desk to report flickering lights and a humming noise in the wall near her room. Maintenance said no problem was detected and offered to move her, but she declined. That evening, a small electrical fire ignited in the wiring and triggered smoke inhalation injuries. Investigation showed that the humming had been traced to prior circuit instability, and that patchwork repairs were made earlier that month.

The guest sued the hotel for premises negligence. The hotel argued she declined relocation and that the fire was sudden and unforeseeable. The guest countered that the complaint, coupled with known wiring history, made her injury preventable.

The jurisdiction holds property owners liable for failure to act on specific safety complaints where resulting harm was foreseeable and related to known conditions.

Is the hotel likely liable?

No, because the guest refused relocation after being offered an alternative.
Yes, because the hotel failed to investigate a repeat hazard and prevent injury.
No, because electrical fires are spontaneous and hard to predict.
Yes, because hotels are automatically liable for in-room injuries.

57. Three friends agreed to vandalize a local political office by breaking windows and spray-painting slogans. During planning, one friend suggested bringing crowbars, but the others discouraged using force. On the night of the incident, while two friends vandalized the building as planned, the third entered alone and ignited a fire in a storage closet. Fire crews responded, and the building suffered severe damage. All three were arrested and charged with conspiracy to commit arson.

At trial, the defense for the two non-fire-setting conspirators argued that they had not planned or foreseen arson. They acknowledged involvement in property damage but insisted they were unaware of the fire plan. The prosecution asserted that the act was foreseeable, given the tools discussed and the aggressive nature of the plan. They emphasized that the fire occurred during execution of the agreed-upon criminal scheme.

Which legal principle most supports conviction of the two non-fire-setting conspirators?

Co-conspirators may be liable for reasonably foreseeable acts done in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Liability for co-conspirators ends once the original plan is completed.
The lack of express agreement limits charges to the initial offense.
Arson charges require direct planning or participation by each conspirator.

58. A city required all applicants for commercial signage permits to agree not to include political or ideological messages in the proposed signage. Officials claimed the rule was necessary to prevent disruption and maintain neutrality in the urban landscape. A bookstore owner applied for a permit to install a sign that included quotes from historical protest literature, but was denied due to noncompliance with the content restriction. The owner filed suit, alleging a violation of the First Amendment.

In response, the city emphasized that commercial signage regulations were limited in scope and applied only to permanent displays in regulated zones. It asserted that the signage program was content-neutral and designed to promote visual consistency and avoid provocative public messaging near sensitive infrastructure. The bookstore owner countered that excluding ideological messages constituted viewpoint discrimination and suppressed protected speech in a traditionally expressive medium.

The court must determine whether the city’s permit condition violates the First Amendment.

Should the court grant relief to the bookstore owner?

No, because cities may regulate content in commercial signage consistent with aesthetic goals.
Yes, because the permit restriction is overly broad and lacks compelling justification.
Yes, because excluding political or ideological messages constitutes unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.
No, because permanent signs are not traditional public forums and receive minimal protection.

59. A publishing house entered into a written agreement with an author to produce a nonfiction book centered on scientific breakthroughs. The contract required the author to submit a final manuscript by March 15 and stated that “timely delivery and editorial cooperation are conditions precedent to final payment.” The house paid half of the advance up front, with the remainder to be paid after acceptance of the manuscript. The author submitted a draft two weeks early, but the publisher determined that large sections lacked factual citations and asked for revisions. The author replied that the editing process was overly controlling and declined to make further changes.

Over the next month, the publisher hired a third-party fact-checker, restructured chapters independently, and removed unsupported portions. It ultimately released a modified version of the book under the author’s name. The author demanded the remaining payment and claimed that the publisher had accepted the work by releasing it. The publisher refused, citing the failure to revise and the costs incurred from salvaging the manuscript.

If the author sues for the remainder of the contract price, what is the likely result?

The author will recover, because the manuscript was submitted on time and ultimately published.
The author will recover, because rejection after independent publication constitutes waiver.
The publisher will prevail, because substantial editing costs shifted performance obligations.
The publisher will prevail, because the author failed to fulfill a condition precedent by refusing to cooperate.

60. A high school principal suspected a student of vaping in class and summoned him to the office. Without contacting law enforcement or notifying parents, the principal asked the student to empty his backpack. Inside were cartridges and paraphernalia resembling drug devices. The principal then searched the student’s phone, scrolling through text messages, and found conversations about off-campus marijuana use. The student was suspended and referred to juvenile authorities.

At the suppression hearing, defense counsel argued that the phone search violated the student's Fourth Amendment rights and exceeded school authority. They emphasized that no warrant had been obtained and that digital searches require heightened justification. The prosecution responded that schools may conduct reasonable searches under T.L.O. standards and that vaping threats created safety concerns.

The court must assess whether the phone search was reasonable under constitutional school search jurisprudence.

What is the best basis for suppression?

That digital content searches require greater justification than physical item searches.
That the student’s suspension was disproportionate to the alleged conduct.
That the school lacked probable cause to initiate the search.
That vaping paraphernalia is not inherently criminal.

61.

A woman visited a ski resort with a season pass and participated in a guided intermediate tour. On a steep descent, the guide took a shortcut off marked trails and several guests fell, including the woman, who suffered a wrist fracture. She sued the resort, claiming negligence and breach of contract. The resort pointed to a broad liability waiver included in the season pass agreement.

Evidence showed the guide deviated from official route maps and ignored radio cautions about poor surface conditions. Other guests confirmed no warnings were given before the shortcut.

Which legal factor most undermines the resort’s waiver defense?

The woman did not sign a separate waiver for the specific tour.
The guide's deviation from marked trails was not authorized or disclosed.
The resort failed to provide updated maps before the event.
The injury occurred on a slope classified as intermediate, not advanced.

62. A plaintiff sued a concert venue after being struck by a falling stage light during setup. Her attorney called a former lighting technician who claimed he had warned management days earlier that the fixture was loose. On cross, defense counsel asked whether the witness had previously told investigators, “Everything looked secure when I left.” The witness denied ever saying that and insisted his warnings had been ignored.

Defense counsel sought to introduce an internal report written by the venue’s safety officer, summarizing witness interviews conducted after the incident. The report quoted the technician as stating, “All gear seemed stable — no complaints from my team.” The plaintiff objected, arguing that the report is hearsay and not signed by the witness.

Should the court admit the report for impeachment?

Yes, because statements made during internal investigations are automatically admissible.
Yes, because Rule 613 permits use of prior inconsistent statements even when the witness denies memory.
No, because unsworn internal summaries cannot be used to impeach third-party witnesses.
No, because quoting someone else’s words in a report is not a direct prior statement.

63. A graduate student hired an academic editor to provide feedback on a thesis chapter. Their written agreement stated that comments would be “returned within five business days of submission,” and emphasized that the timeline was tied to an upcoming departmental review. The student submitted the chapter on Monday and received feedback two weeks later, after the university deadline had passed.

The editor apologized for the delay, citing a scheduling mix-up, and provided detailed suggestions. The student rejected the feedback and requested a refund, arguing that the comments were now unusable. The editor refused, pointing to the quality of her work and her history of reliable service.

The student filed suit, asserting breach of contract based on missed timing and academic harm.

Is the student likely to prevail?

Yes, because the editor failed to meet a clear delivery deadline central to the contract.
No, because the feedback was detailed and aligned with expectations.
Yes, because performance after the deadline frustrated the contract’s purpose.
No, because the delay was minor and the result still useful.

64. A defendant was charged with embezzling funds from a community charity. The prosecution offered testimony from an accountant who analyzed transfers made between project accounts. The accountant held a master's degree in nonprofit finance and had authored several peer-reviewed papers on donor tracing methods. However, defense counsel argued that she lacked experience with digital wallets, the method used for the alleged transfers.

The prosecution responded that the expert used comparative ledger methods, independent of platform, and that she regularly trains auditors on account behavior regardless of medium. The court considered whether her testimony met expert admissibility standards.

Should the expert’s testimony be allowed?

No, because expertise must directly match the technical method used in the case.
Yes, because her experience and methodology satisfy Rule 702 and Daubert standards.
No, because published research cannot substitute for practical experience.
Yes, because any certified finance expert is qualified to testify in fraud cases.

65. A plaintiff sued a delivery company after being injured by falling parcels allegedly stacked unsafely. A driver testified that the plaintiff had walked directly under the shelves despite a visible sign. On cross-examination, plaintiff’s counsel asked whether the driver had earlier told paramedics, “The signs are useless — nobody reads them and we don’t enforce the warning.” The driver denied making any such statement.

Plaintiff’s counsel then offered a certified emergency medical report documenting the driver’s quote. Defense objected under Rule 613 and Rule 403, arguing that the report’s language was informal, that the driver had denied it, and that it might confuse the jury by elevating paramedic notes over sworn testimony.

Should the court admit the paramedic report for impeachment?

No, because medical reports are not designed for evidentiary use and lack proper foundation.
No, because a witness denial of the statement precludes use of extrinsic evidence.
Yes, because it shows bias regarding signage and is relevant to negligence standards.
Yes, because prior inconsistent statements may be introduced for impeachment under Rule 613, even when denied.

66. A federal court held a bench trial on a contract dispute between two corporate vendors. Both sides presented documents and expert testimony regarding product specifications and delivery timelines. After closing arguments, the judge said, “I’ll rule in favor of the plaintiff,” and the clerk entered judgment. No separate findings of fact or conclusions of law were provided.

The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court committed procedural error. On appeal, the defendant asserted that the lack of findings left the basis of the decision unclear and prevented proper review. The plaintiff responded that the judgment was supported by the record and that findings are not required where the evidence is straightforward.

How should the appellate court respond?

Reverse the judgment, because the district court erred by failing to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Affirm the judgment, because findings are discretionary in document-based trials.
Remand for clarification, because the trial court’s oral ruling does not provide a sufficient appellate record.
Affirm the judgment, because summary judgment standards apply to trials based on documentary evidence.

67. A freelance graphic designer agreed to create five logo variants for a startup, with delivery due by March 15. The contract stated that “all final materials shall include layered source files suitable for commercial adaptation.” These files were to be used by the startup’s in-house branding team to scale and modify logos across print and digital platforms.

On March 15, the designer delivered five high-resolution, flattened logo images but did not include the layered design files. When asked, she explained that she did not retain source layers and that flattening was her standard practice to prevent unauthorized edits. She also claimed that the final images were usable and met professional standards.

The startup refused payment, asserting that the deliverables were incomplete and could not be modified for multiple uses. The designer sued for breach, claiming that she provided the requested number of logos and satisfied aesthetic requirements.

Is the designer entitled to payment?

Yes, because she provided usable logo images on time.
No, because the contract required layered source files and they were never delivered.
Yes, because flattening logos is a common practice to protect artistic integrity.
No, because flat files do not meet the commercial adaptation requirements promised.

68. A nonprofit advocacy group launched a campaign criticizing state subsidies to oil companies, using digital ads and flyers in public areas. In response, a state agency required the group to add a disclaimer to all public messaging: “This organization does not represent official energy policy positions.” The group objected, stating that the disclaimer implied illegitimacy and created confusion about its advocacy. Officials argued that the disclaimer promoted transparency and distinguished the group’s views from state-endorsed materials.

The organization refused to include the statement and was fined $10,000 for failing to comply with the rule governing political communications. It sued under the First Amendment, asserting that the compelled disclaimer altered the tone of its message and created a misleading impression about its legitimacy. The state maintained that the rule was content-neutral and did not regulate viewpoint—merely requiring a factual clarification.

The court must determine whether the disclaimer requirement imposes an unconstitutional burden on protected political speech.

Should the court strike down the disclaimer rule?

Yes, because compelled disclaimers interfere with advocacy messaging and free speech.
No, because disclaimers are factual and may be required to avoid confusion.
Yes, because public advocacy must remain unregulated by agency communications policies.
No, because fines for noncompliance do not infringe constitutional rights.

69. A woman was arrested during a shoplifting investigation and brought to the police station. While in custody, an officer read her Miranda rights and asked, “Do you understand these rights?” She nodded and said “Okay.” The officer then began questioning her without further clarification. During the interview, she admitted to taking items from several stores. At trial, the defense moved to suppress the confession, arguing that she had not affirmatively waived her rights.

The prosecution argued that her nod and response were sufficient to constitute understanding and implied waiver. They contended that she was not coerced, had prior experience with the criminal justice system, and spoke freely throughout the interview. The defense insisted that without an express waiver, her statements were inadmissible and violated her Fifth Amendment rights.

The court must determine whether the woman’s conduct constituted a valid waiver of her Miranda rights before interrogation.

Should the confession be admitted?

Yes, because an implied waiver through understanding and voluntary response is valid.
No, because Miranda requires an explicit statement of waiver before questioning.
Yes, because the absence of coercion eliminates the need for formal waiver.
No, because nodding and saying “Okay” do not meet constitutional standards.

70. A plaintiff sued a community center after suffering injuries from a broken step during a crowded event. She introduced a safety checklist created three days prior, signed by a junior custodian. The form included the note: “West steps unstable—wood split halfway through.” The form was stored in the center’s maintenance log and retrieved from its digital archive. The custodian no longer worked there and did not testify.

Defense counsel objected on hearsay grounds, arguing the statement was anecdotal and lacked supervisory review. Plaintiff responded that checklist forms were a routine part of building maintenance and regularly used to track issues.

Should the court admit the checklist?

No, because maintenance notes from junior staff must be reviewed to meet reliability standards.
Yes, because the document qualifies as a business record under Rule 803(6).
Yes, because the employee’s job included hazard monitoring and the statement falls under Rule 801(d)(2)(D).
No, because unsigned checklist entries cannot be traced to individual responsibility.

71. A landowner conveyed his vineyard “to my brother for life, then to my nephew and his heirs, but if my nephew ever leases the property to anyone outside the family, then to my favorite nonprofit.” The brother lived on the property for 21 years before passing away. Upon inheriting possession, the nephew renovated the wine-tasting pavilion and entered into short-term leases with visiting wine sellers who hosted events during the high season.

Two years later, the nonprofit sued, claiming that the leases satisfied the condition and vested title in it. The nephew countered that the nonprofit’s interest was a shifting executory interest created in violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities. He argued that the clause relied on a future uncertain act and that the interest could vest too remotely to survive. The nonprofit insisted that the nephew’s actions activated a valid condition subsequent in the grant.

The jurisdiction applies traditional RAP rules without statutory reforms or charitable exemptions. It voids any contingent future interest not guaranteed to vest within a life in being plus 21 years.

Does the nonprofit currently hold title?

Yes, because leasing to outsiders triggered the conditional grant.
Yes, because charities may be exempt from RAP under grantor intent.
No, because the lease agreement was too short to trigger a full conveyance.
No, because the future interest violates the Rule Against Perpetuities.

72. A woman boarded a commuter ferry with her bicycle and placed it on the outer deck near the railing. A crew member passed by and advised her to secure it with rope, which she declined, saying she would stand near it. Midway through the trip, the ferry rocked in heavy wind, and the bike tumbled and struck another passenger. The injured party sued the woman for negligence.

The woman argued the ferry company bore responsibility for passenger safety and that wind-induced movement was unforeseeable. The company provided surveillance showing the crew had advised her and that unsecured bikes had caused injuries on prior voyages.

The jurisdiction allows contributory negligence claims against passengers who ignore reasonable warnings and whose conduct creates a risk of harm to others.

Is the woman likely liable?

No, because the ferry’s movement, not her conduct, caused the injury.
Yes, as she was warned to secure the bicycle and declined.
No, since she remained nearby and intended to control the bike.
Yes, because bicycles pose known risks on moving vessels.

73. An environmental watchdog based in State A sued a national freight company in federal court for violating federal transportation regulations. The company is incorporated in State B and has its principal place of business in State B, but operates multiple facilities in State A. The suit seeks $150,000 in damages for clean-up and compliance costs related to incidents involving vehicles stored in State A.

The freight company filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that its operations are centralized elsewhere and its contacts with State A are too incidental. In response, the watchdog produced shipping records, advertisements, and contract data showing consistent commercial activity in State A. The company denied this constituted purposeful availment.

The district court denied the motion. The company appealed immediately, asserting that jurisdictional issues should be reviewed early to prevent prolonged litigation.

How should the appellate court rule?

The appeal should proceed, because jurisdictional rulings are constitutional in nature and implicate due process.
The appeal should be dismissed, because orders denying motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction are interlocutory and not immediately appealable.
The appeal should proceed, because forum activity by the company created ambiguity that justifies early appellate review.
The appeal should be dismissed, because immediate review requires certification or an applicable statutory exception.

74. A man met a girl at an amusement park, and they spent the day together. She told him she was 18, presented an ID showing that age, and joined him for dinner before they went back to his hotel room. They engaged in consensual sexual activity. Later, the girl’s parents contacted police, revealing that she was only 15 and had used her older sister’s identification card. The man was charged with statutory rape under a state law prohibiting sexual intercourse with anyone under 16.

During trial, the defense argued that the defendant reasonably relied on the girl’s representation and had no intent to engage in unlawful conduct. The prosecution responded that the statute was strict liability and that the victim’s deception was irrelevant. The court had to decide whether the defendant could present a mistake-of-age defense based on the girl’s active misrepresentation and the identification she provided.

Can the defendant avoid conviction?

No, because the statute defines the offense without regard to defendant’s intent.
Yes, because mistake-of-age is permitted when deception is confirmed and the belief was reasonable.
No, because the defendant failed to verify her age through independent means.
Yes, if the defendant subjectively believed she was above the age of consent.

75. In 1995, a woman purchased a rural parcel and planted hedges to mark her understanding of the boundary line. Over time, she installed fencing, added irrigation, and developed a vegetable garden within a 10-foot strip beyond her actual lot line, unknowingly encroaching onto an adjacent parcel. For the next 28 years, she exclusively maintained the strip, paid for landscaping, and built a small shed for tools. The neighboring lot changed ownership twice, but no survey was conducted until 2023.

When the newest neighbor conducted a title search and survey, she discovered the encroachment and demanded removal of all fixtures. The original owner refused, citing adverse possession. She produced receipts, dated photographs, and testimony from neighbors affirming uninterrupted use since the mid-1990s. The jurisdiction requires 20 years of open, continuous, exclusive, and hostile possession, and accepts mistaken boundaries as satisfying hostility under claim of right.

Who holds title to the disputed strip?

The woman, because her possession meets all elements of adverse possession.
The neighbor, because title cannot transfer without a deed or judgment.
The woman, because fencing and gardening are sufficient to establish claim.
The neighbor, because mistaken belief does not meet hostility.

76. A nonprofit foundation contracted with a grant writer to prepare four applications to federal agencies for education-related funding. The agreement required each grant proposal to follow “current agency guidelines and include full budget and impact narrative as specified in each grant call.” The writer delivered drafts on time, but the nonprofit discovered that one application lacked the required budget breakdown and two omitted sections detailing program outcomes.

The foundation requested corrections, but the writer responded that grant calls often evolved and that the delivered drafts matched her professional experience. After submitting only one of the grants, the foundation terminated the contract and withheld 60% of the fee.

The grant writer sued for breach, arguing that the foundation used her materials and failed to allow reasonable revisions. The foundation claimed that the omissions violated essential agency instructions and rendered the work incomplete.

Did the foundation’s termination constitute a lawful response to breach?

Yes, because the grant proposals failed to include required components clearly specified in the contract.
No, because the drafts were timely and usable with minor edits.
Yes, because submission without proper budgets would likely fail and undermine the purpose.
No, because the contract did not define completeness or formatting in detail.

77. A city council passed an ordinance prohibiting the public display of flags bearing images associated with militant political groups, citing a recent uptick in community disturbances following protests. The ordinance barred the display of any flag that “reasonably evokes hostility or unrest due to historical associations with violence or insurrection,” but allowed for ceremonial flags during permitted civic events. Violators faced civil fines for each incident of noncompliance.

A homeowner displayed such a flag in his front yard as part of a political demonstration opposing a new surveillance policy. Police issued citations after multiple neighbors complained, and the homeowner challenged the ordinance under the First Amendment. He argued that the flag was a form of symbolic expression tied to protest, and that the city’s regulation was both vague and targeted political viewpoints. The city claimed the ordinance was content-neutral and necessary to deter unrest, emphasizing that no group was banned — only certain inflammatory symbols.

At trial, the city presented data showing that similar flags had incited altercations in the past. The homeowner presented testimony from local activists noting that peaceful use of political symbols was widespread and that the city had never fined ceremonial displays or historical reenactments. The court must determine whether the ordinance is constitutionally valid under the First Amendment’s protections for symbolic speech and public expression.

Should the court uphold the ordinance?

Yes, because the regulation serves a legitimate governmental interest in preserving public order.
No, because the ordinance is content-based and impermissibly targets political symbolism.
Yes, because fines for unauthorized flag use are civil and nondiscriminatory.
No, because the ordinance was not approved through a voter referendum.

78. A woman conveyed her mountain lodge “to my brother for life, then to my nephew and his heirs, but if my nephew ever grants a lease for over one year to someone outside the family, then to my favorite charity.” Her brother lived at the lodge for 25 years and passed away peacefully. The nephew then moved in and used the lodge primarily for family reunions and seasonal visits. After a few years, he signed a 13-month lease agreement with a non-relative to use the property for wilderness excursions.

Upon learning about the lease, the charity filed suit to claim title under the conditional clause. The nephew responded that the charity’s future interest was invalid under the Rule Against Perpetuities, arguing that the clause created a shifting executory interest which might vest too remotely. He also asserted that a lease was a temporary possessory arrangement, not a conveyance of ownership. The charity countered that the condition had clearly been met and that the original grantor’s intent should be honored.

The jurisdiction follows common law RAP strictly and voids any contingent future interest unless it is guaranteed to vest or fail within 21 years of a life in being at the time of creation. No statutory modifications, charitable carveouts, or reform doctrines are recognized.

Does the charity currently hold title?

Yes, because the lease satisfied the condition of the deed.
No, because the charity’s shifting executory interest violates the Rule Against Perpetuities.
Yes, because the grantor’s intent and timing of the lease enforce the condition.
No, because lease arrangements do not affect ownership status.

79. A dog owner hired a dog walker from an online app who had passed a criminal background check but not undergone training or prior supervised walks. During a scheduled visit, the walker lost control of the leash on a busy street and the dog ran into traffic, causing a cyclist to crash. The cyclist sustained major injuries and sued the dog owner, claiming negligent entrustment.

The owner argued she had used a reputable service and had never seen any red flags. However, she had not reviewed the walker’s experience profile and did not speak to references. The app made clear that users were responsible for final vetting and safety decisions.

The jurisdiction allows negligent entrustment claims where owners permit others to control potentially dangerous items or animals without adequate screening.

Is the owner likely liable?

Yes, because she failed to ensure the dog walker was qualified.
No, because hiring through an app satisfies reasonable care.
Yes, because dogs are inherently risky in public spaces.
No, because the cyclist’s injuries were not caused directly by the owner.

80. A judicial candidate running for state supreme court accepted large donations from attorneys who had cases pending before the court. While no evidence showed a direct quid pro quo, watchdog groups filed complaints, asserting that the donations compromised the appearance of impartiality and raised constitutional concerns about due process. The candidate’s opponents later moved to disqualify her from ruling on appeals involving those donors.

The state’s judicial ethics commission ruled that the contributions did not violate any enforceable rule and that disqualification was not required unless actual bias could be shown. Plaintiffs then filed suit under the Due Process Clause, arguing that decisions made by judges who benefit financially from interested parties undermine basic fairness and structural integrity. The commission responded that campaign fundraising was inherent in elected judicial systems and did not violate due process on its own.

The court must decide whether campaign contributions that create the appearance of bias require recusal or amount to a constitutional violation.

Should the court find a due process violation?

No, because campaign financing is protected under the First Amendment.
Yes, because judicial decisions influenced by financial relationships violate due process.
No, because elected judges must interact with supporters without triggering constitutional issues.
Yes, because disqualification is required if impartiality could reasonably be questioned.

81. A woman found her husband in bed with another person and, in a panic, grabbed a decorative statue from the shelf and struck her husband repeatedly. He suffered a fractured skull and died hours later. At trial, the woman admitted to the attack but claimed she acted under extreme emotional disturbance. Prosecutors charged her with second-degree murder and argued that the act was intentional and lacked justification.

The defense presented expert testimony about her mental state and emphasized that the provocation was immediate and personal. They requested a manslaughter instruction based on heat-of-passion doctrine, arguing that discovering infidelity has traditionally reduced criminal liability under the common law. The prosecution countered that she had options and that the killing involved a level of deliberation after confronting her husband.

Which charge best reflects the facts?

Voluntary manslaughter, due to provocation and lack of premeditation.
Involuntary manslaughter, due to excessive force without intent to kill.
Second-degree murder, due to intentional killing lacking justification.
Criminally negligent homicide, due to failure to seek help after the injury.

82. A defendant was charged with insurance fraud for submitting inflated claims after a warehouse fire. The prosecution sought to introduce a recorded phone call between the defendant and his associate, in which the defendant said, “Make the losses sound bigger — we’ll use last year’s invoice copies.” The associate was not charged and did not testify.

Defense counsel objected on hearsay grounds and argued that the associate’s identity was never definitively confirmed. The prosecution argued that the defendant’s own words were clear and offered against him, making the statement admissible regardless of the associate’s participation.

Should the phone recording be admitted?

Yes, because the defendant’s own statement is admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(A).
Yes, because financial statements are presumed reliable when tied to business practices.
No, because both participants must be identified for a conversation to be admitted.
No, because the recording was not created for evidentiary purposes.

83. A furniture company entered into a fulfillment agreement with a logistics provider to deliver custom sofas to customers across three states. The contract required “white-glove service including in-home placement and packaging removal,” and specified that personnel must be uniformed and operate within weekday delivery slots.

Over several weeks, the furniture firm began receiving complaints from customers about missed time windows and delivery staff arriving in casual attire without removing packaging. Some deliveries were left outside despite requests for indoor setup. The company confronted the logistics provider, which stated it had outsourced portions of the route to subcontractors who operated on separate terms. The furniture company immediately suspended further deliveries and withheld payment.

The logistics provider sued, claiming successful delivery of the furniture and arguing that subcontractor flexibility was common industry practice.

Did the furniture company lawfully suspend payment?

Yes, because the logistics firm failed to deliver services according to agreed white-glove standards.
No, because the goods arrived at customers' homes without damage.
Yes, because improper delivery impaired customer satisfaction and brand obligations.
No, because use of subcontractors is standard and implied unless prohibited.

84. A defendant was charged with obstruction of justice for destroying evidence during a regulatory inspection. Prosecutors found an unsent email on the defendant’s tablet that read, “Delete the audit folder before 10 a.m.—no time to scrub it.” Metadata showed it was typed 45 minutes before inspectors arrived but never sent. It was stored in a folder marked “Review Drafts.”

Defense counsel argued the draft was speculative and that jurors might confuse preliminary text with actual conduct. The prosecution responded that the defendant authored the message, its timing matched the incident, and it reflected awareness and premeditation.

Should the court admit the unsent email?

No, because unsent drafts are inadmissible unless action was taken.
No, because messages saved in draft form may unfairly prejudice intent analysis.
Yes, because metadata and authorship support authenticity and relevance.
Yes, because unsent emails are admissible under the business records exception.

85. A manufacturer filed suit in federal court against a retail chain for breach of contract and fraud after the retailer allegedly failed to pay for delivered goods. In support of its claim, the manufacturer attached signed invoices, internal delivery logs, and affidavits from warehouse staff. The retailer responded with a general denial and filed no affidavits or documentary evidence.

The manufacturer then moved for summary judgment. The retailer opposed the motion without submitting any supporting exhibits, arguing instead that its pleadings contained sufficient denials to establish material factual disputes. The court must decide whether trial is necessary to resolve the claims.

How should the court evaluate the summary judgment motion?

Summary judgment is inappropriate if pleadings suggest disputed facts, even without affidavits.
The court should deny the motion if the manufacturer fails to show delivery and payment default.
The court must deny the motion unless both parties present admissible evidence.
Summary judgment is appropriate because the retailer failed to present any evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact.

86. A tenant sued her landlord in federal court under diversity jurisdiction, claiming breach of lease after the landlord refused to make promised repairs to the heating system during winter months. The written lease required the landlord to maintain “essential appliances and utilities in habitable condition.” The landlord responded that temporary outages did not constitute breach and that the tenant had unreasonably refused access to contractors sent to make repairs.

At trial, both parties presented conflicting testimony. The tenant introduced photos, invoices for space heaters, and medical records showing adverse health effects during the outage. The landlord introduced maintenance logs and emails indicating repeated attempts to schedule service appointments. The jury returned a verdict for the tenant and awarded $18,000 in damages.

The landlord filed a Rule 59 motion for new trial, arguing that the verdict was excessive and unsupported by the weight of the evidence. The court reviewed the record and concluded that while the award was higher than expected, the evidence reasonably supported the jury’s findings.

What standard applies to the court’s decision on the Rule 59 motion?

Whether the verdict was supported by more than a scintilla of evidence.
Whether the evidence clearly favored the landlord’s version of events.
Whether the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence and resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
Whether the jury’s damage award exceeded statutory limits.

87. A state legislature passed a law banning the sale of over-the-counter sleep aids to any person under the age of 18, citing studies about dependency and misuse among teenagers. The statute imposed fines on retailers for each sale to a minor, regardless of dosage or brand, and included no exceptions for parental consent or medical supervision. A national pharmacy chain challenged the statute, arguing that federal drug labeling laws already established age restrictions and that the state’s added limitations conflicted with federal approval and marketing guidelines.

The state defended the law by pointing to its responsibility to protect public health and its authority to regulate sales within its borders. It emphasized that federal law sets only minimum safety requirements and does not preclude states from enacting stricter standards. The pharmacy chain presented evidence that some federally approved medications were marketed for teen use under clinical guidance, and that the state law effectively barred access even when medically appropriate.

The court was asked to determine whether the state statute conflicted with or was preempted by federal law regulating over-the-counter drugs and their availability based on age, dosage, and labeling. The analysis required careful scrutiny of whether federal regulations were intended to occupy the field or simply establish baseline protections that states could supplement.

Is the state statute constitutional?

Yes, because states retain sovereign authority over consumer safety and youth protection.
Yes, because limiting retail access does not alter drug labeling or national marketing.
No, because the statute improperly restricts access to products already approved for minor use.
No, because the state law is preempted by federal drug regulations establishing uniform age restrictions.

88. A bicycle distributor contracted with a manufacturer to supply 1,500 units of a new lightweight model for spring release. The agreement stated that “delivery shall occur in three equal shipments by March 1, March 15, and March 30” and that all bikes “must comply with current federal brake and lighting standards.” The first two shipments arrived on time and passed inspection. The final shipment was delivered on April 5 due to unexpected customs delays and included bikes with non-compliant lighting components that failed regulatory testing.

The distributor notified the manufacturer and demanded immediate replacement. The manufacturer responded that only minor corrections were needed and offered retrofitting kits, asserting that delivery had substantially complied with the agreement. The distributor rejected the offer and refused to pay for the final shipment, claiming breach of contract and regulatory exposure.

If the manufacturer sues for payment, what is the likely result?

The manufacturer will recover, because the minor delay and correctable defects do not constitute material breach.
The manufacturer will recover, because two-thirds of the shipments were timely and conforming.
The distributor will prevail, because the delivery date was not essential to the contract.
The distributor will prevail, because the final shipment failed to meet agreed specifications and arrived late.3

89. A federal district court entered default judgment against a small business defendant after it failed to respond to a complaint within 21 days of service. The business, incorporated and operated in State A, claimed that it was unaware of the litigation due to turnover in management and a failure to forward mail. Thirty days after judgment, the defendant moved to set aside the default, citing excusable neglect and attaching an affidavit from its new operations manager.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, asserting that the defendant was properly served and that the delay prejudiced its ability to collect damages. The defendant claimed it had a meritorious defense and acted promptly upon discovering the lawsuit.

What is the most likely result?

The motion to set aside will be granted, because corporate staffing changes constitute excusable neglect.
The motion to set aside will be denied, because default judgment creates finality that outweighs fairness concerns.
The motion will be denied, because proper service precludes relief under Rule 60.
The motion will be granted, because the defendant acted quickly, showed a defense, and satisfied Rule 60(b) requirements.

90. A father conveyed a parcel “to my daughter for life, then to my grandson and his heirs, but if my grandson ever tries to sell the property outside the family, then to my neighborhood foundation.” The father died a year later. The daughter lived on the property for nearly two decades before passing away. The grandson, a professional real estate broker, inherited possession and maintained the property as a private residence for six years before entering a negotiation to sell the parcel to a corporate retreat company.

Before the sale was finalized, the foundation filed suit, alleging that the negotiation satisfied the condition in the original deed and triggered its interest. The grandson countered that merely initiating sale discussions did not amount to a legal conveyance, and that even if it had, the foundation’s future interest violated the common law Rule Against Perpetuities. The deed had been recorded in a jurisdiction that strictly applies RAP, requiring that future interests vest or fail within 21 years of a life in being.

The foundation argued that because the grandson was alive when the deed was executed, the interest was valid under RAP, and the triggering event had occurred. The grandson emphasized that the condition was linked to intent rather than act and that even if it had been triggered, the interest remained void due to its uncertainty of vesting.

Does the foundation currently hold title?

Yes, because the condition was triggered during the grandson’s life.
No, because the foundation’s interest violates the Rule Against Perpetuities.
Yes, because contractual intent to sell satisfies the language of the condition.
No, because the grandson’s possession overrides conditional limitations.

91. A family purchased a trampoline from a large retail store and installed it in their backyard. The instruction manual included basic assembly guidance but failed to mention the importance of anchoring the frame to prevent movement during use. On a windy afternoon, the trampoline shifted mid-jump, and the teenage son was thrown off, breaking his arm. The parents sued the manufacturer for failure to warn of anchoring risks.

The manufacturer responded that wind conditions were rare and unpredictable and that customers were expected to understand outdoor equipment safety. However, internal documents revealed prior injury complaints linked to unanchored trampolines tipping or shifting, including reports from similar models over the previous year. Other brands included anchoring warnings in bold print.

The jurisdiction requires manufacturers to warn about non-obvious risks tied to foreseeable use, especially where prior incidents have established patterns of harm.

Is the manufacturer likely liable?

No, because parents should supervise children using outdoor equipment.
No, because wind conditions are not foreseeable product risks.
Yes, because failure to warn about anchoring created a preventable danger.
Yes, because similar products use different design features.

92. A man who formerly leased a workshop became angry when the property owner refused to return his security deposit. Late one night, the man returned to the site and set fire to a pile of leftover building supplies stored under an awning. The flames spread to the structure, causing significant damage to the siding and roof. Fire officials extinguished the blaze and traced the cause to accelerants left at the scene. The man was arrested and charged with arson.

At trial, the defense argued that the building materials had been left behind and still belonged to him, so setting them on fire wasn’t a crime. He claimed he did not intend to damage the building itself and thought the supplies were abandoned. The prosecution presented lease termination records and testimony from the owner that the items were part of the property and had been slated for reuse. They emphasized that intentionally setting fire near a structure risked serious harm.

Which fact most undermines the defendant’s claim?

That the man used accelerants to ignite the supplies.
That he had a dispute with the owner over the deposit.
That fire damage extended to parts of the building not targeted.
That he believed the materials belonged to him after lease termination.

93. A group of four friends planned to break into a local warehouse to steal vintage motorcycles. One of them, after growing nervous, sent a vague text message to the others saying he was “out” and didn’t want to be involved anymore. He then stopped responding and left town. The others proceeded with the burglary and were arrested afterward. The man who had sent the message was later charged with conspiracy and argued he had withdrawn before the crime occurred.

At trial, the defense claimed that his text and departure indicated withdrawal, and that he no longer aided or encouraged the scheme. The prosecution contended that the message was unclear and did not prevent the crime or inform law enforcement. They emphasized that withdrawal from conspiracy requires more than silence—it must include affirmative steps to thwart the plan or clearly sever ties.

The court must decide whether the defendant effectively withdrew from the conspiracy and can escape liability for the crime committed by his co-conspirators.

Which argument best supports conviction?

Texting “out” shows ambiguous intent and ends participation.
Withdrawal must include clear communication and action to prevent the crime.
Departure from town suffices to revoke criminal intent.
Continued silence after one vague message relieves responsibility.

94. A journalist filed a defamation action in federal court against a media outlet. The complaint lacked specific language alleged to be defamatory and failed to identify the context of the statements. The outlet moved to dismiss, and the journalist voluntarily dismissed the case rather than respond.

Soon after, the journalist refiled with improved allegations, quoting the article in question. The outlet again moved to dismiss for lack of sufficient detail. The journalist again voluntarily dismissed before the court ruled. Several weeks later, a third complaint was filed with even more factual allegations. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the two prior voluntary dismissals barred refiling under Rule 41(a).

The journalist countered that prior filings reflected good faith efforts to strengthen the case and should not count as adjudications.

What is the likely outcome?

The motion will be denied, because the plaintiff’s efforts to revise the complaint show procedural diligence.
The motion will be granted, because the second voluntary dismissal operated as a judgment on the merits under Rule 41(a).
The motion will be denied, because the previous actions never reached a merits determination.
The motion will be granted, because two prior voluntary dismissals of the same claim bar a third attempt.

95. A state education board adopted a policy requiring all publicly funded school libraries to remove books containing descriptions of political protests, civil disobedience, or critiques of state government policies. The board claimed the rule protected students from “ideologically disruptive” narratives and promoted curricular consistency. Local librarians reported that dozens of titles were pulled under the policy, including biographies of social justice activists and historical accounts of labor strikes.

A group of parents and educators filed suit, arguing that the blanket ban constituted viewpoint discrimination and suppressed First Amendment rights. They pointed to the absence of neutral criteria and emphasized that many removed books were historically accurate and part of recommended reading lists. The state defended its actions by asserting control over educational content in school facilities and emphasized that libraries remained free to carry nonpolitical materials reflecting general knowledge.

The plaintiffs contended that selective removal based on political themes distorted the educational mission and deprived students of exposure to foundational civic ideas. They argued that government actors cannot purge material from publicly accessible libraries based on ideological content, particularly when the material is neither obscene nor age-inappropriate. The court must decide whether the library censorship violates constitutional principles.

Should the court strike down the policy?

No, because educational officials may curate school content to align with curriculum priorities.
Yes, because the policy constitutes a prior restraint on future intellectual inquiry.
No, because libraries are not traditional public forums for student access.
Yes, because removal based on viewpoint violates the First Amendment.

96. A plaintiff sued a hotel chain for injuries sustained during an evacuation caused by a false fire alarm. At trial, the chain's night manager testified that hotel guests behaved calmly. On cross-examination, plaintiff’s counsel asked whether he had previously said to fire marshals, “People panicked, ran into furniture, it was chaos.” The manager denied ever making that statement.

Plaintiff then offered the fire department’s written report, which attributed the quote directly to the manager. Defense counsel objected, arguing the report was hearsay, did not contain the manager’s signature, and was compiled by an investigator with no audio recording.

Should the court admit the report to impeach the manager?

Yes, because prior inconsistent statements may be introduced under Rule 613.
No, because the report was written by someone else and lacks direct confirmation.
No, because impeachment evidence must be based on sworn or audio-recorded statements.
Yes, because public safety records are automatically admissible in civil trials.

97. A homeowner hired a decorator to refurbish her guest room using eco-friendly fabrics and vintage accents specified in the contract. During installation, the decorator substituted synthetic blends and contemporary fixtures, stating that sourcing issues made the original selections impractical. The homeowner was displeased and argued that the room felt impersonal and violated the agreed-upon design theme.

The decorator demanded full payment, claiming that the replacements were of equal quality and matched her aesthetic interpretation. The homeowner refused, citing breach of style and material preferences.

Was the homeowner justified in withholding payment?

No, because substitution of quality materials is allowed where function is preserved.
Yes, because deviation from aesthetic and sourcing terms breached the designer’s obligations.
No, because decorative contracts are subject to artistic discretion.
Yes, because personal styling agreements demand strict adherence to preferences.

98. A delivery driver carried packages into a residential building and slipped on melted snow near the entrance. The building owner had salted the walkway that morning but did not check for accumulation later that day. The entrance lacked a mat or drainage grate, and the driver claimed the melted snow formed a thin layer of water that caused the fall.

The owner argued that salting was sufficient and that snowmelt is unavoidable during seasonal weather. No tenants had reported issues, and the area was not visibly flooded. Local code encouraged salting but did not mandate continuous monitoring.

Is the owner likely liable?

Yes, because melted snow poses a known hazard near entrances.
No, since salting complies with local maintenance expectations.
Yes, because water accumulation requires constant oversight.
No, as weather-related moisture that’s not excessive does not trigger liability.

99. A homeowner obtained a $675,000 loan to purchase a duplex and executed a mortgage including a standard due-on-sale clause. The mortgage was recorded. Four years later, she sold one unit to her niece, transferring legal title to that half and allowing her to assume half of the monthly payments. The lender was not notified. Seven months after the transfer, the lender discovered the arrangement and demanded full repayment under the clause.

The homeowner responded that the transfer was partial, the buyer was a family member, and payments remained current. The lender stated that any ownership transfer without consent violated the contract, regardless of the nature of the transferee or financial status. The jurisdiction strictly enforces due-on-sale clauses without requiring proof of harm or delinquency. Courts routinely uphold acceleration upon unauthorized transfers.

Is the lender permitted to foreclose?

Yes, because a partial transfer of legal ownership triggers the due-on-sale clause.
No, because familial transfers are presumed permissible.
Yes, because shared occupancy modifies the nature of the lender’s security.
No, because the borrower retains legal liability under the mortgage.

100. A plaintiff sued a logistics company after she tripped over exposed wiring near a loading dock during a public event. She alleged that the company had prior knowledge of the hazard. During discovery, she obtained a tablet screenshot showing a message written by a shift coordinator to the facilities team five days earlier: “Loose cabling at Dock 3 again — someone needs to cover it before we get sued.” The message came from the company's team app, which logs internal maintenance alerts.

At trial, the plaintiff sought to admit the screenshot, but the defense objected under hearsay rules, arguing that the coordinator was not a safety officer and the message was never logged formally. The plaintiff responded that the coordinator worked on the same dock, created the message during his shift, and was responsible for reporting physical hazards to facilities staff.

The judge considered whether the message met admissibility standards as a party-opponent agent statement.

No, because the coordinator lacked authority to issue safety directives.
Yes, because the message was made during employment about a workplace condition within the scope of duties.
No, because informal app messages are inadmissible unless reviewed by the safety department.
Yes, because all employee-written warnings are admissible in premises liability cases.

Part B - Questions 101-200

101. A plaintiff sued a gym operator for negligence after suffering a back injury due to malfunctioning equipment. She offered into evidence a digital maintenance report prepared five days before the incident, authored by a technician who noted: “Cabled arm swings uneven — tension failure likely. Needs inspection before continued use.” The report was stored in the gym’s cloud log and authenticated by a supervisor.

Defense counsel argued the report was hearsay and inadmissible because the technician no longer worked at the facility and never sent the report to management. Plaintiff responded that the technician’s job included equipment evaluations and the report was created during employment, following regular procedures.

Should the court admit the technician’s maintenance report?

No, because there’s no evidence that management received or acted on the report.
No, because statements by ex-employees cannot be used as admissions.
Yes, because it qualifies under Rule 803(6) as a business record made during regular activity.
Yes, because all equipment-related documents are admissible in injury suits.

102. A defendant was part of a lineup involving six men in identical clothing, conducted behind one-way glass. The witness picked the defendant out but hesitated during questioning. Later review showed that the officer conducting the lineup had told the witness, “One of these men is definitely your guy,” before the viewing. The defense moved to exclude the identification, claiming the procedure was suggestive and violated due process.

At the suppression hearing, the prosecution argued that the lineup was fairly constructed and the comment was harmless. They emphasized that the witness ultimately made the selection based on appearance and had identified the defendant during an earlier photo array. The defense maintained that the lineup itself was overly suggestive and the officer’s statement created undue pressure.

How should the court rule on the admissibility of the lineup identification?

Admit the evidence, because the lineup had multiple participants in matching outfits.
Suppress the evidence, because the officer's suggestion created coercive influence.
Admit the evidence, because the witness had previously identified the defendant.
Suppress the evidence, because pre-lineup statements undermined reliability.

103. A teenager told his friend that he was planning to kill his uncle to inherit money. Days later, the teen asked the friend to drive him to the uncle’s house, saying he was “just going to threaten him.” The friend did so, waited outside, and saw the teen enter carrying a knife. Minutes later, the teen fled and confessed in the car that he had stabbed his uncle to death. The friend drove him to a park, where they cleaned the knife in a nearby creek. Both were later arrested.

At trial, the teen was charged with first-degree murder, and the friend was charged as an accessory before the fact. The friend claimed he did not know the teen planned to kill anyone and that he thought he was just giving a ride. The prosecution introduced evidence of the prior conversation and emphasized that the friend knowingly assisted both before and after the crime, enabling its commission and escape.

The jury must assess the friend’s mental state and whether his actions qualify him as an accessory before the fact under homicide law.

What is the friend’s strongest defense?

That he withdrew from participation immediately after learning about the murder.
That he lacked prior knowledge of the teen’s intent to kill and only aided transport.
That cleaning the knife was not essential to the commission of the offense.
That he did not receive any personal benefit or share in the inheritance.

104. A father executed a deed conveying a lakeside parcel “to my son for life, then to my grandson and his heirs, but if he ever attempts to sell the property outside the family, then to my church.” The deed was properly recorded, and all parties named were alive at the time of conveyance. The son lived on the land for 18 years before passing away. Afterward, the grandson inherited possession and converted the property into a seasonal rental, hosting unrelated guests through online platforms and collecting rent.

Three years into his ownership, the grandson negotiated a sale contract with a non-relative, intending to transfer full title for market value. Before closing, the church sued for declaratory judgment, arguing that the sale triggered the deed’s conditional clause and that ownership should now vest in the church. The grandson claimed the clause was unenforceable, asserting the church’s interest violated the Rule Against Perpetuities. He argued that the triggering event could occur generations later, making the interest void from inception.

The jurisdiction applies the traditional common law Rule Against Perpetuities without reform, charitable exemptions, or savings statutes. It voids shifting executory interests that are not guaranteed to vest or fail within the permitted period measured by lives in being plus 21 years.

Does the church currently hold valid title?

Yes, because an attempt to sell outside the family triggered the condition.
No, because the shifting executory interest violates the Rule Against Perpetuities.
Yes, because use as a rental implies intent to transfer ownership.
No, because conditional future interests in favor of charities are unenforceable unless contemporaneously vested.

105. Four families filed a federal wrongful death action in State A following an aviation accident that occurred in that state. The airline is incorporated and headquartered in State C and has no offices, employees, or scheduled flights in State A. The plaintiffs are citizens of State B, and they filed the case in State A just days before the statute of limitations expired.

The airline was properly served and now seeks to prevent trial in State A federal court. It argues that all maintenance records, inspection logs, and corporate witnesses are located in State C, and that defending the case in State A would create a significant burden and disrupt operations. The plaintiffs object to relocation, arguing that the crash site and underlying facts are tied to State A.

What is the best procedural strategy for the airline?

Move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Move to dismiss based on improper venue.
Move to dismiss under forum non conveniens.
Move to transfer the action to federal court in State C based on convenience.

106. A homeowner sued a window manufacturer in federal court, alleging that defective triple-pane glass installed during renovations caused thermal leaks and mold growth. During initial discovery, the homeowner served the manufacturer with broad document requests, including every customer complaint over the past five years and all internal design memos dating back a decade. The manufacturer objected, stating that most documents were unrelated to the alleged defect and included proprietary engineering specifications irrelevant to the case.

The homeowner filed a motion to compel, arguing that the documents would reveal whether the manufacturer had known about similar failures or made changes to the glass formulation over time. The manufacturer argued that the request was overbroad and posed a threat to trade secrets, offering instead to produce summaries and redacted reports focused on the model at issue.

At the hearing, the court must decide whether to order production of the requested materials in full.

What is the strongest basis for denying the motion to compel?

The manufacturer’s trade secrets are protected and not discoverable in civil litigation.
The requests are disproportionate to the needs of the case and impose undue burden.
The manufacturer’s proposed compromise satisfies Rule 26 and should end the dispute.
The homeowner failed to follow proper procedures for requesting confidential documents.

107. A state transit authority enacted a policy barring public demonstrations within ten feet of transit station entrances. The policy was adopted after a series of protests caused congestion and delayed train operations. A civil liberties organization challenged the rule, claiming it was an overbroad restriction on free expression in traditional public forums. The authority responded that the rule preserved passenger safety and ensured unobstructed access to essential services.

In practice, the rule affected a variety of expressive activities, including leafleting, silent vigils, and impromptu musical performances. Protestors were frequently relocated by transit officers or cited for violating the buffer zone, even when platforms and entrances were uncrowded. The organization argued that the policy was not narrowly tailored and failed to provide alternative venues for expression, thereby suppressing protected speech without sufficient justification.

What is the strongest argument that the transit authority’s buffer zone rule violates the First Amendment?

The rule restricts expressive conduct based on the content of demonstrations.
The rule eliminates access to public space traditionally used for communication.
The rule is not narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest.
The rule prohibits speech without offering alternatives for expression.

108. A civil servant was under investigation by an internal government agency for alleged mismanagement of funds. As part of the inquiry, he was ordered to submit a written statement detailing his role in approving various invoices and expenditures. The agency informed him that failure to cooperate would result in immediate termination under administrative rules. Facing dismissal, the employee complied and outlined his involvement, acknowledging errors in documentation and oversight.

Subsequently, a criminal fraud investigation was launched, and the prosecution sought to introduce parts of the written statement as evidence of intent and knowledge. The defense moved to suppress the statement, arguing that it was compelled under threat of job loss and violated his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination. The prosecution responded that the statement was voluntary and relevant to official misconduct, regardless of the administrative pressure.

The court must decide whether the statement is admissible in the criminal trial or protected under constitutional immunity doctrines.

Which legal principle most supports suppression?

That all statements given in an employment setting are protected.
That compelled statements under threat of penalty trigger use immunity.
That administrative pressure is insufficient to override voluntariness.
That civil investigations are not subject to criminal procedure protections.

109. A homeowner borrowed $495,000 to purchase a duplex and executed a mortgage containing a standard due-on-sale clause. The lender recorded the mortgage. Five years later, she transferred legal title of one unit to a close friend, who moved in and began paying half the monthly mortgage. The lender was not notified. Nine months after the transfer, the lender discovered the arrangement and issued a notice of acceleration demanding full repayment.

The borrower argued that the friend was non-commercial, payments were current, and the property's value had increased. She claimed the clause was not enforceable unless the lender could show harm. The lender responded that the clause was triggered by the ownership transfer, and harm was irrelevant under contract enforcement. The jurisdiction enforces due-on-sale clauses strictly and allows acceleration upon unauthorized transfer, regardless of financial consequences.

Is the lender permitted to accelerate the mortgage?

Yes, because ownership was partially transferred without consent.
No, because residential transfers to friends are not material breaches.
Yes, because clause enforcement doesn’t require financial harm.
No, because the borrower still controlled half of the property.

110. A retail employee restocked shelves by climbing a short step stool kept behind the register. While stepping down, he lost balance and fell, hitting his head on the edge of a counter. He sued the store for unsafe equipment, alleging the stool lacked rubber grips and was unstable. Surveillance showed he had used the same stool dozens of times without issue and that the stool was designed for short indoor tasks.

The store defended its use of the stool as industry standard and stated the employee was trained on proper usage. No prior complaints or incidents had occurred, and the stool had recently passed inspection.

Is the store likely liable?

Yes, since the stool created a risk of serious injury.
No, because standard equipment used properly does not constitute a hazard.
Yes, because falls from any height impose liability.
No, because consistent prior safe use and training undermine negligence claims.

111. A hotel contracted with an event planner to organize a professional summit. The planner was responsible for securing the venue, catering, audiovisual logistics, and two keynote speakers, with all details finalized two weeks before the start date. The planner submitted venue and catering materials on time, but delayed speaker confirmations until three days prior—requiring reprints and last-minute schedule adjustments after one speaker canceled.

The hotel withheld part of the planner’s fee and cited breach. The planner argued that speaker changes were common and that most services had been provided.

Which of the following best supports the hotel’s claim?

The planner substantially completed the agreement but failed to meet an internal deadline.
Speaker scheduling was secondary, and the hotel accepted the venue and catering.
The planner failed to meet an express deadline tied to essential conference features.
Cancellations by speakers are outside the planner’s control and not actionable.

112. During the course of a theft investigation, police obtained a valid warrant to search a suspect’s smartphone for incriminating communications. When they arrived at his residence, officers attempted to compel him to unlock the phone using its fingerprint sensor. The suspect refused, stating that fingerprint access was protected from compulsion under the Fifth Amendment. Officers pressed his thumb to the phone screen and successfully unlocked the device, later retrieving several incriminating texts. The defendant moved to suppress the phone evidence.

Prosecutors argued that fingerprint data is physical evidence akin to DNA or handwriting samples and that compelling its use does not trigger testimonial protections. They asserted that the fingerprint itself was not communicative and served only as a biometric key. The defense countered that providing the fingerprint enabled access to a trove of digital content—effectively revealing the contents of the suspect’s mind—and that the act of unlocking constituted compelled self-incrimination.

The court must determine whether police may force a suspect to use their fingerprint to unlock a device protected by biometric security. The defense maintained that the volume and sensitivity of smartphone data distinguishes digital searches from routine forensic sampling, while the state insisted that biometric unlocking is a non-testimonial physical act.

Should the court suppress the evidence?

No, because fingerprint unlocking is analogous to providing a blood sample or key.
Yes, because compelling biometric access reveals testimonial content and violates the Fifth Amendment.
No, because phone searches with a warrant justify all forms of forced unlocking.
Yes, because fingerprints are constitutionally protected expressive data.

113. A plaintiff filed a civil rights suit in federal court against a police department, alleging unlawful arrest and excessive force. The department moved to dismiss based on qualified immunity and claimed the officers acted within lawful bounds. The district court denied the motion, stating that the allegations, if proven, could show a violation of clearly established rights.

The department filed an immediate appeal, asserting that qualified immunity provides immunity from suit, not just liability, and that interlocutory review is appropriate. The plaintiff opposed, arguing that the appeal would delay discovery and that factual disputes remain unresolved.

How should the appellate court respond?

Dismiss the appeal, because the denial of a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order not subject to review.
Hear the appeal, because qualified immunity entitles government officials to avoid suit, not merely liability.
Dismiss the appeal, because factual issues prevent appellate review at this stage.
Hear the appeal, because the officers may suffer reputational harm and litigation expense absent review.

114. A hiker slipped on a sloped trail inside a public park and fractured her ankle. The slope had loose gravel and bordered a drainage channel that had eroded part of the path edge. No warning signs were posted, and several online reviews had flagged this hazard in recent months. Park officials argued that terrain risks were unavoidable and that permanent signage conflicted with environmental policies.

The hiker sued the municipality for negligence. The city responded that the slope was naturally occurring and that recreational trail users assume inherent risks. Inspection logs showed that particular area had not been reviewed for over a year despite prior user complaints.

The jurisdiction permits liability against public landowners when injury arises from known, correctable conditions caused or exacerbated by human maintenance or neglect.

Is the municipality likely liable?

No, because the terrain was naturally occurring and unpredictable.
Yes, because the hazard was foreseeable and unaddressed despite prior complaints.
No, because the hiker assumed the risk of trail injury.
Yes, because government entities are strictly liable for recreational injuries.

115. A landowner granted her neighbor an easement “to walk across the garden path on weekdays between 9 a.m. and 6 p.m.” The easement was recorded and used intermittently for several years. Later, the neighbor sold her home to a boutique fitness studio that began offering morning yoga walks, using the path daily and occasionally during weekends. Over time, the studio expanded access to include staff movement and logistical deliveries using small push carts.

The servient owner noticed increased wear to the gravel and occasional trampling of flowerbeds beyond the designated path. After sending two formal requests to restrict usage back to original terms, the studio insisted their use was within reason and supported wellness-related pedestrian access. The owner filed for injunctive relief, citing expansion of scope, physical burden, and deviation from the stated weekday-only time frame.

The jurisdiction enforces express easements strictly according to recorded terms and limits expansion to what is consistent, non-burdensome, and temporally confined. Courts typically favor servient owners when both time and use scope are exceeded.

Who is likely to prevail?

The studio, because access remained pedestrian in nature.
The studio, because recorded easements transfer with dominant estates.
The landowner, because weekend and cart usage exceeds the express weekday-only scope.
The landowner, because physical degradation supports equitable remedies.

116. A plaintiff sued a construction contractor for negligence after being injured by a falling panel at a renovation site. She offered testimony from a former foreman who claimed the supervisor regularly ignored load-bearing warnings. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked whether the witness had previously praised the supervisor in an industry newsletter for “being detail-oriented about site safety.” The witness responded, “I don't recall writing that, but maybe—I’ve been quoted a lot.”

Defense counsel introduced a scanned copy of the newsletter article, which attributed the quote directly to the foreman. The plaintiff objected, arguing that the newsletter was promotional, not an investigative record, and that prior compliments do not directly rebut site-specific claims.

Should the court admit the newsletter for impeachment?

No, because self-praise in promotional material is not probative of credibility.
No, because extrinsic statements are inadmissible unless the witness expressly denies them.
Yes, because the foreman’s uncertainty allows use of a prior inconsistent statement under Rule 613.
Yes, because trade publications are inherently trustworthy and admissible.

117. A landscaper completed a large project for a homeowner, including installation of a custom garden wall. After disagreements over payments and materials, the homeowner refused to pay the final invoice, claiming the work was incomplete. The landscaper returned days later, dismantled the wall, and removed several stone panels from the property. He was arrested and charged with theft of real property components.

At trial, the defense argued that he retained ownership of the panels under the terms of the contract and believed he was reclaiming his own property. The prosecution countered that the materials had been permanently affixed to the land and were part of the finished work. Witnesses testified that the homeowner had approved the design and that the landscaping was functionally complete at the time of removal.

The question turns on whether the landscaper’s actions meet the elements of theft or whether a reasonable mistake-of-fact defense applies due to the contractual dispute.

Which fact most supports acquittal?

That the homeowner had not paid the full invoice.
That the landscaper installed the materials himself.
That real property components are not subject to theft charges.
That the landscaper believed the items were his and not yet transferred.

118. A plaintiff sued a food processing company for injuries caused by contaminated packaged meals. She alleged that the company ignored quality warnings issued by line supervisors in the weeks before her illness. During trial, she offered an internal email authored by the floor shift manager, which stated, “QA flagged issues again today — same batch. If management doesn’t act, we’re asking for trouble.”

Defense counsel objected to the email as hearsay, arguing that the sender was not involved in product testing and the message was informal. Plaintiff responded that the manager’s responsibilities included reporting safety concerns and that the message was created during employment on a matter within scope.

Should the court admit the manager’s email?

No, because the email was not part of any official reporting protocol.
No, because safety warnings must come from designated quality officers.
Yes, because it is a statement by an employee on a matter within the scope of employment.
Yes, because internal safety complaints are per se admissible in food liability cases.

119. Amid an escalating labor shortage in critical transportation sectors, the President issued an executive directive requiring all freight carriers receiving federal subsidies to implement extended operating hours and mandatory overtime protocols for non-union employees. The directive was framed as part of a national emergency response to supply chain disruptions and cited statutory language authorizing the executive to “promote essential interstate commerce” in emergencies.

Several companies complied, but a transportation trade association representing independent carriers sued, claiming that the directive exceeded the President’s constitutional authority and intruded on private employment decisions. They argued that Congress had never authorized direct labor mandates and that the executive lacked power to alter conditions of work without legislation.

The government responded that emergencies warrant flexible executive action and that the subsidies created a valid basis for enforcing conditions. It emphasized that only recipients of public funds were affected and that the directive did not alter existing labor law. The court was asked to determine whether the President acted within constitutional bounds.

Is the executive directive constitutional?

No, because the President may not impose labor conditions on private industry absent clear statutory authority.
Yes, because emergencies permit executive orders affecting federally subsidized sectors.
No, because separation of powers prohibits executive action that impacts wages and hours.
Yes, because interstate commerce regulation includes labor coordination.

120. A luxury kitchenware distributor contracted with a fulfillment center to handle packaging and delivery for its holiday product launch. The written agreement specified that all shipments must include embossed gift wrap, signature inserts, and custom labeling aligned with the brand’s seasonal campaign. Delivery was to begin November 1 and continue daily until December 15.

When products began arriving at customer homes, the distributor received complaints. The packaging lacked the holiday inserts, the labeling used outdated logos, and some boxes arrived without the promised wrapping. The distributor confronted the center, which acknowledged that some materials hadn’t arrived and said it used standard alternatives to maintain schedule.

The distributor withheld payment for the first two weeks of service and requested reimbursement for customer refunds and replacements. The center sued, claiming it performed the core delivery function on time and that the marketing details were minor.

Is the distributor’s withholding justified?

Yes, because failure to meet brand-aligned packaging requirements breached a material term.
No, because timely product delivery fulfilled the essence of the agreement.
Yes, because customer complaints prove that performance did not satisfy expectations.
No, because the substitution of similar materials was commercially reasonable.

121. A man borrowed $800,000 to buy a mixed-use building and executed a mortgage containing a due-on-sale clause. The mortgage was recorded. Five years later, he sold one residential unit to a friend, transferring legal title and permitting the friend to assume one-fifth of the monthly payments. No notice was given to the lender.

Ten months later, the lender discovered the sale and initiated foreclosure proceedings, citing breach of the due-on-sale provision. The borrower responded that he retained partial ownership, the transferee was non-commercial, and all payments remained current. He argued that lender action required proof of financial harm. The lender countered that consent for any transfer was required and harm was irrelevant.

The jurisdiction enforces due-on-sale clauses strictly. Any unauthorized conveyance of legal ownership — in whole or in part — permits acceleration or foreclosure, without regard to payment status or risk to the lender.

Is the lender’s foreclosure action valid?

No, because the borrower retained partial control of the property.
No, because friendly residential transfers are not materially harmful.
Yes, because unauthorized conveyance of any interest violates the mortgage.
Yes, because co-occupancy creates confusion over repayment and risk allocation.

122. A woman hired a private shuttle service to take her to the airport. During the ride, the driver received multiple alerts about severe hail conditions ahead but pressed on to meet scheduled pickups. As hail intensified, visibility decreased, and the shuttle swerved, striking a traffic barrier. The woman suffered a fractured collarbone and sued the shuttle company for negligence.

The company argued that weather conditions were unavoidable and that the driver exercised good judgment by reducing speed. Internal logs showed that company policy required suspension of service under hail alerts, and other drivers had already pulled off the road. The driver admitted feeling pressure to maintain schedule due to company incentives.

The jurisdiction holds commercial carriers to a heightened duty of care and imposes liability when protocols are ignored and passengers are injured as a result.

Is the company likely liable?

Yes, because commercial carriers are strictly liable for passenger safety.
No, because passengers assume some risk during travel.
Yes, because the driver violated internal policy during known severe conditions.
No, because the injury was caused by extreme weather.

123. A bookstore employee stacked boxes of new inventory in a rear hallway used by staff and occasional vendors. One box protruded slightly into the walking path. A vendor entered the hallway to make a delivery, tripped on the corner of the box, and fell, injuring his elbow. The store manager said the area was employee-only and that vendors had no right to pass through without permission.

The vendor argued he had made deliveries in that hallway before and was never told it was restricted. The store policy manual showed no clear delineation of hallway access. Surveillance indicated that the vendor had used that path dozens of times during prior visits without incident.

The jurisdiction treats foreseeable business visitors as invitees when injury occurs in areas where their presence is known and accepted, even if not formally granted.

Is the bookstore likely liable?

No, because the hallway was employee-only and not marked for vendor access.
No, because the vendor failed to watch his path.
Yes, because the store failed to warn or block foreseeable visitors from hazards.
Yes, because all delivery personnel are covered by premises liability rules.

124. A software developer filed suit in federal court against a former employer, alleging wrongful termination and unpaid royalties under a licensing contract. The developer, a citizen of State A, had worked remotely on a proprietary code base owned by the employer, a corporation incorporated and headquartered in State B. The termination occurred after a dispute about royalty calculations, and the developer claimed the employer withheld multiple payments.

The developer included claims for breach of contract, conversion, and a declaratory judgment regarding future use of the code. In response, the employer moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that all claims arose under state law and failed to invoke federal-question jurisdiction. The developer argued that the declaratory judgment claim related to ongoing federal copyright rights and thus supplied jurisdiction.

The district court must decide whether it has original federal jurisdiction over the suit as filed.

What is the most appropriate ruling?

The court lacks jurisdiction, because the contract and conversion claims arise under state law and cannot be supplemented by declaratory relief.
The court has jurisdiction, because the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and the parties are diverse.
The court has jurisdiction, because the declaratory judgment claim implicates federal copyright law.
The court lacks jurisdiction, because federal copyright claims must be asserted directly rather than through anticipated defenses or future usage.

125. A defendant was charged with falsifying quarterly financial disclosures sent to investors. During a computer search, investigators found an unsent spreadsheet draft titled “Projection Notes,” created two days before the company’s public report. In one hidden comment attached to a cell, the defendant had written, “Just inflate Q4 by 5% — nothing substantiated but we need momentum.” The spreadsheet showed adjusted figures matching the public release.

At trial, the government moved to admit the spreadsheet and its embedded notes. Defense counsel objected under Rule 403, arguing the material was prejudicial because the document was unsent, speculative, and lacked definitive proof it influenced disclosures. The prosecutor argued that the spreadsheet was created by the defendant and closely matched the final report.

Should the court admit the spreadsheet and embedded comment?

No, because the unsent draft may confuse the jury and its probative value is substantially outweighed by prejudice.
No, because internal projections without supporting conduct are inadmissible.
Yes, because it is a party-opponent statement reflecting fraudulent intent.
Yes, because any materials found on a defendant’s device are admissible.

126. A musician contracted to play three weekend shows for a venue at $3,000 per show. He performed the first show, missed the second due to travel issues, and declined the third citing schedule conflicts. The venue paid $1,000 in advance. To cover the second show, it hired a replacement for $4,000 and did not pursue further performances with the musician.

The musician sued for the full contract amount, arguing that he performed part of the deal and that the venue acted prematurely in replacing him. The venue countered that the contract made payment contingent on appearance at each event and that its substitute cost should offset any owed amount.

How much is the musician most likely entitled to recover?

$1,000.
$2,000.
$3,000.
$4,000.

127. A man was charged with aggravated assault after hitting a security guard with a metal pipe during an argument about trespassing. At trial, the defense presented evidence that the man acted in self-defense, claiming the guard approached aggressively and reached for his belt as if reaching for a weapon. The man testified that he feared for his safety and reacted instinctively.

The judge instructed the jury on self-defense and clarified that the defendant had the burden to present evidence supporting justification. However, the prosecution retained the burden of proof on all elements beyond a reasonable doubt. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the jury instructions improperly shifted the burden of persuasion and violated due process.

What is the correct allocation of burdens in this case?

The defendant must prove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
The defendant must produce some evidence of justification, but the state must disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt.
The state must prove lack of justification only if the defense raises it on appeal.
The burden of persuasion always shifts when an affirmative defense is presented.

128. A county election board adopted a rule barring independent candidates from appearing on the general election ballot unless they had first filed notice of intent six months before any major party primaries. The board claimed the policy prevented late-entry campaigns from disrupting planned ballots and allowed for adequate administrative review of candidate eligibility. An independent candidate who missed the deadline by three weeks sued, arguing that the rule unduly burdened ballot access and unfairly advantaged party-affiliated candidates.

In defense, the board stated that party candidates were subject to similar procedural timelines set under state law and that independent contenders must also follow consistent administrative standards. It asserted that late filings strained resources and required midstream changes to ballot layout, which risked voter confusion and increased costs. The candidate responded that major party contenders had multiple access points and benefitted from ongoing recognition, while independents faced rigid barriers disproportionate to their campaign resources.

The court must decide whether the early-filing requirement for independent candidates violates constitutional principles governing elections.

Should the court strike down the rule?

Yes, because ballot access cannot be subject to burdens that disproportionately affect independent candidates.
No, because election boards may impose timelines that apply equally to all candidates.
Yes, because independent candidacies receive heightened protection under the Equal Protection Clause.
No, because preventing administrative disruption justifies candidate deadlines.

129. A plaintiff sued a shopping center for injuries suffered in a parking lot due to defective lighting. During trial, she offered a maintenance log prepared by the center’s janitorial supervisor one week before the incident. The log included the line, “Light poles A5 and A6 still out. Too dangerous to change at night — waiting on daytime work order.” The defense objected to the log entry as hearsay.

The plaintiff responded that the log was created as part of daily facility records, used to track repairs and kept in a cloud-based internal system. Although the supervisor was not available to testify, a current employee authenticated the entry as standard procedure. The court considered whether the entry qualified under a hearsay exception.

Should the maintenance log entry be admitted?

No, because entries made without safety officer review are unreliable.
No, because the author is unavailable to verify the entry’s origin.
Yes, because it qualifies as a business record created as part of a routine system.
Yes, because safety-related complaints are always admissible in tort actions.

130. A buyer contracted to purchase a wooded parcel for $725,000, with closing scheduled “on or before February 15.” The contract included an environmental clause granting the buyer the right to cancel or renegotiate if “hazardous materials or illegal dumping” were discovered. On January 28, the buyer’s inspection revealed buried concrete slabs, rusted barrels, and a pile of debris containing chemical labels.

On January 30, the buyer sent a report to the seller proposing a $50,000 price adjustment. The seller immediately sold the land to a backup buyer on February 1, arguing that the original buyer’s discount request constituted abandonment. The original buyer sued, asserting that her action was permitted under the contingency clause and did not constitute cancellation or rejection. The jurisdiction enforces inspection clauses according to their plain language and does not treat renegotiation proposals as abandonment unless clearly stated.

Who is likely to prevail?

The seller, because buried debris does not qualify as hazardous waste.
The seller, because price renegotiation implies rejection of the original offer.
The buyer, because her adjustment proposal was permitted under the clause.
The buyer, because hazardous conditions make the contract voidable by default.

131. A state agency introduced a new system for distributing disaster relief funds to small businesses, allocating aid based on audited financials and compliance certifications. Following backlash over transparency and mismanagement during past emergencies, the agency added a new requirement: each applicant must sign a statement affirming that “state recovery efforts have been timely and effective.” Businesses refusing to sign the statement were deemed ineligible for funding and received no opportunity to revise or appeal.

Several business owners objected, noting that their own experience of delayed inspections and bureaucratic confusion contradicted the statement’s content. They argued that being required to endorse the government’s performance as a condition for emergency aid constituted compelled speech. The agency defended the requirement as a communication strategy designed to restore public confidence and unify messaging around disaster preparedness. Officials emphasized that applicants could opt out and seek other non-state aid, and that participation in the relief program was voluntary.

The plaintiffs filed suit under the First Amendment, arguing that the condition punished dissent and forced recipients to affirm a narrative contrary to their beliefs. They cited precedents barring the government from conditioning public benefits on ideological agreement. The agency argued that the requirement was a symbolic affirmation, not a viewpoint mandate, and served a rational civic purpose. The court must now determine whether denying emergency funds based on refusal to endorse a government statement violates constitutional protections.

Should the court strike down the requirement?

No, because disaster funds are discretionary and subject to policy-linked certification.
Yes, because compelled affirmation of government performance violates free speech.
No, because applicants may retain personal views while submitting public declarations.
Yes, because businesses are entitled to express frustration during public funding reviews.

132. A vintage clothing retailer hired a photographer to produce promotional images for a retro-themed catalog. The contract specified “studio-quality images incorporating brand-selected models and approved props, with delivery of edited files by June 10.” The photographer completed the shoot on time, but used his own props—including a modern chair and neutral backdrops—and substituted one model who was unavailable for the scheduled session.

The retailer immediately raised concerns about the aesthetic mismatch and the absence of its preferred styling elements. The photographer refused to revise the images, claiming creative license and insisting that the final shots were usable and high-quality. The retailer hired a second photographer to redo the session and refused payment on the original contract.

The first photographer sued, arguing that the photos were submitted on time and fit general branding themes.

Was the retailer likely justified in rejecting the photos?

Yes, because deviation from the approved styling and props breached essential creative terms.
No, because the photographer acted in good faith and met the delivery timeline.
Yes, because substituting the model without permission violated performance expectations.
No, because photo quality and general theme adherence satisfy the contract’s intent.

133. A defendant was charged with mail fraud. On cross-examination of a government witness, defense counsel asked whether the witness had previously claimed that she thought the defendant “was just sloppy, not criminal.” The witness denied ever saying that. Defense counsel then sought to introduce a dated email sent by the witness to a colleague stating, “He’s so careless, it feels more negligent than illegal.”

The prosecution objected, arguing that the email is hearsay and that the witness has denied making any contradictory statement. Defense responded that the email contradicts current testimony and may be introduced to impeach.

Should the email be admitted for impeachment?

No, because emails between third parties are not sufficiently reliable.
No, because the witness denied the statement and impeachment is limited to cross-examination.
Yes, because hearsay exceptions allow prior emails to rebut contradictory testimony.
Yes, because Rule 613 permits introduction of prior inconsistent statements to challenge credibility.

134. A man was convicted of assault. During sentencing, the judge imposed an enhanced penalty based on the defendant’s possession of a knife during the altercation. The enhancement statute classified weapon possession as an aggravating factor, but no jury finding was made during trial. The defense objected, claiming that the enhancement increased the sentence beyond the statutory maximum and required jury determination under constitutional law.

The prosecution argued that weapon possession was a sentencing factor and that judicial findings based on preponderance of evidence were sufficient. The judge overruled the objection and imposed the longer sentence, citing witness testimony and photographic evidence. On appeal, the defendant challenged the procedure and argued the enhancement violated the Sixth Amendment.

How should the appellate court rule?

Reverse the sentence, because any enhancement increasing punishment requires jury finding.
Affirm the sentence, because sentencing factors may be found judicially by a preponderance.
Reverse the sentence, because aggravating facts beyond the verdict must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Affirm the sentence, because photographic evidence supports the weapon's presence.

135. A journalist sought access to video footage recorded by police body cameras during a protest in a downtown park. The incident involved multiple arrests and allegations of excessive force. The footage was stored by the police department and not released to the public. The journalist filed a public records request, citing a state transparency law and asserting that the incident involved matters of public concern.

The police department denied the request, arguing that the footage was part of an ongoing investigation and that disclosure could interfere with case preparation. The journalist filed suit in state court, asserting that the denial violated her First Amendment rights to access information related to public proceedings. The department responded that police investigations are not judicial records and that the First Amendment does not guarantee general access to all government-held documents.

The court must decide whether the journalist’s claim implicates a constitutional right or merely a statutory dispute over public records access.

Should the court grant relief on First Amendment grounds?

Yes, because all records of public arrests are subject to public disclosure.
No, because there is no First Amendment right of access to internal law enforcement materials.
Yes, because incidents of potential misconduct are categorically matters of public interest.
No, because the journalist lacked standing to assert constitutional injury.

136. A defendant was charged with attempting to destroy records tied to a corporate audit. During investigation, agents recovered a note from the defendant’s office trash that read: “Remove the ‘unverified’ folder — delete contents before Friday. We can say it was never finalized.” The note was unsigned, but handwriting analysis matched samples from the defendant’s employment file.

Defense counsel objected to the note as hearsay and speculative, claiming it might reflect a legitimate archiving instruction. The prosecution countered that the note suggested intent to conceal data and was written by the defendant shortly before the audit.

Should the court admit the handwritten note?

Yes, because it is a party-opponent admission that is probative of intent under Rule 801(d)(2)(A).
No, because unsigned handwritten documents are too vague to meet authentication standards.
Yes, because unsigned notes found near audits are automatically admissible.
No, because the note was discarded and never acted upon.

137. A boutique eyewear company entered into a written agreement with a promotional agency to run a social media campaign tied to the release of its spring collection. The contract specified that the agency would deliver “a series of promotional posts featuring influencer content consistent with brand styling guidelines,” including posts on Instagram and TikTok beginning March 1. The eyewear company provided mood boards, sample captions, and color palettes to guide the campaign’s look and tone.

The agency launched posts featuring influencers selected from its roster, but several posts used filters and backgrounds that clashed with the company's established aesthetic. Some captions included humor that conflicted with the brand’s refined image. The company asked for revisions, but the agency claimed it had creative latitude and that no specific style terms had been legally binding. The campaign continued for two weeks before the company halted payment and hired a new firm to relaunch the materials.

The promotional agency sued for breach, claiming partial performance and entitlement to compensation for the launch. The eyewear brand defended based on breach of stylistic consistency and failure to follow agreed branding inputs.

Was the eyewear company justified in withholding payment?

No, because the agency launched the campaign using its standard creative approach.
Yes, because the posts failed to align with brand-provided stylistic guidelines.
No, because brand tone is subjective and hard to enforce.
Yes, because continued use of mismatched content frustrated the promotional purpose of the agreement.

138. In 1992, a man purchased a large lot in the countryside and installed fencing along what he believed was his southern boundary. Within the fenced strip, he planted hedgerows, stored firewood, and cultivated a vegetable patch. For over 30 years, he maintained the area as part of his backyard. Ownership of the adjacent lot changed hands twice, and neither prior owner raised objections or conducted a survey.

In 2023, the new neighbor hired a surveyor while planning a garage addition and discovered that the man’s fence and improvements encroached 14 feet into her property. She demanded removal and restoration of the strip. The man refused and asserted ownership through adverse possession, presenting decades of maintenance records, photographs, and receipts. The jurisdiction requires 20 years of open, continuous, exclusive, and hostile possession. Mistaken boundary belief satisfies hostility under claim of right.

Who holds title to the disputed strip?

The neighbor, because record title has not been formally transferred.
The man, because all elements of adverse possession are satisfied.
The neighbor, because mistaken use cannot establish legal ownership.
The man, because fencing and cultivation demonstrate hostility.

139. A tech startup posted job listings offering “high-growth salaries” and “guaranteed equity options.” A candidate applied, was hired, and relocated based on the compensation package. Three months later, the company revoked the equity offer, citing internal restructuring. The employee sued for misrepresentation, claiming reliance on the advertised benefits. The company argued the language was aspirational and subject to change.

Evidence showed that leadership knew the equity program was under review when the job was posted but chose not to disclose it. The employee had asked about equity during interviews and received verbal assurances from the hiring manager.

The jurisdiction permits intentional misrepresentation claims when defendants knowingly make false factual statements to induce action that causes harm.

What is the strongest theory of recovery?

Breach of contract for failure to honor salary expectations.
Negligent hiring, due to failure to explain compensation terms.
Intentional misrepresentation, for knowingly inducing reliance with false statements.
Interference with economic advantage, due to relocation costs.

140. A public park installed overhead lighting on tall poles along a jogging path. One fixture became unstable after a lightning storm and leaned significantly over the path. Maintenance workers noticed the tilt during routine inspection but postponed repairs due to budget concerns. Three weeks later, the pole collapsed during high winds, striking a jogger and fracturing her leg.

She sued the city for negligence, claiming failure to act on a known hazard. The city responded that extreme weather was an intervening cause and that the park’s design met all safety codes. Inspection logs confirmed awareness of the unstable fixture but showed no emergency orders were issued.

The jurisdiction imposes liability on municipalities when known public hazards are ignored and injuries result from predictable events — including weather when it exacerbates existing risk.

Is the city likely liable?

No, because weather caused the injury, not municipal conduct.
Yes, because the pole’s condition was apparent and dangerous.
No, since compliance with safety codes defeats negligence.
Yes, because failure to repair a known structural hazard made harm foreseeable.

141. A state health department adopted a regulation requiring all dietary supplement manufacturers to include a disclaimer stating “This product does not provide scientifically verified health benefits” on the front of their packaging. The rule applied even to products with FDA-approved ingredients, and made no distinction between products advertising general wellness and those citing published studies. A manufacturer challenged the rule under the First Amendment, arguing that the disclaimer constituted compelled speech that diluted truthful advertising.

The state responded that the regulation helped consumers distinguish between drugs and supplements, and avoided confusion about health claims that lacked medical consensus. Officials maintained that disclaimers were factual and applied uniformly across the industry, regardless of the manufacturer’s actual messaging. The manufacturer countered that forcing a generic statement mischaracterized products backed by emerging research and made packaging language seem deceptive or contradictory.

The court was asked to determine whether the disclaimer rule violates constitutional protections of commercial speech. The manufacturer emphasized that its claims were carefully worded and supported by citations, and that blanket disclaimers undermine credibility even when not misleading. The state insisted that uniform labeling protected public health and helped deter unfounded health claims.

Should the court strike down the rule?

No, because the disclaimer provides essential information for consumer protection.
Yes, because compelled speech that overrides accurate messaging violates the First Amendment.
No, because commercial disclaimers are subject only to rational basis review.
Yes, because supplement makers have the same expressive rights as political advertisers.

142. A startup hired a freelance developer to build a custom automation tool for $12,000. The contract called for three equal payments of $4,000 tied to project milestones. The developer received the first $4,000 and finished the first half of the work. However, he missed the second milestone deadline by two weeks. Concerned about losing additional time, the company terminated the agreement and hired another developer for $8,000 to complete the remaining work.

The original developer sued for compensation, arguing that he completed half the project and the delay was minor. The company responded that the breach caused increased costs and justified offsetting any further payment.

Assuming the developer’s delay caused the company to spend $2,000 more than planned, what is the most appropriate recovery for the developer?

$0.
$2,000.
$4,000.
$6,000.

143. A college student sued her university in federal court for breach of scholarship contract, alleging that promised financial aid was abruptly terminated without cause midway through the academic year. The student claimed she relied on written confirmations and that the sudden loss of funds caused educational interruption and emotional distress. The university moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that scholarship letters were conditional offers, not binding contracts, and that her academic performance voided further eligibility.

The student’s complaint referenced email communications stating that aid “will continue through spring semester,” and included screenshots of award details from the university’s online portal. She denied receiving any warning or notice that her grades had fallen below eligibility thresholds. The university’s motion relied on its general policy handbook and did not attach individualized records.

What is the strongest basis for denying the university’s motion to dismiss?

The university failed to attach academic records confirming its defense.
The student’s allegations plausibly state a claim for breach of contract under Rule 8.
The university’s policy handbook is not binding unless signed by the student.
The court must resolve factual disputes regarding grade thresholds before ruling on the motion.

144. A defendant was charged with falsifying government compliance documents. At trial, the prosecution introduced a draft memo written by the defendant and saved on his desktop. The memo included the line, “We’ll just paste the old safety numbers into this quarter’s sheet—nobody will notice the change.” The memo was never sent but was recovered during a search of the defendant’s computer.

Defense counsel objected, arguing that the memo was speculative and should be excluded under Rule 403 due to unfair prejudice. The prosecution responded that the document was created by the defendant and reflected direct intent to falsify compliance data.

Should the draft memo be admitted?

No, because speculative intent statements are inadmissible.
No, because the document was unsent and its meaning is ambiguous.
Yes, because all personal documents recovered under warrant are admissible.
Yes, because it is a party-opponent statement and its probative value is not substantially outweighed by prejudice.

145. A plaintiff sued a regional home improvement store for injuries sustained after slipping on spilled paint in an aisle designated for renovation products. She alleged that employees were aware of the spill before her fall and failed to take action. During pretrial discovery, her attorney obtained an audio recording from a customer service associate’s body-worn device, captured two hours before the incident. In the recording, the associate says, “Aisle 5’s got that open can still leaking. I radioed floor team but nobody’s gotten around to cleanup. Hope nobody trips — it’s real slick.” The store maintained audio logs for liability and training, and the file was stored on a centralized server.

At trial, plaintiff’s counsel moved to admit the recording. Defense counsel objected on hearsay grounds and claimed the associate was not responsible for aisle maintenance, that the remark was casually made to a customer, and that it lacked any supervisory action. Plaintiff responded that the associate’s job included logging environmental hazards, that he was trained to report spills, and the recording reflected that duty in action. The associate had made similar comments in his shift records, and another employee later confirmed hearing the same concern about Aisle 5 during that shift.

The court must determine whether the employee’s statement in the audio recording qualifies as a party-opponent agent statement under Rule 801(d)(2)(D).

No, because the employee did not have managerial authority over floor maintenance procedures.
No, because casual statements made to customers are not admissible unless repeated in official logs.
Yes, because the statement was made during employment about a work-related hazard within the scope of duties.
Yes, because audio recordings related to premises conditions are automatically admissible in tort actions.

146. In 1994, a man installed a split-rail fence enclosing what he believed was the full boundary of his newly purchased property. He landscaped, stored firewood, and created a compost station along one edge, which included an 8-foot strip that actually extended onto the neighboring parcel. Over the next 28 years, the neighbor never objected, and ownership of that parcel changed hands twice without any surveys or challenges. In 2022, the newest owner commissioned a survey and demanded removal of the fence and reclamation of the strip.

The man refused, asserting title by adverse possession. He produced dated photographs, landscaping receipts, and affidavits from neighbors confirming that he exclusively maintained the strip as part of his yard. The jurisdiction requires 20 years of open, exclusive, continuous, and hostile possession, and accepts mistaken boundary use under claim of right. No agreements or permissions were ever made between the parties.

Who holds title to the disputed strip?

The man, because he satisfies all statutory requirements for adverse possession.
The neighbor, because mistaken possession does not meet the hostility element.
The neighbor, because record title prevails without formal conveyance.
The man, because fences and firewood constitute constructive possession.

147. A plaintiff filed suit in federal court against a private insurance company, alleging deceptive practices and denial of benefits under a disability plan. The complaint stated that the insurer “routinely uses delay tactics and blanket denials to deny legitimate claims,” and included a spreadsheet comparing 10 similar cases. No individual facts were alleged for the plaintiff’s own denial, and there was no supporting documentation.

The defendant moved to dismiss and filed a Rule 11 motion, claiming that the complaint was frivolous and lacked factual support. It argued that the spreadsheet was composed of unrelated lawsuits and that the plaintiff had failed to allege any facts unique to her situation. The plaintiff responded that she was in the process of gathering records and believed that the complaint sufficiently reflected a pattern of abuse.

The court must determine whether the Rule 11 motion should be granted.

What is the most likely result?

The motion should be denied, because the plaintiff demonstrated a good-faith belief in systemic misconduct.
The motion should be granted, because the complaint lacked specific factual allegations supporting the plaintiff’s claim.
The motion should be denied, because Rule 11 applies only after discovery begins.
The motion should be granted, because referencing other cases in a complaint is prohibited under Rule 11.

148. A bakery ordered customized pastry boxes from a supplier for its anniversary promotion. The contract required “ivory boxes with embossed gold lettering and fold-top closures,” delivered by the week before the event. The supplier ran short on materials and delivered cream-colored boxes with printed labels and sticker-sealed tops, citing an effort to meet the deadline.

The bakery used some boxes but held others back, complaining that the packaging lacked the elegance advertised in its promotional materials. It withheld a portion of payment and demanded reimbursement for altered branding materials and unused inventory. The supplier sued for full payment, arguing that the boxes were attractive, timely, and functional.

Should the bakery be required to pay in full?

Yes, because the supplier delivered functional boxes on time and in good condition.
No, because the packaging failed to meet aesthetic and design specifications central to the promotion.
Yes, because promotional materials are unrelated to supplier obligations.
No, because the bakery’s ability to use the boxes as intended was impaired.

149. A homeowner awoke to the sound of glass breaking and found a teenager entering through the back window. Startled, the homeowner grabbed a baseball bat and struck the teen in the shoulder. The teen fell backward, breaking his arm. Police arrived and learned the teen had been trying to retrieve a soccer ball that landed in the yard and had used the back window out of panic. The homeowner was charged with battery.

At trial, the defense argued that she believed the entry was a break-in and that the force used was lawful under self-defense and defense-of-home statutes. The prosecution responded that the force was excessive, and the circumstances did not reasonably suggest a criminal entry. The window was ajar, and the teen shouted apologies while trying to get inside. The defense emphasized the homeowner’s fear and the suddenness of the event.

What is the homeowner’s strongest legal defense?

Justification—reasonable belief of unlawful entry permits non-lethal force.
Excuse—her emotional response prevented formation of criminal intent.
Mistake of law—she misunderstood her rights under defense statutes.
Necessity—she acted to prevent future trespass and property damage.

150. A national religious organization was selected for routine federal tax audit review after internal IRS guidelines flagged it based on donation patterns and regional growth. The organization alleged that it had been targeted due to religious affiliation and filed suit under the Establishment Clause and Equal Protection Clause, arguing that selective enforcement amounted to unconstitutional scrutiny.

The IRS responded that its risk matrix included donation spikes, regional clustering, and staffing indicators—not religious affiliation. It emphasized that the algorithm was neutral and had flagged both secular and religious nonprofits over time. The organization countered that internal documents revealed disproportionate focus on faith-based groups, and that outreach efforts were used as proxies for determining audit targets without clear justification.

The court must determine whether the audit selection process violates constitutional limits on religious discrimination. The organization argued that faith-based status should not trigger heightened examination, and that transparency and neutrality are required when applying enforcement protocols.

What is the strongest argument that the IRS violated the Constitution?

Faith-based groups receive different treatment under federal nonprofit law.
Internal records show disproportionate enforcement against religious entities.
The Establishment Clause prohibits government oversight of religious growth metrics.
Donation patterns are insufficient to trigger tax scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.

151. A woman conveyed her forested parcel “to my husband for life, then to my son and his heirs, but if my son ever leases the land to any business, then to the local land trust.” The deed was recorded. After the woman’s death, her husband lived on the property until his passing fourteen years later. Her son inherited possession and continued using the land as a residence and small apiary. Six years later, he signed a short-term lease with a regional hiking club allowing limited seasonal access for guided tours.

Upon learning of this, the land trust filed suit, claiming that the lease satisfied the condition in the original deed and that title had vested in it. The son responded that the lease was informal, seasonal, and not a transfer of possessory interest in the conventional sense. He further argued that even if the condition had been triggered, the land trust's interest was void under the Rule Against Perpetuities, since it was not guaranteed to vest within the required timeframe measured from the grant.

The jurisdiction adheres to strict common law RAP and does not recognize charitable exemptions or reform doctrines. It voids contingent interests like shifting executory limitations unless they are certain to vest or fail within lives in being plus 21 years.

Does the land trust hold valid title?

Yes, because leasing to a business triggered the divesting clause.
No, because the land trust's interest violates the Rule Against Perpetuities.
Yes, because the lease constitutes a possessory interest sufficient to activate the condition.
No, because a seasonal use agreement is not a qualifying lease under the deed.

152. A group of homeowners hired a landscaping company to install drought-resistant greenery and decorative stone across shared common areas. The contract required the use of specified plants from a provided list and “installation of natural stone borders consistent in color and size.” The landscaping crew completed the job, but used a mix of gravel and concrete edging. Some plants matched the list, but others were substitutes based on availability.

Homeowners complained that the result looked mismatched and differed from the design they approved. The company argued that the substitutes were equivalent and made decisions on-site to preserve the timeline. The group refused to issue the final payment and hired another crew to rework the borders and replace several plant beds.

Was the landscaping company in breach of contract?

No, because the installed features served the same function.
Yes, because the stone and plant choices differed from the specified design.
No, because landscaping decisions often involve practical substitutions.
Yes, because group aesthetic approval was a condition for final payment.

153. A printing company agreed to deliver 10,000 promotional brochures for $18,000. It printed 5,000 but experienced a supply shortage. It offered to deliver the completed half and fulfill the rest two weeks later. The client refused, citing a product launch and hired another printer for $20,000 to reprint the entire batch. The original printer sued for value of the 5,000 already finished.

The client responded that the delay made the order worthless and that accepting half would have disrupted the campaign. Evidence showed that no brochures from the original order were used.

How much is the original printer most likely entitled to recover?

$0.
$6,000.
$9,000.
$18,000.

154. A man was driving a rental car when police pulled him over for speeding. During the stop, officers noticed several large duffel bags in the back seat and claimed they smelled marijuana. Without obtaining a warrant or asking for consent, they searched the bags and found individually wrapped packages of methamphetamine. The man was arrested and charged with possession with intent to distribute.

At trial, the defense moved to suppress the drug evidence, arguing that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The prosecution asserted that the automobile exception applied because the officers had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained contraband. The defense responded that the smell alone was not a sufficient basis for bypassing the warrant requirement, especially when the stop was for a traffic violation and the bags were zipped shut.

Should the court admit the drug evidence?

No, because officers lacked probable cause and failed to seek consent.
Yes, because the automobile exception permits warrantless searches with probable cause.
No, because closed bags inside a car require separate search warrants.
Yes, because the defendant was driving a rental and had no privacy expectation.

155. In a federal theft trial, the prosecution called a neighbor who testified that two days before the defendant’s arrest, she heard him say, “Nobody tracks these hand tools — I just grab a few whenever we’re short.” Defense counsel objected on hearsay grounds, arguing the comment was casual, lacked a clear reference, and was overheard in passing.

The government responded that the statement was made by the defendant and offered against him, making it a party-opponent admission. The witness could identify the defendant's voice and recalled the context as part of a conversation about work inventory.

Should the neighbor’s testimony be admitted?

No, because casual remarks about tools are not sufficiently probative.
No, because overheard statements must be corroborated by other witnesses.
Yes, because the defendant’s own statement is admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(A).
Yes, because statements made near arrest are automatically admissible.

156. A landlord filed a federal diversity action against a tenant for unpaid rent totaling $80,000. The landlord, domiciled in State A, owns rental properties in State B, where the tenant resides and where the lease was executed. The tenant answered and filed counterclaims for breach of warranty and violation of state rental codes, seeking $25,000 in damages for alleged habitability issues.

During a pretrial conference, the court raised questions about whether the tenant’s counterclaims met federal subject-matter jurisdiction. The landlord argued that the court could not hear the counterclaims because they didn’t exceed the $75,000 threshold. The tenant countered that the claims were compulsory and arose from the same lease dispute.

The district court must decide whether to retain jurisdiction over the counterclaims and the original action.

What is the most appropriate ruling?

The court may hear the counterclaims under supplemental jurisdiction, because they arise from the same case or controversy.
The court must dismiss the counterclaims, because each claim must meet the amount-in-controversy requirement individually.
The court may retain jurisdiction, because diversity of citizenship exists and the lease is governed by state law.
The court must dismiss both claims, because counterclaims below the threshold invalidate diversity jurisdiction.

157. A man with no criminal record was approached by an undercover officer posing as a member of a local drug syndicate. Over the course of several weeks, the officer repeatedly encouraged the man to supply small quantities of marijuana to other members and offered money for each successful delivery. Initially resistant, the man eventually agreed and participated in three transactions before being arrested.

At trial, the defendant claimed he was entrapped and that the government's persistent solicitation overcame his will. The prosecution presented evidence that, although pressured, the man ultimately carried out the acts willingly and never expressed fear or confusion. They argued that the defendant had existing knowledge of marijuana sourcing and did not need convincing beyond financial incentives.

Is the defendant likely to succeed with an entrapment defense?

Yes, because the government induced the crime and the defendant lacked predisposition.
No, because providing drugs is inherently unlawful, even when initiated by police.
Yes, because undercover officers cannot offer payment during investigations.
No, because the defendant’s delay in accepting the offer shows conscious choice.

158. A teenager was injured during a high school wrestling match when his opponent performed a banned takedown maneuver. The referee allowed the move and awarded points. The injured boy sustained spinal damage and sued the school district for negligence, alleging failure to enforce safety rules and train referees adequately.

The district argued that wrestling involves inherent risk and that injuries may occur during legal contact. They claimed the referee acted in good faith and was not liable for in-match decisions. However, review of training materials revealed that referees received minimal instruction on illegal moves, and the maneuver in question had been highlighted in past incident reports.

The jurisdiction requires schools to maintain reasonable safety standards and may impose liability where injuries result from failure to supervise or enforce known safety policies.

Is the district likely liable?

No, because the referee acted within match discretion.
Yes, because the district failed to prepare staff to prevent foreseeable harm.
No, because wrestling injuries are part of accepted sport risk.
Yes, because schools are strictly liable for student injuries during activities.

159. A woman left her purse on a bench at a public park while jogging. A nearby teenager saw the purse and assumed it had been abandoned. He took the purse home and later used one of the gift cards found inside. The police tracked the card to a store and identified the teenager, who admitted he had taken the purse but thought it was unwanted. He was charged with larceny.

At trial, the defense argued that the teen lacked intent to steal because he believed the property was discarded. The prosecution emphasized that the purse contained cash, personal IDs, and bank cards—indicating ownership. Witnesses described the teen laughing with friends and referring to the purse as a “score,” which suggested awareness that he was taking something that belonged to someone else.

The court must determine whether the teenager can raise a mistake-of-fact defense to negate the specific intent element of larceny.

Can the defendant successfully assert a mistake-of-fact defense?

No, because the purse was removed from a public place without inquiry.
Yes, because discarded items do not support ownership claims.
Yes, if he genuinely believed the purse was abandoned and not owned.
No, because larceny is a general intent crime and mistake is irrelevant.

160. A woman suspected of theft was brought to a police station for questioning. Upon arrival, she asked, “Do I need a lawyer for this?” Officers replied, “That’s up to you,” and began asking about stolen merchandise. She answered several questions before eventually confessing to having taken a jacket. Officers then read her Miranda rights and continued the interrogation. The woman later moved to suppress her confession, arguing that she had requested counsel and was questioned in violation of her rights.

At the suppression hearing, the prosecution argued that her initial question was ambiguous and did not constitute a clear request for counsel. They contended that the Miranda warnings were eventually given, and that her confession was voluntary. The defense claimed that her inquiry about needing a lawyer should have triggered a halt to interrogation until counsel was provided or waived.

Was the woman's right to counsel violated?

No, because she received Miranda warnings before continuing the interview.
Yes, because she did not affirmatively waive her rights prior to interrogation.
No, because the question about needing a lawyer was too vague to be a request.
Yes, because custodial interrogation began before Miranda warnings and without counsel.

161. A lawful permanent resident from Guatemala was detained by federal immigration authorities after a routine traffic stop revealed outdated travel records from years prior. Although no criminal charges were filed, the individual was held for eight days without access to counsel or a hearing. Officials claimed his documentation status raised concerns about prior visa violations. The detainee filed suit under the Due Process Clause, arguing that indefinite civil detention without notice or hearing violated his constitutional rights.

Federal authorities responded that administrative processing of status checks requires time and coordination between agencies, and that permanent residents may be held temporarily while citizenship data is verified. They maintained that detention was brief and aimed solely at reconciling record discrepancies—not to punish or remove the individual. The plaintiff countered that the absence of counsel access and any formal notice created a coercive environment and deprived him of liberty without lawful process.

What is the strongest argument that the detention violated the Constitution?

The absence of criminal charges rendered the detention unauthorized under federal immigration law.
The government failed to provide adequate procedural safeguards for a deprivation of liberty.
The duration of detention exceeded reasonable administrative timelines.
Permanent residents are entitled to immediate counsel access upon questioning.

162. A man attended an outdoor music festival and sat on the edge of a temporary stage to get a better view. A staff member warned him to move, but he remained seated. Moments later, a speaker mounted to the overhead rigging fell and struck him, causing serious head injuries. The speaker’s mounting had been installed by a third-party vendor earlier in the day.

The man sued the festival organizers, claiming negligence for failing to secure stage equipment. The organizers argued that they delegated setup to a licensed vendor and had no direct involvement with rigging installation. Evidence showed that staff had previously reported concerns about movement in that speaker but no action was taken.

The jurisdiction applies liability for negligent supervision and recognizes nondelegable duties for safety at public events when harm results from foreseeable equipment failure.

Is the festival likely liable?

No, because the attendee remained in an unsafe location after being warned.
No, because the third-party vendor was independently responsible.
Yes, because licensed vendors are jointly liable with event hosts.
Yes, because the organizers retained a nondelegable duty for event safety.

163. A plaintiff sued a chemical company after suffering chemical exposure injuries tied to emissions from a company-owned storage facility. During trial, she sought to introduce an internal memo written by a safety inspector two weeks before the incident. The memo said: “Tank 14 showed seal leakage signs again. If nothing’s done, this system will fail under pressure.” The inspector sent it to the operations manager, and it was stored in the company’s standard tracking system.

The company objected to its admission, arguing that the inspector had since left and was not called as a witness. Further, the memo had not prompted any managerial follow-up or entries in the company’s resolution records. Plaintiff argued that the inspector's job was to report infrastructure risks, and the memo was created in the scope of employment.

The judge must decide whether the memo qualifies as an admissible agent statement under Rule 801(d)(2)(D).

No, because no action was taken and the document lacks corporate adoption.
Yes, because the memo was written during employment about a safety issue within the scope of duties.
No, because the author no longer works for the company and cannot verify contents.
Yes, because all internal safety messages are automatically admissible in injury cases.

164. A software company sued a former client in federal court, claiming breach of a licensing agreement after the client failed to pay usage fees. The defendant previously litigated a related contract dispute in state court and obtained a judgment dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. The software company now argues that the dismissal did not resolve the merits and that federal litigation should proceed.

The defendant moved to dismiss under claim preclusion, asserting that the state court action arose from the same contract and that both parties and facts are identical. The software company countered that the earlier dismissal was procedural and did not constitute a final judgment on the merits.

The district court must assess whether the earlier state court judgment bars the federal suit.

Is the defendant likely to prevail?

Yes, because the previous judgment involved the same parties and the same contract dispute.
No, because the previous dismissal was based on jurisdiction and not on the merits.
Yes, because dismissal by any court precludes later related litigation.
No, because claim preclusion only applies to federal judgments.

165. A software company developed an AI-based hiring tool that analyzed candidate profiles and produced automated rankings. Concerned about potential liability, the company filed suit in federal court seeking a declaratory judgment that its system complied with anti-discrimination laws. No complaints had been filed against the company, and no enforcement proceedings were underway. The suit named a federal agency responsible for employment oversight but did not cite any specific threat or administrative action.

In response, the agency moved to dismiss, arguing that the case was premature and not ripe for adjudication. It emphasized that it had not investigated the company, and that federal courts do not issue legal rulings absent an actual controversy. The company argued that uncertainty chilled its business expansion and investor confidence, and claimed that a declaratory judgment would clarify its legal exposure before entering new markets.

The court reviewed the company’s filings, which contained hypothetical use cases and general legal analysis but no concrete harm or imminent enforcement. It considered whether abstract fears and speculative consequences satisfied the Article III requirement of a “case or controversy” sufficient to justify declaratory relief.

Should the court proceed with the claim?

Yes, because businesses may seek legal clarity before engaging in regulated conduct.
Yes, because federal agencies must respond when challenged on statutory authority.
No, because speculative harm and lack of enforcement render the claim unripe.
No, because agency regulations preclude judicial review of algorithmic systems.

166. A homeowner granted her neighbor a recorded easement “for walking access along the rear footpath.” For years, the neighbor used the path to reach a nearby lake. Years later, she sold her home to a wilderness retreat company that expanded use by offering daily walking tours and transporting equipment with hand-pulled carts. The servient owner observed erosion and expansion of foot traffic beyond the original trail.

He sent a written demand asking the retreat company to cease commercial operations and restore the trail to its original state. The company responded that its activities were consistent with the pedestrian nature of the easement and that no structural changes had occurred. It claimed carts did not qualify as motorized vehicles and emphasized the minimal environmental footprint. The servient owner filed suit seeking termination or limitation of use.

The jurisdiction enforces express easements strictly and limits expansions only where the new use is consistent, nonburdensome, and does not physically degrade the servient estate.

Who is likely to prevail?

The retreat, because pedestrian easements include modest support tools.
The retreat, because hand-pulled carts don’t violate motorized vehicle exclusions.
The servient owner, because erosion and overuse materially burden the property.
The servient owner, because commercial activity exceeds the original scope.

167. A construction worker used a nail gun to secure framing during a housing project. The nail gun jammed several times, and while troubleshooting, he held down the trigger and tapped the casing. A misfire launched a nail into his leg, requiring surgery. The gun’s design included no trigger lock, and its manual did not warn against tapping or holding the trigger during malfunction.

The worker sued the manufacturer for design defect. The company argued that the gun met all regulatory standards and that users are trained to avoid contact with loaded tools during jams. However, industry experts testified that safer models included lockouts and shields that could have prevented the injury.

The jurisdiction applies the risk-utility test for design defect, asking whether safer alternatives were available and feasible and whether the product’s risk outweighed its utility.

Is the manufacturer likely liable?

No, because the worker misused the product during troubleshooting.
Yes, because safer designs with lockout features were available.
No, because the injury resulted from workplace protocol failure.
Yes, because trigger-held tools are subject to strict liability.

168. A residential builder agreed to construct a stone patio using materials selected by the homeowner from an approved sample. The contract prohibited substitution without written consent. When the chosen stone became unavailable, the builder used a similar material differing in tone. The homeowner withheld payment and hired another builder to replace the patio.

Assuming the builder delivered on schedule, which party is likely to prevail in a breach claim?

The builder, because the substitute material was similar and installed on time.
The homeowner, because the patio did not match the approved sample and violated the contract.
The builder, because construction timing outweighed appearance.
The homeowner, because the builder failed to offer a discount or cure.

169. A defendant was charged with falsifying financial documents submitted to a grant committee. As part of its case, the government introduced a spreadsheet recovered from the defendant’s laptop titled “Revisions,” dated two days before submission. A cell comment read: “Push totals to match proposal — real invoices fall short.” Investigators confirmed the file was authored by the defendant, who had full access rights to the folder where it was saved.

Defense counsel objected under Rule 403, claiming the spreadsheet was a draft never sent or finalized, and that the comment could be interpreted as note-taking rather than a directive. The prosecution responded that the defendant's authorship and timing demonstrated intent and planning.

The judge must determine whether the spreadsheet and its contents are admissible.

No, because unsent drafts may mislead the jury about actual conduct.
No, because spreadsheet annotations are inherently ambiguous.
Yes, because the document is a party-opponent statement relevant to intent and properly authenticated.
Yes, because all materials retrieved under a warrant are admissible in fraud trials.

170. A state public benefits program excluded families headed by cohabiting, unmarried couples from eligibility for certain housing subsidies. The policy was based on administrative rules defining “household unit” as individuals related by blood, legal guardianship, or marriage. A couple raising three children together applied for assistance and was denied on the basis that they were not legally married. They sued under the Equal Protection Clause, arguing that the denial discriminated based on familial structure.

The state defended its rule by asserting that marriage provided clear documentation and legal responsibility for joint income reporting and benefits oversight. Officials claimed that permitting unmarried couples would complicate fraud prevention and create administrative inefficiency. The couple responded that their household functioned as an economic and parenting unit and that denying aid based solely on marital status lacked rational justification and disproportionately harmed low-income families.

What is the strongest argument that the policy violates the Equal Protection Clause?

The exclusion penalizes children based on their parents’ marital status.
Denying benefits based on household structure imposes an unconstitutional condition.
The policy lacks a rational basis and discriminates against similarly situated families.
Limiting benefits to married couples violates substantive due process guarantees.

171. A plaintiff filed a federal complaint against a contractor alleging breach of warranty and product liability after repairs to a backyard deck collapsed. The defendant responded with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, asserting that the complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to show causation or damages. The plaintiff opposed the motion and filed a motion to amend the complaint to include photographs and repair bills obtained post-filing.

The defendant argued that amendment should be denied because the plaintiff was already aware of the potential defects and failed to include them initially. The plaintiff insisted that the new evidence was obtained from third-party inspection services and came to light after the original filing.

The court must determine whether amendment is warranted under Rule 15.

What is the strongest argument for granting the plaintiff’s motion?

Amendments must be permitted freely when they introduce factual details supporting the original claim.
Amendments may not be denied unless they were made in bad faith or with undue delay.
Leave to amend should be granted when it cures pleading deficiencies without causing prejudice.
Leave to amend is inappropriate when the plaintiff knew of the defects but failed to allege them.

172. A plaintiff sued a sports facility after tripping over a loose floor panel during a tournament. She introduced a statement made by a janitor during a phone call to his shift supervisor the day before the event. In the voicemail, the janitor said, “Court 5’s panel keeps lifting — someone’s gonna catch a toe if they don’t fix it soon.” The janitor was not present at the event and had quit shortly after.

Defense counsel objected, arguing the statement was hearsay and informal. The plaintiff responded that the janitor worked during the time period, was responsible for facility maintenance, and the statement was made during employment concerning a job-related hazard.

Should the voicemail be admitted?

No, because statements from departing employees are inherently unreliable.
Yes, because it was made by an employee during the relationship, within the scope of duties, and qualifies under Rule 801(d)(2)(D).
No, because phone recordings must be supported by transcripts and voice confirmation.
Yes, because remarks about safety are always admissible in injury litigation.

173. A homeowner borrowed $550,000 to finance the purchase of a multi-unit townhouse and signed a mortgage agreement that included a standard due-on-sale clause. The mortgage was recorded. Three years later, she sold one unit to her cousin, executing a private agreement that allocated one-third of loan payments to the new occupant. She retained control over the remaining units but failed to notify the lender of the arrangement.

The lender discovered the partial transfer eleven months later and issued a notice of acceleration, demanding full repayment. The borrower contested, arguing that the cousin was a family member, that payments remained current, and that no harm had resulted. The lender responded that the due-on-sale clause prohibited any transfer of interest without consent, and that enforcement does not depend on financial impact.

The jurisdiction enforces due-on-sale clauses according to their terms and permits acceleration upon unauthorized transfer, regardless of payment history or harm. Courts recognize even partial conveyances as triggering events under such clauses.

Is the lender entitled to accelerate the loan?

Yes, because a partial transfer without consent breaches the due-on-sale clause.
No, because family transfers are presumed exempt.
Yes, because property use changed from exclusive to shared occupancy.
No, because the borrower retained primary control and remained liable.

174. A college cafeteria served peanut-based dressing on a salad bar without clear signage. A student with a severe peanut allergy unknowingly consumed a portion and experienced anaphylactic shock. She sued the university, alleging negligent failure to warn. The school argued that ingredient lists were available on request and that staff had been trained in allergen awareness.

The student had eaten at the salad bar regularly but had never been told peanut products were used. Investigators found that the dressing container had no label and that menu boards failed to highlight allergens. Emergency personnel confirmed the student’s reaction was triggered by peanut exposure.

The jurisdiction requires food providers to display clear allergen warnings when known allergens are present and injury risk is substantial.

Is the university likely liable?

No, since food safety protocols were generally followed.
Yes, because staff training must be paired with effective communication.
No, because the student assumed risk by eating without inquiry.
Yes, because failure to clearly disclose peanuts created a foreseeable and preventable risk.

175. A state legislature enacted a tax on retirement income received by all residents, including pensions paid by private employers, state agencies, and the federal government. The law exempted benefits paid to state employees, citing recruitment incentives and the need to retain experienced public workers. A retired postal worker sued, arguing that taxing federal benefits while exempting state benefits violated constitutional principles protecting federal instrumentalities from discriminatory state taxation.

The state defended the tax by asserting broad authority to levy income taxes and emphasizing that the exemption for state retirees served internal workforce goals. It claimed the distinction was based on employment origin, not hostility toward federal employees. The plaintiff responded that the exemption created preferential treatment for state workers and unfairly burdened retirees from federal service.

The court evaluated whether the tax discriminated against federal employees in violation of the intergovernmental immunity doctrine, which limits states from taxing federal functions or treating federal sources unfavorably compared to their own.

Is the state tax constitutional?

Yes, because states may exempt income paid to their own employees without violating federal protections.
No, because exempting state pensions while taxing federal ones discriminates against federal employment.
Yes, because all residents are subject to income tax, regardless of their employer.
No, because taxing any federal benefits interferes with national supremacy.

176. A man decided to poison his rival and researched how to make a deadly concoction from household chemicals. He mixed several substances into a drink and placed the bottle in his rival’s locker at work, expecting it to be consumed during lunch. Unknown to the man, the chemicals were harmless and incapable of causing any injury. The rival drank the bottle, noticed the odd taste, and reported the incident. Surveillance footage confirmed the placement. The man was arrested and charged with attempted murder.

At trial, the defense argued that because no harm occurred and the chemicals were inert, there could be no criminal attempt. He maintained that he lacked the capacity to succeed and therefore should not be punished. The prosecution responded that impossibility is not a defense where the defendant took substantial steps intending a crime, even if the plan was doomed to fail due to flawed materials or misunderstanding.

Which legal principle most supports conviction?

Legal impossibility prevents attempt liability when the act isn’t criminal.
Factual impossibility does not prevent conviction where intent and steps are proven.
The defendant’s lack of access to real poison negates the required mens rea.
Attempt requires both intent and actual ability to harm the victim.

177. A nonprofit filed a federal class action against a national food manufacturer, alleging mislabeling of “organic” status and seeking compensatory damages for thousands of customers nationwide. The complaint identified six named plaintiffs residing in various states, all of whom purchased the product in the past two years. Discovery revealed significant differences in labeling across states and time periods, and that some plaintiffs had never read the labels prior to purchase.

The manufacturer opposed class certification, arguing that individual issues—such as reliance, state labeling laws, and damages—would predominate. The plaintiffs acknowledged differences but asserted that the central question of mislabeling could be resolved through common evidence from internal marketing records and supply chain audits.

At the certification hearing, the court must decide whether class treatment under Rule 23(b)(3) is appropriate.

Which factor most strongly supports denying certification?

The plaintiffs reside in different states with different consumer protection statutes.
The labeling claims may involve variations in packaging design and wording.
Individualized inquiries into reliance and consumer behavior predominate over common issues.
Damages for each plaintiff differ based on quantity purchased and economic impact.

178. A homeowner borrowed $800,000 to renovate a historic four-unit building and executed a mortgage with a standard due-on-sale clause. The mortgage was recorded. Two years later, she sold one unit to a friend and allowed the friend to assume one-quarter of the mortgage payments. No notice was provided to the lender. A year later, the lender discovered the transfer and initiated foreclosure proceedings, demanding full repayment based on the clause.

The borrower argued that the transfer was partial, the friend was not a commercial buyer, and that payments were current. She emphasized that the lender had suffered no financial harm and that the arrangement increased the property’s value and stability. The lender responded that any transfer of ownership interest violated the clause and gave it the right to accelerate the loan. The jurisdiction enforces due-on-sale clauses strictly, without requiring economic harm or payment default.

Is the lender permitted to accelerate the mortgage?

Yes, because any ownership transfer without consent violates the due-on-sale clause.
No, because assumption of payments preserves lender security.
Yes, because four-unit properties have stricter mortgage restrictions.
No, because no substantial change in use or risk occurred.

179. In 1990, a woman purchased a parcel and installed a stone wall along what she believed was the southern boundary. Over the next 33 years, she expanded a garden across the wall, installed lighting, and stored supplies in a shed near its base. The adjacent parcel changed owners three times, with no surveys or challenges issued during that time.

In 2023, the new neighbor commissioned a survey before building a detached garage. The results showed that the woman's improvements encroached 15 feet into the neighbor's parcel. When asked to remove the wall and restore the land, the woman refused and asserted ownership by adverse possession. She presented tax records, dated photographs, and testimony supporting uninterrupted use dating back three decades.

The jurisdiction requires 20 years of open, exclusive, continuous, and hostile possession. It accepts mistaken belief about boundaries as satisfying the hostility requirement when the occupier treats the land as her own and no permission was granted.

Who holds title to the encroached strip?

The neighbor, because record title controls without conveyance.
The woman, because her possession satisfies all elements of adverse possession.
The neighbor, because landscaping and storage do not indicate intent to own.
The woman, because improvements show active exclusion of others.

180. In a federal medical malpractice case, both parties consented to a jury trial. During voir dire, the plaintiff’s attorney objected to the exclusion of two jurors who had medical backgrounds, arguing that their personal familiarity with procedures was relevant and shouldn’t be viewed as bias. The court had allowed the defendant’s peremptory strikes of both individuals, citing litigation strategy and procedural discretion.

After trial, the plaintiff moved to set aside the verdict and for a new trial, asserting that the exclusion unfairly deprived her of a balanced jury with subject-matter insight. She pointed to comments during voir dire suggesting that the strikes were based on profession, not responses to questions.

Should the court grant a new trial?

Yes, because exclusion of jurors based on occupation violates the right to an impartial jury.
No, because peremptory strikes may be used to remove potential jurors without explanation, absent discrimination.
Yes, because professional experience enhances the jury’s competence in complex matters.
No, because the plaintiff waived any challenge by failing to object before the strikes were exercised.

181. A homeowner contracted for handcrafted kitchen cabinetry made from reclaimed maple with matte varnish, to be delivered by June 30. On July 5, the cabinetmaker delivered cabinets made from newly milled wood with a glossy finish. The homeowner objected and withheld payment. The cabinetmaker offered a discount but refused to remake the cabinets.

Which legal issue most directly affects the outcome?

Whether the homeowner accepted delivery by allowing installation.
Whether the material and finish deviations breach express contractual terms.
Whether the substitute materials improved the overall quality.
Whether delivery after June 30 voids the agreement entirely.

182. A man approached several acquaintances at a local bar and offered $5,000 to anyone willing to help him “teach his ex a lesson.” He provided her address and encouraged them to “make it look like a break-in gone wrong.” None of the acquaintances accepted the offer, though one reported it to police. The man was arrested and charged with both criminal solicitation and conspiracy to commit assault.

At trial, the defense argued that no agreement was reached, and therefore no conspiracy existed. The prosecution maintained that the defendant’s overt efforts to recruit others and offer payment reflected intent to collaborate. The judge instructed the jury on both offenses. The defense objected, asserting that charging both solicitation and conspiracy for the same conduct was redundant and constitutionally suspect.

Which statement best reflects the legal principles at issue?

Solicitation requires completion, while conspiracy does not.
Solicitation and conspiracy are distinct offenses and may be separately charged.
Conspiracy supersedes solicitation when planning begins.
Multiple charges for similar conduct violate double jeopardy protections.

183. A plaintiff filed suit in federal court after suffering injuries in a bike accident allegedly caused by a defect in a commuter app’s mapping software. The defendant company, headquartered in State C and incorporated in State D, moved to dismiss for improper service of process. The summons and complaint had been left with a receptionist at the company’s satellite office in State A—where the suit was filed—but not addressed to the company’s registered agent.

The plaintiff argued that delivery to a business office sufficed under State A’s procedural rules, and that the receptionist regularly handled company mail. The defendant countered that the rules governing service require delivery to an authorized agent or officer and that the receptionist lacked authority to receive service.

The district court must determine whether the service complied with federal standards.

What is the strongest basis for ruling in the plaintiff’s favor?

State service rules permit delivery to any employee at the company’s operational site.
The receptionist qualifies as a suitable agent under federal law due to her regular handling of documents.
Federal rules permit service using state law for the forum state or the defendant’s state of incorporation.
Personal jurisdiction over the defendant was established, making service formality less important.

184. An attorney filed a consumer protection lawsuit in federal court, alleging deceptive business practices against a national dietary supplement company. The complaint consisted of conclusory statements such as “the product is dangerous” and “the company has defrauded thousands,” but lacked factual allegations or evidence supporting those claims. It did not reference test results, customer accounts, or specific misrepresentations.

The company filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for sanctions under Rule 11, arguing that the complaint was baseless and filed without adequate factual inquiry. In response, the attorney asserted that public outrage and online complaints supported the claims, and that discovery would provide further details once initiated.

The court must now evaluate the Rule 11 motion.

How should the court rule?

Deny the motion, because attorneys are allowed to rely on public complaints prior to discovery.
Grant the motion, because the complaint lacked sufficient factual inquiry before filing.
Deny the motion, because sanctions are inappropriate before discovery is completed.
Grant the motion, because Rule 11 requires prefiling investigation of factual support, which the complaint lacked.

185. A contractor hired a lighting supplier to deliver energy-compliant fixtures with built-in dimming capability for a new apartment complex. The agreement required dimmable features and integration by April 15. The fixtures were delivered on time, but lacked dimming controls. The supplier offered to ship dimmer kits separately. The contractor declined and withheld payment.

What was the supplier’s primary performance failure?

Shipping incomplete fixtures without the promised integrated feature.
Delivering energy-efficient components consistent with local regulations.
Offering to provide add-on parts after the order was completed.
Substituting parts that met quality standards but failed integration.

186. A plaintiff filed a federal tort suit against a theme park after falling on an unstable walkway section. During trial, the plaintiff offered a smartphone video taken by a former employee two weeks prior. In the clip, the employee says, “This slab lifts every time a cart rolls over it—someone’s gonna get hurt.” The defense objected that the employee was not in maintenance and the video commentary was hearsay.

Plaintiff argued that the employee worked in operations and regularly reported facility issues, and that the statement was made during employment on a matter connected to daily duties. The court reviewed the role, timing, and whether the video and commentary qualified under hearsay exclusions.

Should the court admit the employee’s commentary in the video?

No, because cell phone commentary is too informal for evidence.
No, because only maintenance personnel may make admissible safety reports.
Yes, because video commentary about observed hazards is a present sense impression.
Yes, because it qualifies under Rule 801(d)(2)(D) as a statement within scope of employment.

187. A buyer agreed to purchase a hilltop parcel for $990,000 with closing set “on or before July 15.” The contract included an inspection clause allowing the buyer to cancel or renegotiate in the event of “environmental contamination.” On June 25, inspectors found traces of industrial chemicals and a buried tank labeled “hazardous waste” near the northern edge of the lot.

The buyer emailed the seller with the report and proposed a $65,000 price reduction. On June 28, the seller refused and conveyed the property to a backup buyer on July 1. The original buyer sued, claiming breach and asserting the contingency clause permitted renegotiation. The seller countered that the discount proposal constituted a rejection of the deal and entitled him to move forward with a different buyer.

The jurisdiction upholds inspection clauses where renegotiation is explicitly permitted, and does not equate a good-faith price adjustment with abandonment.

Who is likely to prevail?

The buyer, because her proposal was within the scope of the inspection clause.
The buyer, because environmental contamination voids land contracts.
The seller, because price adjustments negate the original offer.
The seller, because the clause required cancellation rather than negotiation.

188. A man visited a private marina to inquire about dock rentals. While walking along the edge, he tripped over a rusted anchor chain partially buried under sand. He had not made an appointment and entered through an open pedestrian gate without signage. The marina’s manager argued the man was trespassing and the chain was visible to anyone being cautious. The injured party sued for negligence, claiming the chain was a latent hazard.

Photographs showed only a small portion of the chain was exposed, and shifting sand concealed most of it. Staff confirmed prior incidents had occurred near stored equipment, prompting internal notices about hazard visibility.

The jurisdiction applies landowner duty principles, obligating owners to warn licensees of known, non-obvious dangers — even if no formal invitation was extended — when entry is foreseeable.

Is the marina likely liable?

No, because the man was not invited onto the property.
No, because the chain was a naturally occurring condition.
Yes, because the chain constituted a known hazard not visible to visitors.
Yes, because the marina owed a duty of care to all individuals near its facilities.

189. A state legislature redrew its congressional district boundaries using demographic data that concentrated voters affiliated with a particular political party into two districts, leaving other districts overwhelmingly dominated by the opposing party. Critics described the map as a partisan gerrymander that diluted voting power. Voters filed suit, arguing that the redistricting violated the Equal Protection Clause and deprived them of fair representation.

The state defended the map as a political decision well within legislative discretion. It claimed that redistricting inherently involves political judgments and that courts have traditionally deferred to legislatures on district design. The plaintiffs pointed to the extreme imbalance in district voting strength and the use of voter affiliation data to produce electoral advantage. They argued that modern technology allows precision gerrymanders that subvert democratic principles.

What is the strongest argument that the redistricting violates the Constitution?

The new map favors one party’s access to political office over another.
The use of voter affiliation data to entrench power violates equal protection principles.
The redistricting suppresses votes by altering the weight of individual ballots.
Gerrymandering creates districts that no longer reflect geographic continuity.

190. A homeowner hired a landscaper for $15,000 to build a garden and water feature. Midway through, the homeowner requested decorative lighting and stonework. The landscaper quoted $5,000 orally and performed the extras without written modification. The homeowner used the upgraded space for an event and refused to pay the $5,000, claiming lack of formal agreement.

The landscaper sued for the full $20,000, arguing that the homeowner observed the add-ons being installed and benefited from the enhancements. Photos showed the new features prominently used during gatherings and promotional videos.

What amount is the landscaper most likely entitled to recover?

$15,000.
$17,000.
$20,000.
$5,000.

191. A defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute counterfeit textbooks. Investigators discovered a spreadsheet saved to a cloud folder titled “Fulfillment Team.” One cell contained a note: “Shave off labels before packaging — avoid scanning issues.” The prosecution claimed the defendant authored the document and used it to direct fulfillment workers before shipment.

Defense counsel argued the spreadsheet was not authenticated and no witness could confirm the defendant created the comment. The government presented login logs, timestamps, and a shared folder linked to the defendant’s verified email credentials. The court considered whether the spreadsheet could be admitted.

Should the spreadsheet note be admitted?

No, because digital comments require eyewitness verification.
Yes, because document metadata and account linkage support authentication.
No, because shared folders cannot be attributed to one person.
Yes, because all fulfillment logs are admissible under Rule 803(6).

192. A plaintiff sued a government contractor in federal court, alleging toxic exposure during building repairs at a federal installation. The contractor answered and denied the allegations. During discovery, the plaintiff’s attorney served 35 interrogatories asking the contractor to explain its defenses, safety protocols, and involvement in specific hazardous tasks.

The contractor objected to the interrogatories and moved for a protective order, citing excessive number and asserting that the questions were argumentative and sought legal conclusions rather than facts. The plaintiff argued that the interrogatories were relevant and focused on what the contractor contended as its defense.

How should the court resolve the dispute?

Grant the protective order, because the interrogatories exceed the allowable number without leave of court.
Deny the protective order, because contention interrogatories are permitted and relevant to the defense.
Grant the protective order, because discovery cannot be used to explore legal theories or conclusions.
Deny the protective order, because interrogatories directed at defenses are permitted under Rule 26.

193. A catering firm agreed to supply buffet meals at a corporate retreat, including labeled vegetarian and gluten-free dishes. On the first day, trays were mislabeled and one gluten-free dish contained breadcrumbs, leading to complaints and a mild health issue. The client hired another service mid-retreat and refused further payment.

Which party’s position is better supported under contract principles?

The catering firm, because it provided food each day and made efforts to correct issues.
The client, because the mislabeling violated a key safety provision of the contract.
The catering firm, because termination was excessive given the limited mistake.
The client, because food errors automatically render the contract void.

194. A plaintiff sued an apartment management company for injuries suffered when a stairwell light failed during a nighttime emergency. She alleged that staff knew the lighting was defective for weeks. During discovery, she obtained a text message sent from a maintenance worker to the building supervisor two days before the incident. The message read, “Stair light still flickers out randomly — can't swap it until that panel gets replaced. Shouldn't be in service.”

At trial, the plaintiff sought to admit the message to show prior knowledge. The defense objected on hearsay grounds, arguing that the worker was not authorized to determine stair access and that text messages are informal and not part of safety logs. Plaintiff argued that the statement was made during employment, concerned a physical condition directly tied to the worker’s duties, and was retrieved from the building’s official mobile system.

Should the court admit the maintenance worker’s message?

No, because facility access decisions must come from supervisors, not rank-and-file staff.
No, because phone messages are not trustworthy unless transcribed in standard inspection forms.
Yes, because it was made during employment concerning a matter within the scope of duties and qualifies under Rule 801(d)(2)(D).
Yes, because all employee communications are admissible in negligence cases.

195. A plaintiff sued a regional medical center for injuries sustained after being trapped in a malfunctioning elevator. She alleged that staff had notice of the hazard and failed to remove the elevator from service. The incident occurred during peak visiting hours and resulted in physical and emotional harm. The plaintiff’s legal team focused on showing that prior warnings had been disregarded.

During trial, the plaintiff offered a voicemail recording left by a maintenance staff member for his supervisor six days before the incident. The message stated, “Elevator 3 misfires between floors again. Guests got spooked last night — this needs to be shut down until it’s checked properly.” The staff member was not called to testify, having left the hospital for another job after the incident. The voicemail was retrieved from the supervisor’s archived inbox and authenticated by the hospital’s IT department.

The hospital objected to the voicemail, arguing that it was hearsay, informal, and unverified by the speaker. The plaintiff countered that the statement was made during employment, about a facility issue directly within the staff member’s responsibilities. The court must decide whether the statement qualifies for admission under the party-opponent agent exclusion.

No, because the declarant is unavailable and cannot be cross-examined.
No, because informal workplace messages are inadmissible unless logged in a safety report.
Yes, because statements about guest safety are relevant and admissible in negligence cases.
Yes, because the voicemail was made during employment about a matter within the scope of duties, qualifying under Rule 801(d)(2)(D).

196. A homeowner brought a negligence suit against a roofing contractor in federal district court. The suit alleged defective installation of solar panels and sought $65,000 in damages. The homeowner is a citizen of State A; the contractor is incorporated in State B and has its principal place of business in State B. The complaint also included a state claim for trespass related to unauthorized entry onto the property.

The contractor moved to dismiss, claiming that federal jurisdiction was improper because the amount in controversy failed to meet the required threshold under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The homeowner argued that the court should still hear the trespass claim and that damages might increase based on future repair estimates. The district court must determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists and what approach to take.

What is the best outcome for the court?

The court should retain the case under supplemental jurisdiction based on the close relationship between negligence and trespass.
The court should dismiss the action, because neither claim meets the federal jurisdictional minimum on its own.
The court should retain jurisdiction, because diversity is complete and damages could increase during litigation.
The court should dismiss the action, because the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000 at the time of filing.

197. A recreational boating company offered day-long lake excursions on speedboats, with each group accompanied by a guide. The company’s marketing materials emphasized thrill-seeking and listed safety instructions, including the prohibition on “high-speed maneuvers near docks or other vessels.” During one outing, a guide encouraged passengers to experience a “power turn” near a small island. The maneuver caused a spray of water and a sudden jolt that threw one passenger across the boat, resulting in a fractured wrist.

The passenger sued the company for negligence. The company argued that participants assume inherent risks of boating and that all rides involve sudden movements. The guide claimed he had performed the same maneuver dozens of times without incident. Internal records showed that a similar injury had occurred two months earlier during a power turn, and that management had cautioned guides against performing them near land.

The jurisdiction imposes a duty of care on recreational operators and holds that participants assume only risks that are inherent and not exacerbated by preventable conduct.

Is the boating company likely liable?

No, because the passenger accepted risks associated with recreational boating.
No, because sudden maneuvers are integral to speedboat operation.
Yes, because the maneuver was discouraged by company safety policy and increased danger.
Yes, because guides are strictly liable for any injuries occurring during guided excursions.

198. A man entered a public library carrying a backpack and sat at a corner table. While browsing the internet, he discreetly took a library laptop and slipped it into his backpack. Security footage later showed him glancing around, concealing the device, and exiting the building without checking it out. Three hours later, he returned with the laptop and said he had “accidentally walked off with it,” claiming he was distracted by a phone call and thought it was his own device.

He was charged with larceny. His attorney argued that larceny requires intent to permanently deprive, and that his voluntary return indicated lack of criminal intent. The prosecution pointed to his surreptitious concealment and failure to notify staff immediately.

The jurisdiction follows the common-law definition of larceny and recognizes circumstantial evidence of intent, including concealment and inconsistent explanations.

Is the man likely guilty of larceny?

No, because he returned the laptop voluntarily and promptly.
No, since confusion about ownership negates specific intent.
Yes, because concealment and departure without permission support intent to deprive.
Yes, because any unauthorized removal of property constitutes larceny.

199. A tenant in a downtown apartment complex installed wireless motion-activated lights in the shared hallway outside her unit. Without consent, she also placed a small, hidden camera above her door to monitor comings and goings. The footage automatically uploaded to her cloud account and was reviewed weekly. Another resident discovered the setup and confronted the tenant after realizing footage of him entering and exiting his apartment was being retained and accessed. He felt invaded and alleged the camera captured intimate scenes through his doorway.

He sued the tenant for invasion of privacy. The tenant argued that all footage was taken in a public hallway, and that she had a right to monitor her doorstep for security. Building rules did not address personal recording devices, but prohibited unapproved modifications to common areas.

The jurisdiction recognizes intrusion upon seclusion as a viable tort when a person intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the private affairs of another in a way that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.

Is the tenant likely liable for invasion of privacy?

No, because hallway footage is not protected by privacy law.
No, because the plaintiff voluntarily entered the camera’s view.
Yes, because hidden surveillance in shared space intruded into private conduct.
Yes, because any filming without written consent constitutes a tort.

200. A consumer filed a federal class action against an online marketplace, alleging breach of contract and deceptive trade practices. The complaint sought damages exceeding $5 million and identified hundreds of potential class members. The defendant, incorporated in State C with headquarters in State D, argued that many class members reside outside the district and that local courts should not host such a nationwide dispute.

In response, the plaintiff showed that the company routinely advertised in the district and entered contracts with customers in the forum. Many named plaintiffs had experienced similar harm through transactions processed by the defendant’s platform. The court found personal jurisdiction satisfied for the named plaintiffs but questioned whether the forum could hear claims involving absent class members.

The defendant moved to dismiss all claims not involving district residents, citing fairness concerns and jurisdictional limits.

How should the court rule on the defendant’s motion?

Deny the motion, because personal jurisdiction over the defendant suffices for absent class members.
Grant the motion, because each absent class member must individually meet jurisdictional requirements.
Grant the motion, because fairness and burden factors weigh against nationwide claims in a local court.
Deny the motion, because federal subject-matter jurisdiction allows nationwide reach regardless of personal jurisdiction limits.

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MBE Simulated Practice Exam - Questions

Part A - Questions 1-100

Part B - Questions 101-200

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